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2Abstract
Presidents of the United States and other American policymakers have throughout
history cited democracy promotion as one of the chief goals of American foreign policy,
and the current administration of George W. Bush has been no exception. However, and
notwithstanding the habitual endorsement of this objective by US administrations, the
subject of democracy promotion has received relatively little academic attention. This
study aims to correct this gap in the literature by considering two questions relating to
United States democracy promotion. First, have the efforts of the US to spread
democracy to other countries met with success? Second, is promoting democracy truly a
priority of American policymakers, or is it rather window dressing cynically aimed at
winning public and congressional support for foreign policy? I begin by defining the
terms democracy and democracy promotion. I then use three recent case studies to
answer the two questions outlined above, the first of which focuses on President
Reagan’s policy towards Nicaragua. In the second case study I consider President
Clinton’s policy towards Haiti, while the third deals with President George W. Bush’s
policy towards Colombia. The evidence I present points to the conclusion that the United
States has not been successful in its efforts to promote democracy in other countries, and
that spreading democracy abroad is at best a secondary goal of American foreign policy.
The evidence presented in the thesis also demonstrates the utility of foreign policy
analysis-based approaches to the study of international relations.
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81. Introduction
The objective of spreading democracy abroad has been a prominent feature of the
foreign policy discourse of President George W. Bush, with the president famously
committing the United States to furthering freedom in foreign states in his 2005 state of
the union address. There was, however, nothing particularly original about President
Bush’s democracy agenda, beyond its emphasis on the Middle East, for he was simply
emulating the example of many of his White House predecessors. Bill Clinton, whom
Bush had castigated while a presidential candidate for spending too many of America’s
resources on nation-building, had made “democratic enlargement” the centrepiece of his
foreign policy. Bush’s father, George H.W. Bush, had also professed support for foreign
democracy, while Ronald Reagan once called for a global “crusade for freedom.” Perhaps
the most celebrated presidential advocate of foreign democracy was Woodrow Wilson, a
man who left the White House eighty years before George W. Bush took his first oath of
office. The pedigree extends far deeper into American history than Wilson, though. As
one scholar has put it,
The decision by the [George H. W.] Bush and Clinton
administrations to pursue the enlargement of the democratic
community can be viewed almost as an instinctive and
involuntary reversion to the very core values of
America…From the time of the founding, Americans have
viewed themselves and their government in a special light.
The Winthropian metaphor of America as a shining “City
upon a Hill” has held great meaning for countless Americans
throughout time.1
1 Rick Travis, “The Promotion of Democracy at the End of the Twentieth Century: A New Polestar for
American Foreign Policy?” in James M. Scott, ed., After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-
Cold War World (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 253.
9This study concentrates on the role of democracy promotion in US foreign policy
from Reagan onwards. I aim to answer two questions. First, has the United States
succeeded in its efforts to advance democracy abroad? The answer to this question ought
to have serious implications for future United States foreign policy. Huge sums of money
are spent by the US government on policy initiatives that are defended in terms of their
contribution to democracy in other nations, the most obvious recent example being the
invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. Yet if it can be shown that these ventures are
likely to end in failure it would behove US policymakers, as well as American citizens, to
ask whether promoting democracy is really worth the enormous financial burden. There
are other costs to take into account as well. One of the favoured means for furthering
foreign democracy is to send the American military into action, which of course carries
the risk that American soldiers will die. Should soldiers’ lives be wasted on futile quests
for foreign democracy?
The second question I ask concerns the significance of democracy promotion as a
foreign policy objective of the United States. Do American policymakers really mean
what they say when they proclaim their commitment to advancing democracy in foreign
countries, or can we dismiss these statements as rhetoric designed to drum up public and
congressional support for foreign policy? The importance of this question cannot be
overstated. The objective of spreading democracy abroad is routinely advanced by
American officials, yet if it can be shown that in reality they consider this goal to be of
little import then our understanding of United States foreign policy will undergo a
significant change. Moreover, there is some justification for being sceptical of the pro-
democracy pretensions of American officials, for there have been occasions when the
state of democracy in other nations appeared to be of little concern to American leaders.
An in-depth appraisal of the role of democracy promotion in United States foreign
relations is therefore very much in order. It is also germane when we consider the
emphasis placed on this objective during President George W. Bush’s tenure. Another
reason for undertaking a thorough analysis of United States democracy promotion is to
add knowledge to an area of study that has received relatively little academic attention.
As Thomas Carothers, a well-known and respected writer on the subject has commented,
“overall, democracy promotion remains remarkably understudied” and “is only weakly
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present in scholarly research circles.”2 This relative dearth is peculiar given the repeated
pronouncements of support for foreign democracy on the part of American officials, and
should be corrected.
This is largely an empirical study, although I do highlight theories that are
relevant to my work. As I make clear in chapter two, the thesis is grounded in the sub-
field of international relations known as foreign policy analysis (FPA). I proceed from the
assumption that individuals and institutions matter when it comes to foreign policy.
Variations between presidencies are to be expected. I also consider some of the
theoretical work on democratization. I discuss the democratic peace thesis, which has
influenced many US policymakers in recent times, and which has been invoked as the
justification for democracy promotion. Nonetheless, theoretical questions are largely
outside the remit of this study. Nor do I address the question of why the United States
promotes democracy. My intention is to take a step back and ask whether America
promotes democracy. There is a tendency among democracy promotion scholars to
assume that democracy promotion is a genuine policy goal; I want to explore whether this
is truly so. I therefore give little attention to the issue of why American officials regularly
claim that advancing democracy is a primary foreign policy objective of the US, although,
as noted above, I do touch on the democratic peace thesis. Why the US promotes
democracy, if indeed it does so, is a question for future research.
I have chosen to employ a qualitative methodology for this study. There are three
case studies, each of which deals with a major democracy promotion effort carried out by
a modern presidential administration. In the first case study I consider President Reagan’s
policy towards Nicaragua, the second concerns President Clinton’s policy in Haiti, while
the third involves an examination of President George W. Bush’s policy towards
Colombia. I have used these recent presidencies to ensure that my findings are pertinent
to current US foreign policy. The administration of George H.W. Bush was overlooked as
a result of his comparatively short tenure. In terms of the case studies, various factors
informed my choices. I wanted to use examples where policy was described in
unmistakably pro-democracy terms, and which received a great deal of attention from
2 Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2004), pp. 2-3.
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policymakers over a long period of time. I also wanted to look at countries in the Western
Hemisphere, as the states in that region are closest to the United States and most
susceptible to its influence. If the US has had little success promoting democracy in the
Americas or has shown scant concern for democracy there then it is reasonable to
extrapolate these conclusions to other regions.
I use two separate metrics to determine whether or not the US has been successful
in promoting democracy and the extent to which this is a goal of US foreign policy. The
first of these may be referred to as the democracy metric. This comprises three broad
criteria by which we can measure the level of democracy in the state in question. These
criteria are first, the extent to which elections are genuinely free and fair; second, the
degree to which citizens can put certain vital human rights into practice; third, the
legitimacy of a state’s political institutions. The second metric is used to measure the
commitment of the US to promoting democracy. I list five actions that the US can take
that would demonstrate its dedication to furthering democracy. These are the promotion
of genuinely free and fair elections; opposition to any actions that jeopardise the
legitimacy of a state’s political institutions; the promotion of human rights; attaching
democracy-related conditions to any aid provided to another state; and attempting to
effect the replacement of a dictatorial regime with an elected one, whether by imposing
sanctions, using force, or employing diplomacy. This last test of America’s dedication to
furthering democracy applies only to situations where a dictatorial regime is in place. The
two metrics are outlined in more detail in chapter two. It is the use of these two metrics to
answer the questions posed above that makes this thesis truly original.
I declined to use a quantitative methodology for one very good reason: the data
would simply be unreliable. I say this because my thesis focuses on democracy, a
notoriously slippery concept. It is not always obvious if a state is democratic or not. As I
will make clear in chapter two I do not believe that the ritual of regular elections is
enough for us to deem a state democratic. We must look further, taking into account the
human rights situation and the legitimacy of a country’s political institutions. By
restricting my analysis to three cases I can provide a very thorough evaluation of the state
of democracy in each of the nations in question, which will allow me to draw firm
conclusions about whether or not the United States was successful in its efforts to
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promote democracy there. It would have been more difficult to reach robust conclusions
had I chosen a quantitative methodology, as the larger data set would have precluded a
detailed consideration of each state’s democratic credentials.
What will become clear from the case studies is that, notwithstanding the
pretensions of American policymakers, the record of the United States when it comes to
promoting democracy abroad is not stellar. There must be serious doubts about the
Reagan administration’s commitment to furthering democracy in Nicaragua, for its
chosen method for doing so was to finance a group of anti-government rebels that
engaged in acts of terrorism against Nicaraguan civilians. By the time Reagan departed
the White House thousands of Nicaraguans had been killed as a result of the US-
sponsored war, while the country’s economy and infrastructure had been devastated. The
Reagan administration also strove to discredit elections held in Nicaragua in 1984. There
was a good deal more truth to the Clinton administration’s claim to want to further
democracy in Haiti, with President Clinton going so far as to dispatch US forces to
remove that country’s military leader and reinstate the elected president. However,
Clinton’s dealings with Haiti were heavily influenced by domestic politics, especially his
relationship with Congress, and this, rather than promoting democracy, was the main
factor governing policy. Democracy promotion in Haiti ultimately proved a failure, with
human rights abuses, shambolic elections and political turmoil the order of the day as
Clinton’s presidency wound down. Clinton’s successor as president, George W. Bush,
invoked the goal of defending democracy in Colombia from the beginning, but his
administration’s policy has been inconsistent. Although the Bush administration has
supported free and fair elections in Colombia, and funded programmes aimed at
strengthening political parties, NGOs, and furthering human rights, it has carried out
other policies that call into question its dedication to Colombian democracy. For instance,
the US has sought to downplay a scandal linking members of Colombia’s Congress with
the far-right paramilitary organisation known as the AUC, despite the implications these
revelations have for the legitimacy of Colombia’s political institutions.
The thesis is divided into five sections. In the first of these I define democracy,
outline various ways that democracy may be promoted, and review the literature on
United States democracy promotion. I then move on to the case studies, the first of which
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deals with the policy of the Reagan administration in Nicaragua. This is followed by an
analysis of the Clinton administration’s policy towards Haiti, with the final case study
concerning George W. Bush’s policy in Colombia. In the final, concluding, chapter I
review the findings of the case studies and offer answers to the two questions outlined in
this introduction. I also consider the implications of the study for international relations
theory. I conclude by offering a number of recommendations for future US foreign policy
and suggest some possible avenues for future research.
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2. Defining Democracy and Democracy Promotion
In order to answer the two questions addressed in this study it is necessary first to
provide definitions of democracy and democracy promotion. The meaning of the word
democracy is a source of considerable disagreement. It is therefore imperative to
elucidate precisely what the word signifies, otherwise no conclusions can be reached
about the success or failure of attempts by the United States to promote democracy, or the
relative importance of this goal in overall US foreign policy. The second part of the
chapter concerns the issue of democracy promotion. I will begin this section by
discussing the various means for promoting democracy that have been outlined by
scholars. I will then provide an overview of the literature on United States democracy
promotion, a body of work that can be grouped into mainstream and critical categories. I
will conclude the chapter with a critique of the assumptions and arguments characteristic
of these two schools of thought. The chapter begins, however, with a brief overview of
the sub-field of international relations called foreign policy analysis.
Foreign Policy Analysis
This thesis is located within the branch of international relations theory known as
foreign policy analysis. I proceed from the assumption that to understand foreign policy
we must look further than systemic theories of international relations and take into
account domestic factors, such as the preferences and personalities of leaders, institutions,
and bureaucratic politics. This focus on how internal factors shape policy is a defining
characteristic of the literature on foreign policy analysis. As Jean Garrison has put it,
“Decision-making scholars…specifically argue that there is a need to look inside the state
to understand the complex motivations that make up a state’s foreign policy.”3 Or, to
quote Valerie Hudson, FPA presupposes that “human decision makers acting singly and
in groups are the ground of all that happens in international relations and that such
decision makers are not best approximated as unitary rational actors equivalent to the
3 Jean Garrison, “Constructing the “National Interest” in U.S.-China Policy Making: How Foreign Policy
Decision Groups Define and Signal Policy Choices,” Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 3, no. 2 (2007), p. 105.
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state,” placing this approach at odds with rationalist theories of IR such as structural
realism.4
By applying FPA to the study of foreign policy we can assess the extent to which
individuals and institutions have an impact on the decision-making process and the
direction of policy. Some scholars have focused on the role played by high-level
decision-makers in making foreign policy. Stephen Benedict Dyson, for example, has
studied how the personality of Prime Minister Tony Blair affected the British decision to
join the United States in its war against Iraq in 2003. According to Dyson, “Tony Blair’s
personality is a crucial factor in understanding why the British went to war.” He
comments further that the example of Blair and Iraq “reemphasizes the importance of
actor-specific factors in theories of foreign policy. Put simply, the proposition that “who
leads matters” does seem to be supported in this instance.”5 Other scholars have explored
the way partisanship affects foreign policy decisions. In their analysis of European
attitudes towards the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003, Jurgen Schuster and Herbert
Maier find that in Western Europe “the party affiliation of a government seems to be a
good indicator of how a country behaved during the Iraq crisis,” with eight out of ten
governments acting in line with their ideological standpoints, although they concede that
partisanship can’t explain the attitudes of countries in Eastern Europe.6 Their findings
lead them to assert that “political parties should receive greater attention in the analysis of
foreign policy” and that “to ignore the ideological orientations of parties and
governments today means to ignore an important determinant of foreign policy.”7
In short, then, a full understanding of foreign policy requires that we give due
consideration to the role of individuals and institutions like political parties, not just the
structural factors that are emphasised by rationalist theories of international relations. In
the case studies that form the bulk of this thesis I start from this insight and I therefore
4 Valerie M. Hudson, “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International
Relations,” Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 1, no. 1 (2005), p. 2.
5 Stephen Benedict Dyson, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair’s Iraq Decisions,” Foreign Policy
Analysis, vol. 2, no. 3, (2006), pp. 303-4.
6 Jurgen Schuster and Herbert Maier, “The Rift: Explaining Europe’s Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up
of the American-Led War on Iraq,” Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 2, no. 3 (2006), p. 233. Schuster and
Maier posit that left-of-centre parties should be expected to oppose America’s policy towards Iraq, while
right-wing parties should support the US. Ibid, pp. 229-30.
7 Ibid, pp. 236, 238.
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look at the policy makers involved and the influence of institutions, especially the United
States Congress, on American foreign policy. However, I would like to make clear at this
point that although this study is grounded in the field of foreign policy analysis my main
purpose is not to prove the validity of such an approach, or to open up new areas of FPA-
related research, but to answer the questions of whether or not the United States
genuinely seeks to promote democracy and if it has had any success in this respect. These
are empirical questions, and I do not intend to draw on theory to answer them. Having
said this, I will return to the theme in the conclusion, where I will discuss the implications
of my work for research on FPA.
The Meaning of Democracy
What William Robinson has called “the classic definition of democracy”8 – the
rule of the people – lost out in academic circles following the end of the Second World
War to an institutional, or procedural, interpretation of the word. In 1942 Joseph
Schumpeter recast democracy as a form of rule in which the role of the people was
reduced to voting for political leaders in regular elections.9 As Schumpeter expressed it,
“Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the
men who are to rule them.”10 Democracy no longer meant the rule of the people, but the
rule of elites, with the political activity of the citizenry restricted to the act of choosing
their leaders every few years. According to Samuel Huntington, the debate between those
who insisted on the classical definition of democracy and those who favoured
Schumpeter’s interpretation continued until the 1970s, by which time “the debate was
over, and Schumpeter had won.”11
The procedural definition of democracy is set out by Huntington himself.
Following Schumpeter, he writes that “The central procedure of democracy is the
selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern.” A state
8 William Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 50.
9 Ibid, p. 51; David Beetham, Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 2.
10 Quoted in Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 49.
11 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman and
London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 6.
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may be viewed “as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision
makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.” This
“popular election of the top decision makers is the essence of democracy.” While
Huntington’s emphasis is squarely on the act of voting for political leaders, he does
acknowledge that his variety of democracy “implies the existence of those civil and
political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political
debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns.”12
One of the foremost modern thinkers on democracy is Robert Dahl, who, like
Huntington, advances a procedural definition of the term. Dahl contends that it is
necessary to distinguish between democracy as “an ideal and an actuality.”13 He argues,
with reason, that in large political systems such as the modern nation-state the “ideal”
type of democracy is simply impracticable, as the citizen body is far too numerous to
make political decisions directly. As the ideal is impossible to achieve, it is therefore
necessary to find an alternative that can be actualised. This alternative is representative
democracy, or what Dahl calls polyarchy. Dahl claims that in a polyarchal system of
governance citizens are able to exercise control of politics through the institution of
elections, which allows them “to elect their top officials and hold them more or less
accountable…by dismissing them, so to speak, in subsequent elections.” 14 Like
Huntington, Dahl underlines that, in addition to the right to choose their leaders in
periodic elections, citizens must also have other political rights if democracy is to exist,
notably the freedoms of expression and assembly, and access to sources of information
not provided by the state. 15 Although Dahl recognises that polyarchy is “highly
imperfect”, he also asserts that it is the “only feasible solution” to the problem of
ensuring a democratic political process in a large state.16
The likes of Dahl and Huntington are right to underscore the importance of
elections, for by definition there can be no democracy if citizens do not have the
opportunity to decide who is to govern them. Elections are consequently a vital element
12 Ibid, pp. 6-7, 9.
13 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 26.
14 Ibid, p. 93.
15 Ibid, pp. 85-86.
16 Ibid, p. 93.
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of any truly democratic political system. Nonetheless, procedural definitions of
democracy do suffer from limitations. Most obviously, defining democracy in such a way
associates the existence of a set of institutions, like free and fair elections, with the
existence of democracy. But democracy is not a set of institutions. Institutions exist to
realise the rule of the people, and it may well be that these institutions are incapable of
ensuring popular control of the government. As David Beetham has commented, equating
democracy with institutions “is to elevate a means into an end, to confuse an instrument
with its purpose.” The “end” is democratic rule – popular control of the government –
while the “means” to achieve this is a set of institutions such as those outlined by Dahl
and Huntington. The point is that the institutions of democracy may be little more than “a
façade” concealing undemocratic practices.17 In short, institutions like elections are only
democratic to the extent that they actualise the rule of the people. They should not be
confused with democracy itself.
This over-emphasis on institutions on the part of many modern theorists of
democracy can lead to contradictory statements. For example, Huntington notes that
elected governments “may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated
by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good.”
Yet Huntington claims that these failings do not make such governments “undemocratic,”
only “undesirable.”18 And yet, a government that is dominated by special interests is self-
evidently undemocratic, as a small group exerts undue influence over government policy.
Such a state of affairs has more in common with oligarchy – the rule of the few - than
democracy. As regards corruption, a government that accepts bribes for political favours
is acting in its own interest, rather than the people’s. In such situations, democracy is not
functioning: money, rather than the will of the people, is the determining factor in
political decisions. The types of government mentioned by Huntington are therefore both
“undesirable” and “undemocratic,” but he is unable to draw conclusion as he associates
the holding of elections with the existence of democracy, which leaves no room for a
consideration of whether the government in fact rules democratically.
17 Beetham, Democracy and Human Rights, p. 3.
18 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 10.
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If procedural definitions of democracy are inadequate, how then should we define
the term? A more satisfying definition of a democratic political system is offered by the
political scientist Anna Dickson, according to whom democracy “includes not only
regular elections but also redistributive social and economic reforms, broadened political
participation, social justice and respect for human rights.”19 A similar definition is offered
by William Robinson, who outlines the concept of “popular democracy.” According to
Robinson, popular democracy encompasses “a dispersal throughout society of political
power through the participation of broad majorities in decision-making.” Democracy
“begins with respect for human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law, and elections, and
includes the outlawing of racial, ethnic, gender, and other forms of discrimination.”
These, however, are merely “pre-conditions” for democratization, which takes place to
the extent that there is “direct participation of majorities in their own vital affairs.” As for
elections, in popular democracy they are “meaningful components of popular
democratization to the extent that [they]…allow for accountability and control by the
population over those elected.” Ultimately, Robinson writes, “a society is democratic to
the extent that popular majorities are able to impose their sovereignty.”20
Respect for human rights is essential if a system of government is to be
considered democratic. This is recognised, albeit partially, even by theorists who
propound procedural definitions of democracy. Robert Dahl for one has remarked that
“Democracy is not only a system of governing,” it “is inherently also a system of rights.”
If citizens are to participate effectively in political life, they must “necessarily possess a
right to participate and a right to express their views” (italics in original). Furthermore,
Dahl states that written or legal guarantees of these rights are inadequate, asserting that
they “must be effectively enforced and effectively available to citizens in practice,”
otherwise “the trappings of “democracy” are merely a façade for nondemocratic rule.”21
According to Dahl, political rights are core elements of a democratic political system.
Freedom of speech, for example, is vital if citizens are to play any role in political life for,
as Dahl asks, “How can citizens make their views known and persuade their fellow
19 Anna K. Dickson, Development and International Relations: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity,
1997), p. 137.
20 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, pp. 57-59.
21 Dahl, On Democracy, pp. 48-49.
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citizens and representatives to adopt them unless they can express themselves freely
about all matters bearing on the conduct of the government?”22
Dahl is of course correct to argue that certain political rights are essential if
citizens are to exert control over the government. If citizens lacked the right to discuss
political matters, they would self-evidently be unable to play a role in political life and
would have no influence on the government. If they only had access to one news source,
their capacity for formulating independent ideas would be severely curtailed. If they were
deprived of the right to form political groups, the state would face nothing more than a
multitude of powerless individuals. To quote David Beetham, “human rights constitute an
intrinsic part of democracy, because the guarantee of basic freedoms is a necessary
condition for people’s voice to be effective in public affairs, and for popular control over
government to be secured.”23 However, Beetham goes further than those who merely
focus on political rights. While he agrees that political rights are imperative for the
effective functioning of democracy, he also asserts that social and economic rights must
be respected and advanced if a political system is to be considered genuinely democratic.
Political rights are, in this view, but one part of the body of human rights.
Beetham’s point is that while citizens may be endowed with formal political
rights, this does not imply that they will benefit from them in practice. One barrier to the
enjoyment of one’s political rights is poverty: citizens who are barely subsisting are
unlikely to make use of their political rights, as they have more pressing concerns, like
survival; even if they wished to play a significant political role, their ability to do so is
constrained by their lack of resources. As Beetham remarks, “the poor [may be] so
deprived that they are incapable of exercising any basic civil or political rights, and are
effectively excluded from any common citizenship.”24 At an even more basic level, the
right to life of citizens may be tenuous: their physical security may be jeopardised by
violence or they may lack the most basic economic necessities, like food, clothing, clean
water and shelter. If a person’s very survival is in doubt, it is doubtful that he or she will
participate politically. So a state whose constitution upholds the rights to vote and to
freedom of speech but that cannot protect its citizens cannot be considered truly
22 Ibid, p. 96.
23 Beetham, Democracy and Human Rights, p. 93.
24 Ibid, p.97.
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democratic. In the words of one scholar, “all other rights are meaningless” if these
“fundamental human rights,” those which are “basic to the preservation of life itself,” are
not protected.25 Beetham considers education to be another essential human right: it is
“necessary if we are to be able to exercise our civil and political rights effectively, or
even to know what these are.” The denial of a right to education “is especially damaging
to the democratic principle of civil and political equality.”26 Citizens who are uneducated
will probably have no understanding of public affairs, and given their presumably
precarious economic situation, will have no time to engage in political matters; some may
be illiterate, hence effectively disenfranchised. In sum, then, if these social and economic
rights are absent then the quality of a state’s democracy is severely impaired.
To sum up, human rights need to be protected and advanced if a state is to be
considered democratic. Political rights are essential if citizens are to play a significant
role in political life and exercise control over the government. These political rights,
however, imply the presence of civil and socio-economic rights such as the right to life,
the right to education and the right to an adequate standard of living, if they are to be
anything more than noble principles. Poorer members of society who are barely
subsisting or whose physical security is threatened cannot be expected to involve
themselves in political affairs. The socio-economic inequalities in modern states need to
be mitigated if poorer sectors are to play any role in politics, which requires the state to
do its utmost to promote the aforementioned economic and social rights.
It remains for me to clarify exactly how I define the term democracy. The key is
to combine the two approaches, procedural and substantive. Proponents of the procedural
definition rightly highlight the pivotal role of elections in a democracy, while substantive
theories of democracy emphasise human rights. Much of the literature on democracy
suffers from a failure to integrate the two approaches, and it is vital that we bridge this
gap. In my view, democracy comprises three elements, and we can measure the extent of
a state’s democracy by applying these criteria, the first of which is the holding of
genuinely free, fair and regular elections.
25 Michael Linfield, “Human Rights,” in Thomas W. Walker, ed., Revolution and Counterrevolution in
Nicaragua (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 275.
26 Beetham, Democracy and Human Rights, p.97.
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Six conditions must be met for an election to be deemed truly free and fair. First,
the election must be contested by at least two political parties, which are independent of
one another and which offer at least some distinct policies. This guarantees that voters are
offered a meaningful choice when casting their ballots. Second, it must be free of fraud,
which means that there can be no tampering with ballot papers, no padding of electoral
rolls, no stuffing of ballot boxes and no falsification of results. Third, independent
international or domestic election monitors must be present to witness the election, in
order to deter cheating and ensure that any violations of electoral rules do not go
unreported. Fourth, the overwhelming majority of adults must have the right to vote.
Certain members of society, such as non-citizens, may justifiably be refused this right.
Fifth, voters and candidates alike must be able to participate in the electoral process in an
atmosphere that is free of intimidation, and without fear of retribution. Sixth, voters must
be given the chance to make an informed judgement when voting. This means that all
political parties and candidates competing in an election must have the opportunity to
disseminate their message. It follows that there must be media outlets that are not
controlled by the government.
The second core element of democracy is the protection of certain essential
human rights. Two criteria must be met in this context. First, the state must ensure that
citizens are able to enjoy a number of constitutionally guaranteed civil and political rights,
as set out in the 1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These include the
following rights: to life; to freedom of expression, including the “freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds”; to freedom of assembly; to
freedom of association; to vote in elections.27 Second, citizens must possess a number of
economic and social rights, as set out in the 1966 UN Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: specifically, the right to an education; and “the right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living,” which includes “adequate food…and housing.”28
It could be argued that these criteria are simply unrealistic, for no state can ever
fully guarantee the right to life of its citizens, nor can we expect that developing, or
27 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,” Articles 6, 19, 21, 22, 25, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm>
28 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights,” Articles 11 and 13, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm>
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relatively poor states, will be able to ensure that everyone has adequate shelter and food. I
would emphasise here that I am using an ideal standard against which to measure the
level of democracy in a given state. I do not expect that states will be able to ensure that
all citizens have the right to life, or that all will have access to adequate housing and
nourishment. Nonetheless, we can draw conclusions about the extent to which these
rights are protected, which has implications for democracy, for as I noted above, citizens
who are barely subsisting or whose physical security is seriously imperilled are not likely
to participate in political life.
The third component of democracy is legitimate political institutions. Legitimacy
implies that the executive and legislature be empowered by the people, which means in
practice that both must be elected, either directly or indirectly, by the voting public.
While the legislature must be directly elected by voters, the executive may be chosen
indirectly by the legislature. Legitimacy also implies that members of the legislature and
the executive represent the interests of those who empowered them, namely the electorate.
Therefore, special interests cannot be granted undue influence, nor can members of the
legislature and/or executive accept money for political favours. If this occurs, they can no
longer be said to represent the electorate, rendering the executive and/or legislature
illegitimate.
In the chapters that follow this comprehensive definition of democracy will serve
as a metric that will be used to judge whether the United States successfully promoted
democracy in the cases in question. However, I would like to make clear at this point that
not all of the criteria listed above need to be met for us to conclude that democracy was
indeed successfully promoted. I have set out an ideal of representative democracy and
there is probably no state in the world that could be said to meet all of my standards.
Nevertheless, by applying this metric we can draw conclusions about the degree to which
a state is democratic, enabling us to make judgments about the success or failure of
United States democracy promotion.
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Ways to Promote Democracy
Perhaps the most well-known way of promoting democracy is the so-called
democracy assistance programme, which can take various forms: training and funding
political parties, trade unions, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); developing
independent media; and helping states to hold free and fair elections. Free and fair
elections are viewed as a particularly crucial marker on any state’s path to democracy,
especially by academics and officials in the United States. Indeed, as Jeffrey Kopstein
has emphasised, United States government officials view the holding of an election as
“the apotheosis of democracy.”29 The salience given to elections leads advocates of
democracy promotion to highlight the importance of having monitors observe electoral
processes. Francis Fukuyama has underscored the pivotal role played by election
monitors in helping to facilitate the democratic transitions in Yugoslavia, Georgia and
Ukraine between 2000 and 2005. “Without a sophisticated network of international
elections monitors who could be mobilized quickly,” he writes, “it would have been
impossible to demonstrate the falsification of election results.”30
Democracy promoters can also help to ensure the fairness of elections by
supporting domestic election monitoring organisations (DMOs). An example of a DMO
that has made an important contribution to democracy is Peru’s Transparencia, which has
received funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
and the EU, among other donors. Transparencia proved “a major force in Peru’s
controversial 2000 elections,” with its election monitors reporting that “pre-electoral
media coverage was highly skewed in favour of the incumbent, Alberto Fujimori.”
Transparencia “documented widespread anomalies in the first-round vote count,” and
ultimately condemned the contest as “critically flawed,” a judgement shared by
international observers. Although Fujimori initially claimed he had won, he soon fled the
country.31 However, at times DMOs can have a less positive impact. For example, in
1990 the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which receives an annual
29 Jeffrey Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 29,
no. 2 (Spring 2006), p. 89.
30 Francis Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads (London: Profile, 2007), pp. 136-7.
31 Sharon F. Lean, “Democracy Assistance to Domestic Election Monitoring Organizations,”
Democratization, vol. 14, no. 2 (2007), p. 300.
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appropriation from the US Congress, financed a Nicaraguan DMO called Via Cívica that
served as a vehicle for the US-backed opposition coalition aiming to unseat the ruling
Sandinistas. “All the members of the board of directors of the organization were
representatives of political parties or business groups with direct ties to the opposition
UNO coalition,” with the result that Via Cívica “was widely perceived to by the
Nicaraguan public as partisan (anti-Sandinista)” and just exacerbated the country’s
already serious political divisions.32 In sum, then, we can say that external aid to DMOs
can have a salutary effect on democracy, but if these groups are not independent they
may do more harm than good.
Another type of democracy assistance is training and funding political parties,
which can also contribute to a state’s democratization. “International assistance has
generally had a positive, and often significant, effect on electoral processes in recipient
countries,” writes Krishna Kumar. “It has enabled many nascent political parties to better
participate in elections by teaching them skills and techniques that they could put to use
immediately.”33 Nonetheless, there is some controversy about the propriety of foreign
funding and training of political parties, NGOs, and other civil society groups. Kumar
observes that foreign donors at times exhibit partisanship when deciding which political
parties to support, which “blurs the distinction between assistance and political
manipulation.” Examples include the defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 Nicaraguan
elections, an outcome that was heavily influenced by US support for the opposition
coalition.34 A related point is that political parties that accept money and training from
abroad may lack independence, and may not be responsive to or representative of people
in their own country. Democracy entails popular rule, and this could be undermined if
political parties are taking money from foreign donors. The same concerns apply to
foreign support for NGOs. As Marina Ottaway and Theresa Chung point out, foreign
funding of NGOs enables them “to arise whether or not they have support in their
countries.” A feature of NGOs that are reliant on foreign money is that “it is not the
membership that determines the organisation’s policies, but the leaders, together with the
32 Ibid, p. 302.
33 Krishna Kumar, “Reflections on International Political Party Assistance,” Democratization, vol. 12, no. 4
(2005), p. 508.
34 Ibid, p. 520. Kumar wrongly gives 1989 as the date of the elections lost by the Sandinistas.
26
funders and the NGOs from donor countries that won the contract to “strengthen civil
society” in a particular country.”35 It is clearly not good for democracy if NGOs are more
responsive to the demands of foreign donors than those of the country’s citizens.
Attaching democracy-related conditions to the support, financial or otherwise,
given to a foreign state has come to be seen by scholars as one of the most effective ways
to advance democracy in other states. An example of conditionality is the US, or any
other state, insisting that recipients of foreign aid must hold free and fair elections or
eliminate corruption as a condition of continued, or future, financial support. The utility
of this instrument has been underlined by Larry Diamond, who, in a recent article on the
“rollback” of democracy in numerous countries, asserts that by “making foreign aid
contingent on good governance, donors can help reverse the democratic recession.”36
Diamond contends that many democracies are suffering from the “predatory” rule of
elites who seek to monopolize power and use the state as a means of making money,
necessitating the creation of strong institutions to curb their corrupt practices. He
condemns international donors for providing developing states with “indiscriminate aid
that only serves to entrench corrupt elites and practices,” and argues that the “key” to
effecting change in these failing democracies is conditionality. “The leverage needed to
bring about radical change will never exist unless the politicians and officials who sit
atop the structures of predation come to realize that they have no choice but to reform,”
writes Diamond.37 Evidence that conditionality can have an impact on democratization
comes from the EU, which makes democratization a condition of membership. As Peter
Schraeder notes, this “political conditionality has greatly influenced the further
democratization of late southern European joiners to the EU club, as well as providing a
powerful incentive for many aspiring states in central and eastern Europe to refashion
their political systems in a more democratic direction.” 38 The importance of
conditionality has also been emphasised by Ecaterina McDonagh in her analysis of the
democracy promotion efforts of the EU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe in post-
35 Marina Ottaway and Theresa Chung, “Toward a New Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 10, no. 4
(1999), p. 107.
36 Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 87, no. 2 (March/April 2008), p. 37.
37 Ibid, pp. 47-8.
38 Peter J. Schraeder, “The State of the Art in International Democracy Promotion: Results of a Joint
European-North American Research Network,” Democratization, vol. 10, no. 2 (2003), p. 39.
27
independence Moldova. She concluded that these “European institutions were very much
part of the political change process” in a country that has experienced a rocky transition
to democracy, and that “their involvement became more effective when conditionality
and new incentives were applied.”39
The use of violence to force from power an autocratic ruler or regime is often
proffered as another way to promote democracy abroad. Presidents of the United States
have often claimed to be promoting democracy through military action. As James
Meernik has noted, “All through history, when United States presidents have sought to
explain or defend US military interventions in foreign lands, few goals…have been
advanced with such regularity and frequency as the promotion of democracy.”40 President
Clinton, who declared “democratic enlargement” to be the defining feature of his foreign
policy, was following “a century-long American tradition,” remarks Mark Peceny. In the
Cold War alone, Peceny notes, “the United States promoted democracy during military
interventions in Greece, South Korea, South Vietnam, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, and a variety of other nations.”41 While there are grounds for disputing
Peceny’s characterisation of these actions as democracy promotion efforts, there is no
doubt that the United States often falls back on pro-democracy rhetoric when justifying
the resort to force.
There are theoretical grounds for arguing that military action can indeed have a
very beneficial impact on democracy in a foreign state. If the use of force brings about
the fall of a dictator and his replacement by an elected government then self-evidently
democracy has been promoted, at least to some extent. Things are not quite so clear cut,
though. By utilising violence to get rid of an authoritarian ruler, a state such as the US
may cause the deaths of many civilians, which has serious negative implications for
democracy. It could be argued that it is oxymoronic to assert that a state is promoting
democracy while at the same time killing civilians. Democracy is after all the rule of the
39 Ecaterina McDonagh, “Is Democracy Promotion Effective in Moldova? The Impact of European
Institutions on Development of Civil and Political Rights in Moldova,” Democratization, vol. 15, no. 1
(2008), p. 156.
40 James Meernik, “United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy,” Journal of
Peace Research, vol. 33, no. 4 (1996), p. 391.
41 Mark Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University
Press, 1999), p. 2.
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people, so how is it furthered by killing those who are supposed to rule? There is thus a
very fine line between a military action that promotes democracy and one that harms it.
According to David Hendrickson, “The promotion of democracy and human
rights through economic sanctions has become one of the most important components of
contemporary American foreign policy.” Sanctions are seen as a way of economically
isolating an undemocratic government in order “to punish the enemy so badly that it has
no choice…but to submit” to the demands of those imposing the sanctions. The sanctions
option was employed by the United States against the military regime that ruled Haiti
from 1991 to 1994, throughout the 1990s in an effort to unseat Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein, and during the wars in Yugoslavia in the early part of that decade. Yet as
Hendrickson himself concedes, they are a blunt tool, for it is “highly doubtful” that their
imposition will effect the collapse of the “enemy government.” Moreover, the use of
sanctions “inflicts punishment on the entire economy and society,” rather than just the
authoritarian regime, so that ultimately it becomes “difficult not to move to military
intervention.” Hendrickson concludes that imposing “draconian economic sanctions are
[a] particularly suspect” method of advancing democracy: “They can only have an effect
by wreaking serious damage on a broad range of civil activities, yet they are normally
incapable of inflicting sufficient deprivation on the holders of power to make them
surrender.”42
David Adesnik and Michael McFaul have argued that states can also promote
democracy by “using close ties with a [dictatorial] regime to exert effective pressure for
political liberalization.”43 They point to various policies pursued during the presidency of
Ronald Reagan as examples of this particular branch of democracy promotion. In the
Philippines and South Korea, for instance, the Reagan administration began “pushing for
democratic change when oppositions arose within the autocratic countries,” 44
notwithstanding the fact that these regimes had long been reliable friends of Washington.
McFaul and Adesnik discern lessons for present US policymakers here, asserting that
“The experience of democratization in anti-Communist autocracies during the Cold War
42 David C. Hendrickson, “The democratist crusade: intervention, economic sanctions, and engagement,”
World Policy Journal, vol. 11, no. 4 (Winter 1994) (electronic version).
43 David Adesnik and Michael McFaul, “Engaging Autocratic Allies to Promote Democracy,” Washington
Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006), p. 8.
44 Ibid, p. 11.
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suggests that U.S. officials can and should engage…autocratic allies [in the Middle East]
while pushing for evolutionary change as a pre-emptive strategy to avoid revolutionary
change.”45 Francis Fukuyama also invokes the case of the Reagan administration as
evidence that the US, by exerting diplomatic pressure, can have a major impact on
democratization processes. He notes that the Reagan administration withdrew its support
of Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet in the late 1980s and “played a critical role in
easing Ferdinand Marcos out of office” in the Philippines, while in South Korea in 1987
the US “used its influence to prevent the South Korean military from cracking down on
student and trade union protesters, and facilitated that country’s move to free legislative
elections.” 46
Many scholars have argued that promoting free market economics is a crucial,
and very effective, element of democracy promotion. To quote Michael Mandelbaum,
“the best way to foster democracy is to encourage the spread of free markets.” He argues
that a free market economy engenders democracy because it generates wealth, and
“wealth implants democracy by, among other things, subsidizing the kind of political
participation that genuine democracy requires.”47 It is in fact widely accepted by scholars
of democratization that a strong correlation exists between wealth and democracy. As
Henry Rowan has commented, since the 1960s “it has been well known that the higher a
nation’s income, the more likely its politics are to be democratic.”48 In an exhaustive
statistical analysis of the relationship between political regimes and economic
development from 1950 to 1990 Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio
Cheibub and Fernando Limongi conclude that “there is no doubt that democracies are
more likely to be found in the more highly developed countries.”49 They argue that the
richer a democracy is the more likely it will endure. Indeed, they go so far as to say that
45 Ibid, pp. 24-5.
46 Fukuyama, After the Neocons, p. 135.
47 Michael Mandelbaum, “Democracy Without America – The Spontaneous Spread of Freedom,” Foreign
Affairs, vol. 86, no. 5 (September-October 2007) (electronic version).
48 Henry S. Rowan, “The Tide Underneath the ‘Third Wave,’” Journal of Democracy, vol. 6, no. 1 (1995),
p. 53.
49 Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, Democracy and
Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), p. 106.
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“in affluent countries democracy is impregnable,” whereas it is “brittle in poor
countries.”50
Mandelbaum also argues that the free market promotes democracy by enabling
civil society to develop, which acts “as a counterweight to the machinery of
government.”51 A similar argument is made by Larry Diamond, who asserts that in the
absence of free market conditions the state will have a stranglehold over the economy,
preventing the “distribution of power resources” throughout society, the upshot of which
is that the state will face no serious political competition. 52 These arguments are
persuasive, and it is in truth hard to think of any democracy throughout history that has
not had a free market economy. As Robert Dahl has written, “Polyarchal democracy has
existed only in countries with predominantly market-capitalist economies and never (or at
most briefly) in countries with predominantly nonmarket economies.”53 The alternative to
capitalism is a planned economy, which “puts the resources of the entire economy at the
disposal of government leaders,” giving them enormous power. In a free market economy,
by contrast, economic power is dispersed to firms and individuals independent of the
state.54
However, Dahl himself acknowledges that market capitalism “has two faces” in
terms of its impact on democracy, one “friendly” and the other “hostile.”55 Capitalism,
Dahl writes, “is important in causing an unequal distribution of many key resources:
wealth, income, status, prestige, information, organization, education, knowledge” and so
forth, with the result that “some citizens gain significantly more influence than others
over the government’s policies, decisions, and actions.”56 William Robinson makes a
similar point, arguing that a free market economy militates against truly free and fair
elections by creating an “unequal distribution of material and cultural resources among
50 Ibid, pp. 109, 137. Przeworski et al do not claim, however, that economic development inevitably leads
to the democratization of dictatorships. Their data reveal that “dictatorships survived for years in countries
that were wealthy by comparative standards. Whatever the threshold at which development is supposed to
dig the grave for an authoritarian regime, it is clear that many dictatorships have passed it in good health.”
Ibid, p. 94.
51 Mandelbaum, “Democracy Without America.”
52 Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy.” Foreign Policy, no. 87 (Summer 1992). p. 33.
53 Dahl, On Democracy, p. 166-7.
54 Ibid, pp. 168-9.
55 Ibid, p. 173.
56 Ibid, pp. 177-8.
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classes and groups.” 57 The downside of the free market economy has also been
highlighted by David Held, who has written that it places “constraints” on governments
that “systematically limit policy options.” As its fate is closely related to the health of the
economy, a government is obliged to “follow a political agenda that is at least favourable
to, i.e. biased towards, the development of the system of private enterprise and corporate
power.”58
Amy Chua contends that the mix of free markets and democracy is potentially
explosive in societies where an ethnic minority dominates the economy. “Markets
concentrate enormous wealth in the hands of an “outsider” minority,” notes Chua,
“fomenting ethnic envy and hatred among often chronically poor majorities.” Holding
elections under these circumstances is not necessarily a wise idea, for “the competition
for votes fosters the emergence of demagogues who scapegoat the resented minority and
foment active ethnonationalist movements demanding that the country’s wealth and
identity be reclaimed by the “true owners of the nation.”” This volatile mix of democracy
and the free market can result in the mass emigration of persecuted ethnic minorities, or,
worse still, “majority-supported violence aimed at eliminating a market-dominant
minority.”59 Examples of the latter phenomenon mentioned by Chua are the Rwandan
genocide of 1994 and the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. “In the
former Yugoslavia,” writes Chua, “the result of market liberalization and democratic
elections was not prosperity and political freedom, but rather economic devastation,
hatemongering, populist manipulation, and civilian-conducted mass murder.”60 In short,
then, promoting free market economics can under certain circumstances have very nasty
consequences.
What can we conclude about the effect of free market economics on democracy?
The answer would seem to be that it can have both a positive and negative impact. As
Przeworski et al have shown, democracy is far more stable in wealthy societies than in
poor ones, which suggests that promoting free market economics is good for democracy.
Furthermore, a free market economy enables civil society to emerge and dilutes the
57 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 59.
58 David Held, Models of Democracy, 3rd edition (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 170.
59 Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global
Instability (London: William Heinemann, 2003), pp. 9-11, 164.
60 Ibid, p. 175.
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economic, and hence political, power of the state. In contrast, Robinson and Dahl have
argued that the free market can create inequalities in income that lead in turn to
inequalities in political resources, which has a negative effect on democracy. The extent
to which this is true is contextual, with the problem far more serious in countries like
Colombia, where “the richest 10% owned 42.7% of national income” in 2000,61 than in
European democracies such as the Netherlands, which have a strong social democratic
ethos. However, it is my contention that notwithstanding the at times salutary impact of
free market economics on democracy, Mandelbaum is nonetheless wrong when he says
that “the best way to foster democracy is to encourage the spread of free markets.” In my
view, the best way to foster democracy is to promote human rights and genuinely free
and fair elections.
This leads us to the issue of how we can determine whether democracy promotion
is truly a goal of United States foreign policy. There are a number of actions the US, or
any other state, can take that would demonstrate its commitment to promoting democracy.
The first strand of democracy promotion relates to the holding of free and fair elections.
There are numerous contributions that can be made in this respect, each of which would
serve as evidence that the US truly seeks to promote democracy. It could assist political
parties, NGOs, trade unions and other civil society organisations that are committed to
democracy, whether through funding or training. It is imperative, however, that such
support be non-partisan. The US could also send observers to monitor electoral processes,
or support international or domestic election monitoring bodies, although there is a
crucial caveat: these election monitors be free of political bias. Any electoral fraud or
intimidation of voters or candidates during elections must be highlighted by US officials.
A more general point is that elections should be treated on their merits: if they are
unsatisfactory, American officials should acknowledge this. Taken together, these actions
would constitute strong evidence of a desire to promote democracy.
A second test of a country’s commitment to democracy promotion is whether or
not it opposes any actions that undermine the legitimacy of a state’s political institutions.
The next branch of democracy promotion relates to human rights. If the United States
61 Grace Livingstone, Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 2004), p. 78.
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undertakes a policy that is aimed at promoting citizens’ enjoyment of the political, civil,
and socio-economic rights necessary for democracy, this may be considered evidence of
a genuine effort to promote democracy. Examples would be the provision of
peacekeeping troops in a post-conflict situation, or assisting trade unions or media groups.
A fourth means of promoting democracy is attaching democracy-related conditions to
any aid provided by the US to another state. If the US makes military assistance
conditional on improvements in human rights then this would count as evidence that
America genuinely seeks to promote democracy. There is a final strand of democracy
promotion that relates specifically to situations where an authoritarian regime is in place.
If the US attempts to effect the replacement of a dictatorial regime with an elected one,
whether by imposing sanctions, using force, or employing diplomatic means, we can say
that its policy is aimed at promoting democracy.
It will be observed that I have not listed promoting free market economics as one
of the actions that are indicative of a state’s commitment to promoting democracy. This is
because it is very difficult to predict the impact of free market economics on democracy.
This is a complex issue that is simply beyond the scope of this study, and rather than
offering superficial arguments I have chosen not to incorporate it in my democracy
promotion metric.
Democracy Promotion and United States Foreign Policy
It is now necessary to move on to a consideration of the issue of United States
democracy promotion. Broadly speaking, we can divide the literature on this subject into
two categories, mainstream and critical. Mainstream writers prefer a procedural definition
of democracy and are inclined to believe that the US is genuinely committed to furthering
democracy abroad, either out of pure self-interest or because such a course of action is
perceived to be morally right. Mainstream scholars attribute some success to Washington
in its efforts to spread democracy, although it is conceded that its record is mixed.
Scholars writing from a more critical standpoint interpret democracy in substantive terms
and are much less willing to accept that democracy promotion is a genuine American
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foreign policy goal. They also argue that the United States has often had a distinctly
adverse effect on democracy in other nations.
Mainstream Perspectives on United States Democracy Promotion
The mainstream literature on United States democracy promotion is characterised
by three central themes. First, the United States is considered to be genuinely committed
to furthering democracy abroad, for both ethical and strategic reasons. Second, the word
democracy is defined in procedural terms, with particular emphasis placed on elections,
although I should add that mainstream thinkers do not always offer a definition.
Nonetheless, the procedural definition of the word is implicit in their writings. This
overemphasis on procedures and institutions leads to the classification of certain states as
democracies when they have obviously undemocratic features, and to claims of
democracy promotion by the US when it did no more than press for elections. Third,
although mainstream scholars do believe that the US seeks to promote democracy, they
also acknowledge that it has not always done so, and in fact has sought to destabilize or
overthrow democratic governments on occasion. There are varying opinions as to the
extent to which the US allows other foreign policy goals to impede its desire to advance
democracy.
America’s enthusiasm for spreading democracy to foreign countries is
emphasised by Jonathan Monten. According to Monten, the George W. Bush
administration’s alleged preoccupation with democracy promotion is rooted in an
American foreign policy tradition that has always embraced liberalism and democracy.
He argues that America is notable for “a foreign policy nationalism that regards the
United States as an instrument of democratic change in the international system.”62 This
American urge to advance the cause of democracy in foreign countries “originated not
only in the instrumental maximization of some material interest, but in a moral
commitment to the universal political values that define the United States as a self-
62 Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in
U.S. Strategy,” International Security, vol. 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005), p. 114.
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contained political community.”63 He argues that the issue for US policymakers has
always been how – not whether - to advance the cause of democracy outside the United
States. The question facing officials is therefore whether Washington should follow the
path of “exemplarism,” using its own democratic institutions and values as an inspiration
to others, or employ a policy of “vindicationism,” which involves the use of “active
measures to spread its universal political values and institutions.”64 One of these “active
measures” is of course military action.
A similar perspective to Monten’s is offered by G. John Ikenberry, who argues
that during the Cold War the US pursued twin strategies of containment of the Soviet
Union and of promotion of a “liberal democratic order” among the industrialised states of
the West. The goal of advancing this liberal democratic order, which embraced “open
markets, democratic states, and international institutions,” has persisted following the
collapse of the Soviet Union and is “deeply bipartisan.”65 Ikenberry asserts that the US
desire to promote democracy and, more generally, “liberal internationalism,” is reflective
of “a distinctively American national security orientation,” which posits that a state’s
internal characteristics have major implications for the attainment of American foreign
policy aims. As Ikenberry puts it, “the United States is better able to pursue its interests,
reduce security threats in its environment, and foster a stable political order when other
states – particularly the major great powers - are democracies rather than non-
democracies.”66 As we saw above, this idea of the US promoting democracy out of
pragmatism, rather than merely idealism, was invoked by Monten. Another scholar who
emphasises that furthering democracy is in Washington’s own self-interest is Tony Smith.
Writing just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Smith concluded that the promotion of
democracy abroad “as a way of enhancing the national security” was “surely the greatest
ambition of United States foreign policy over the past century.”67 He speaks of America’s
“century-old determination to promote this cause,” and like Ikenberry, notes “how firmly
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bipartisan it now has become to see American national security promoted by the
expansion of democracy around the globe.”68 Smith marvels at the contribution of the US
to democracy throughout the world, opining that “we can have no confidence that,
without the United States, democracy would have survived,” and he asserts that “it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that since World War I, the fortunes of democracy
worldwide have largely depended on American power.”69
Smith defines democracy as “free elections contested by freely organized parties
under universal suffrage for control of the effective centers of governmental power.”70 As
with other scholars who adopt so narrow an interpretation of the term, Smith’s excessive
focus on elections leads him to describe as democratic states that exhibit patently
undemocratic features. For example, in a major text on US democracy promotion
published in 1994, he referred to the Philippines as “a troubled democracy, but…a
democracy nonetheless.” 71 The basis for this assertion appears to be the holding of
procedurally fair elections. A more plausible assessment of politics in the Philippines has
been offered by Joel Rocamora who, writing at about the same time as Smith, observed
that “the Philippine political system today, is not, in any substantive sense, a democracy.”
Rocamora noted that political participation was restricted to “limited elite circles,” human
rights violations were prevalent, while the military remained an effectively autonomous
actor.72 There were six coup attempts in the first six years of “democracy” after the flight
of dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, with “each attempt…followed by [President
Corazon] Aquino government concessions which strengthened the military as an
institution.”73 While Smith was surely right to say that the Philippines was “troubled,” his
designation of the country as a democracy is more questionable.
Larry Diamond also subscribes to the view of democracy as a set of institutions.
In a work he co-edited on democratization in Latin America, Diamond and his fellow
editors stated that their “conceptualization of political democracy” was one “that focuses
68 Ibid, p. 6.
69 Ibid, pp. 9-10.
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72 Joel Rocamora, “Lost Opportunities, Deepening Crisis: The Philippines under Cory Aquino,” in Barry
Gills, Joel Rocamora and Richard Wilson, eds., Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New
World Order (London: Pluto, 1993), p. 221.
73 Ibid, p. 207.
37
on procedural issues rather than substantive outcomes, and that does not conflate
democracy with social and economic dimensions.”74 Democracy is to be understood as a
political system encompassing competition for political office in free, fair and frequent
elections, in which all adults may participate, with sufficient guarantees of political and
civil rights to ensure a legitimate political process. By concentrating solely on the
institutions of democracy Diamond can assert that the US “made a difference in the early
1960s” by providing aid to the “new democracies” of Colombia and Venezuela. 75
Although Diamond does not spell out why he considers these two states to have been
democratic, we can presume that it is because elections took place and the whole adult
population was entitled to vote. Unfortunately, his choice of Colombia merely serves to
illustrate the inadequacy of procedural definitions of democracy. There were elections,
but they were of a very unusual kind. In 1958, an agreement known as the National Front
was reached between the Liberal and Conservative parties to “alternate the presidency
every four years and to divide equally the seats in all legislative bodies.”76 Other parties
were simply barred from participating. Moreover, state of siege restrictions have been
commonplace in Colombia, while human rights abuses by the security forces became
commonplace from the 1970s onwards. These facts notwithstanding, other democracy
promotion scholars have likewise seen fit to deem Colombia in the 1960s a democratic
state. Hence Laurence Whitehead’s claim that “democracy did flower…in Colombia and
Venezuela since 1958.”77 This tendency to describe countries as democratic on the basis
of the presence of the political institutions of democracy is characteristic of mainstream
writings on the subject, and represents a major weakness.
One mainstream writer who avoids the trap of associating democracy with
elections and other political institutions is Thomas Carothers. He rightly points out that
Washington has a habit of “focusing far too much on formal institutions as the essential
elements of democratization at the expense of underlying values and processes.” Hence
the tendency of US officials to “extol an election with little attention to the more complex
74 Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Democracy in
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realities of actual political participation.”78 Discussing the “third wave” of democratic
transitions at the end of the twentieth century, Carothers calls for an approach grounded
in reality. Dismissing what he refers to as “the chimera of instantaneous democracy,”
Carothers highlights the presence of “entrenched antidemocratic power structures” in
these so-called new democracies.79 Thus, in Latin America the issue “is not whether
democracy can be maintained in form but whether it can be achieved in substance,”
which would entail extending political participation beyond elites, reducing corruption
and embedding the rule of law.80 Ultimately, Carothers argues, “Helping countries turn
democratic forms into democratic substance is a deep, broad task,” that requires
“reducing entrenched concentrations of economic power,” broadening participation to
include “poor, marginalized sectors,” and “rejuvenating stale, often deeply problematic,
political elites.”81
Carothers is right to emphasise that bringing democracy to foreign countries is a
very difficult task, a point also made by Francis Fukuyama, who asserts that the US “can
be extremely helpful to an organic process of democratic transition, but it has little
leverage in the absence of relatively strong domestic actors.”82 Discussing the reasons for
the success of democracy promotion efforts in Yugoslavia, Ukraine and Georgia from
2000 to 2005, Fukuyama contends that while foreign democracy promotion bodies played
an important part, what these examples show is that “the initiative has to come from
within the society in question. Unless there are strong, unified indigenous groups willing
to resist the former regime, regime change will not occur.” It is not surprising, then, that
America’s “record in nation-building is mixed: there are a few successes and a large
number of failures; and where the successes occurred, they required an extraordinary
level of effort and attention.”83 The argument that there must be strong pro-democracy
internal actors for democratization to take place is borne out by the democratic openings
in Guatemala, Argentina, South Korea and the Philippines in the 1980s. As Barry Gills,
Joel Rocamora and Richard Wilson, who adopt a more critical attitude towards US
78 Carothers, Critical Mission, p. 35.
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democracy promotion, comment, “the overthrow of these authoritarian regimes was first
and foremost the result of popular impetus.”84
Notwithstanding their willingness to attribute noble motives to the United States,
mainstream scholars are nonetheless aware that Washington has not always lived up to its
rhetoric and has at times undermined democracy in foreign states. Mark Peceny, for
example, has observed that Washington “has often allied itself with brutally repressive
authoritarian regimes rather than with the liberal opponents of such regimes…In perhaps
half a dozen nations, most prominently in Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973, the
United States used covert measures to help overthrow elected governments.”85 Tony
Smith, who speaks of Washington’s “century-old determination” to spread democracy,
nevertheless accepts that its record in this respect is by no means perfect. In reference to
Latin America, for instance, he comments that “whatever its intentions, American policy
on balance may have done substantially more to shore up dictatorships in the region than
to advance the cause of democracy.”86
Scepticism regarding the pro-democracy credentials of the United States is
certainly warranted, and it informs Thomas Carothers’ work. Carothers calls for a
realistic appraisal of the efforts of the United States in this regard. He criticises what he
sees as “inflated declarations by U.S. officials about America’s unbending commitment
to supporting democracy worldwide,” noting “the often partial or conflicted place of
democracy in America’s foreign policy.”87 Carothers detects “a strong line of continuity”
in United States democracy promotion since the presidency of George H.W. Bush, with
American officials strongly endorsing this objective at the rhetorical level, but shelving it
in practice when vital foreign policy goals were at stake. The US approach to foreign
affairs, according to Carothers, is thus better understood as “semirealist.” This is evident
from the fact that “Washington [has] almost always downplayed its democracy concerns”
in cases “where policy makers saw strong economic or security reasons for staying on
friendly terms with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes.”88 Still, while Carothers
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does contend that Washington’s desire to advance the cause of democracy abroad is often
exaggerated by officials, this does not imply that he views US democracy promotion as
nothing more than a cover for other foreign policy objectives. The Clinton administration,
he writes, was “interested in promoting democracy abroad as an end in itself,” for the
simple reason that the president and his foreign policy team believed that “democracies
tend to be more peaceful than nondemocracies.”89 Likewise, Carothers has emphasised
that the administration of George W. Bush has made a “strenuous effort…to carry off a
democratic transformation of Iraq” and has a “broader…commitment to supporting a
democratic transformation of the Middle East.”90
As the quotes from Carothers imply, Clinton administration policymakers were
believers in what is known in international relations theory as the democratic peace thesis.
In the 1980s Michael Doyle drew attention to the absence of war between democracies,
which he sought to explain by invoking the work of the nineteenth century German
philosopher Immanuel Kant. Doyle claimed that Kant, in his essay Perpetual Peace, had
foreseen “the ever-widening pacification of a Liberal pacific union,” and he remarked
that the “historical record of Liberal international relations seems to support Kant’s
speculations.”91 Doyle argued that the democratic, or what he called the liberal peace,
was the product of three factors. First, in a liberal state the decision to wage war requires
the consent of citizens, which is hard to gain, as they are the ones who are obliged to bear
the costs of conflict. Second, feelings of mutual respect subsist between citizens of liberal
states; there is an awareness of shared values and principles, which makes liberal states
appear less threatening than non-liberal states. Third, the ties of trade act as a further
incentive to avoid conflict, for each side would suffer from a rupture in economic
relations.92 Doyle’s work has proved to be highly influential. “That democracies rarely
89 Ibid, pp. 15, 19.
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fight each other is now generally, if not universally, accepted,” comment two fellow
proponents of the democratic peace thesis.93
Doyle acknowledged that the peace subsisting between liberal states did not
extend to their relations with autocracies and that the former could be extremely
belligerent and war-prone when dealing with the latter. In short, the peacefulness of
democracies only goes as far as their relations with fellow democracies. However, some
scholars have gone further than Doyle and argued that democracies are in fact
intrinsically more peaceable than authoritarian states. Bruce Russett and John Oneal, for
example, have asserted that “democracies are in general more peaceful than other kinds
of states.”94 For advocates of the democratic peace thesis, then, there is considerable
reason for optimism about the future of international politics, for the increasing
prevalence of democratic rule around the world renders interstate conflict less likely. As
Russett and Oneal have put it, “The emergence of new democracies in the last decade of
the twentieth century presents the possibility for widespread peace in the international
system.”95
While there is strong empirical support for the contention that democracies do not
fight each other, the democratic peace thesis has nonetheless come under attack from
scholars who argue that its logical underpinnings are unconvincing. Sebastian Rosato, for
example, has shown that there are flaws in the causal logic of the theory. He asserts that
the argument made by Doyle (and others) that wary citizens exert a restraining influence
on leaders in a democracy because they fear having to bear the costs of war, is erroneous.
Rosato points out that if this were so, “then democracies would be more peaceful in their
relations with all types of states, not just other democracies.” The improbability of
publics restraining their leaders from entering into wars is due to three factors: first, the
costs of war are met by a very small percentage of the population; second, nationalist
sentiment among the public may override any fear of facing the burdens of war; third,
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democratic leaders have the ability to “cultivate nationalism” and may use it to build
support for military action.96
Rosato also questions the claim that there are feelings of mutual trust and respect
subsisting between leaders of democracies, who will be disposed to externalize domestic
norms of peaceful conflict resolution, ensuring that disputes do not escalate into war.
“The available evidence suggests that democracies do not have a powerful inclination to
treat each other with trust and respect when their interests clash,” he writes. To make his
point Rosato invokes the record of the United States during the Cold War, when it used
force covertly to destabilize numerous democracies with which it had clashes of interests,
instead of trying to resolve disputes peacefully.97 Kenneth Waltz has likewise drawn
attention to occasions during the Cold War when the United States worked to effect the
removal of elected leaders, citing the examples of the Dominican Republic in 1965 and
Chile in the early 1970s. “American policy may have been wise in both cases,” Waltz
remarks, “but its actions surely cast doubt on the democratic peace thesis.” Waltz’s
underlying point is that, while there certainly seems to be an absence of war among
democracies, this does not mean that democratic states will not attempt to subvert one
another. Powerful democratic states do not always need to resort to war in order to
achieve their objectives, he observes.98 Waltz contends that the democratic peace cannot
adequately explain the causes of war and peace, for it overlooks the way anarchy shapes
state behaviour. He emphasises that as long as the international system is anarchic states
cannot be certain that other states will not threaten or make war on them, regardless of
whether they are democratic or not. So, while Waltz acknowledges that “Democracies
rarely fight democracies,” he insists that we must “add as a word of essential caution that
the internal excellence of states is a brittle basis of peace.”99
As both Rosato and Waltz indicate, the history of United States foreign relations
since the Second World War provides compelling evidence that the democratic peace
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thesis is flawed. Nonetheless, the fact remains that US policymakers have consistently
embraced the concept of the democratic peace and used it as a rationale for spreading
democracy abroad. As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott wrote in 1996, Bill
Clinton had made democracy promotion “a priority of his administration’s diplomacy”
because democracies were “less likely to threaten the peace.”100 President Clinton himself
stated in his 1995 State of the Union address that “ultimately, the best strategy to ensure
our security and to build durable peace is to support the advance of democracy
elsewhere.”101 Top officials in the George W. Bush administration have also subscribed
to the theory that democracies do not make war on one another and are generally of a
more peaceful persuasion than non-democracies. Paul Wolfowitz, who served as deputy
secretary of defence in Bush’s first term, had a “warm embrace of the democracy-as-
security-tool thesis,” writes Michael Mazarr, while Secretary of State Colin Powell in his
confirmation hearings before the Senate “spoke glowingly about the progress of
democracy – and its benefits for US security.” Mazarr sees a parallel between the foreign
policy ideologies of George W. Bush and Reagan administrations, with both “adherents
of the…notion of the ‘democratic peace.’”102
Returning to the literature on United States democracy promotion, Larry Diamond
is another believer in the US mission to spread democracy worldwide. He highlights what
he sees as “the U.S. commitment to freedom and democracy,” which in his opinion is
what “distinguishes America most as a people and a nation.” Diamond nevertheless
accepts that Washington has not always matched words with deeds, as evidenced by his
acknowledgment that “the Cold War obsession with communism often led U.S.
policymakers to embrace dictators and even occasionally sabotage popularly elected
governments.” 103 Abraham Lowenthal is yet another writer who has highlighted
America’s commitment to foreign democracy, while at the same time noting that the
historical record does not present the US in a uniformly favourable light. Lowenthal
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comments that Washington has “an underlying predisposition…to favor democratic
politics throughout the Western Hemisphere (and the world, for that matter),” but this
“U.S. bias for democracy is rarely sufficient to…give the promotion of democracy
priority over the other goals of U.S. policy.” Its “frequent and fulsome rhetoric”
notwithstanding, “the U.S. government has actively promoted Latin American democracy
only on occasion,” and its “efforts have often been ineffective and sometimes
counterproductive.” 104 In a similar vein, Steven Hook states that “the promotion of
democracy has long served as a key vehicle for the promotion of US political ideals as
well as for the pursuit of the country’s material self-interests.” However, he recognises
that Washington has “routinely strayed from its declared principles toward a starker form
of realism.”105
Mainstream scholars point to three factors when accounting for Washington’s
failure to convert its commitment to democracy promotion into practice, the first of
which is Cold War anti-communism. During its decades-long struggle with the Soviet
Union, the US was at times forced to shelve the goal of democracy promotion as this
would have hindered the fight against communism. As Fukuyama has expressed it, before
the mid-1980s “anticommunism…led Washington to support or at least acquiesce in the
rule of a number of authoritarian states on the grounds that these governments were the
lesser of two evils.”106 Second, democracy promotion often loses out when a choice
needs to be made between it and other policy objectives, a point made by Hook.
“Regional security considerations…weighed heavily in U.S. foreign policy calculations”
under Clinton, he observes. “In cases when these clashed with the policy of Building
Democracy, most conspicuously in the Middle East, strategic concerns generally
prevailed.” Likewise, economic interests usually trumped democracy promotion during
Clinton’s presidency. 107 Finally, these scholars have asserted that the objective of
democracy promotion often suffers from a lack of domestic political support in the US.
To again quote Hook, Clinton’s policy of “democratic enlargement failed to resonate
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among the general public” and was met with deep scepticism by congressional
Republicans, who “advanced a more limited role for the United States based on narrowly
defined national self-interests rather than transnational concerns.”108
Critical Approaches to American Democracy Promotion
The critical literature on United States democracy promotion is characterised by
three shared beliefs. The first of these is that the United States, despite official rhetoric
and the assertions of many commentators and academics, is not genuinely committed to
promoting foreign democracy. These scholars contend that, at best, Washington seeks to
advance highly attenuated, elite-based forms of democracy which they describe as “low-
intensity democracies,” “elite democracies,” or “polyarchies.” In their view, these
emasculated “democracies” are not worthy of the name. Second, although the US does
not desire the advance of real democracy in foreign states, it has been promoting
polyarchy or low-intensity democracy since the mid-1980s. Critical scholars argue that
the shift to supporting limited forms of democracy abroad was occasioned by the
realisation among US policymakers that the presence of authoritarian rulers in the
developing world no longer served US interests: while Third World strongmen like
Pinochet in Chile and Marcos in the Philippines had once been valuable allies of the
United States, the fall of Somoza in Nicaragua and the Shah of Iran at the end of the
1970s provided powerful evidence that dictatorial forms of rule engendered massive
social discontent, creating the conditions for revolution. This leads us to the third shared
belief, that while the means for achieving US objectives have changed, the objectives
themselves have not. The overriding goal of US foreign policy is still American
dominance of an international capitalist economic system, and promoting polyarchy,
rather than authoritarianism, is now seen as the most effective way of sustaining such an
international order.
The work of William Robinson constitutes the most sophisticated attempt to
develop a theory of democracy promotion from a critical perspective. Robinson, as we
saw above, equates democracy with a high degree of political participation by citizens.
108 Ibid, pp. 119-20.
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Democratic forms like elections are only democratic to the extent that they allow the
people to exercise political control. He disputes the notion that the United States seeks to
advance genuine democracy in other countries. Democracy promotion is a highly
misleading term, according to Robinson: “What US policymakers mean by “democracy
promotion” is the promotion of polyarchy,” which he defines as “a system in which a
small group actually rules and mass participation in decision-making is confined to
leadership choice in elections carefully managed by competing elites”(italics in
original). 109 Democracy promotion, as understood by “US policymakers and organic
intellectuals”, in reality translates into “the suppression of popular democracy, in theory
and in practice” (italics in original).110
Robinson claims that the move to a policy of promoting polyarchy occurred in the
1980s. Previously, Washington, in its efforts to ensure the durability of the US-dominated
international capitalist system, relied on authoritarian regimes as “the most expedient
means of assuring stability and social control in the Third World.” By the eighties,
however, authoritarians could no longer be relied upon to carry out this role, as their use
of repression and the existence of severe socio-economic inequality in the developing
world engendered the emergence of “mass popular movements” that threatened the social
order.111 The examples of Nicaragua and Iran, where pro-US dictators were toppled in
popular uprisings, were salutary lessons for US officials of the dangers of relying on
autocrats for order and stability.112 Polyarchy was adopted as a way of undercutting
popular demands for a radical overhaul of the socio-economic system. The idea was to
open the political system just enough to prevent revolution, but also to ensure that elites,
rather than popular sectors, kept a tight grip on political power. As Robinson comments,
“The intent behind promoting polyarchy is to relieve domestic pressure on the state from
subordinate classes for more fundamental change in emergent global society.”113
United States democracy promotion thus aims “to preempt more radical political
change, to preserve the social order and international relations of asymmetry.” This is the
“immediate purpose” of the policy. However, at a deeper level, US democracy promotion
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also seeks the advance of unrestrained capitalism.114 Robinson argues that democracy
promotion (as understood by US policymakers) is “inextricably linked to globalization,”
a process that has brought about “a hitherto unseen integration of national economies.”115
In the highly globalised international economic system, political and economic power
flows to a new “transnational elite” that is at the heart of the global economy.116 The
objective of the transnational elite is “to promote the economic and political conditions
around the world for the unfettered activity of transnational capital.” Authoritarian
political arrangements are viewed as a barrier to the imposition of unbridled capitalism,
as they cannot “manage the expansion of social intercourse associated with the global
economy.” Polyarchy provides a more stable environment for transnational capital as it
provides a means of co-opting popular opposition and resolving conflicts between elites.
Therefore, Robinson contends that “polyarchy is better equipped in the new global
environment to legitimize the political authority of dominant groups and to achieve a
minimally stable environment, under the conflict-ridden and fluid conditions of emergent
global society, for global capitalism to operate.”117
A similar critique to that offered by Robinson is set out by Barry Gills, Joel
Rocamora and Richard Wilson. They too identify the 1980s as the moment the US turned
from a policy of propping up authoritarian regimes deemed favourable to US interests to
promoting “democracy” in the Third World. Again, though, they emphasise that the type
of democracy the US has been supporting is not really worthy of the name, and they
propose the term “low-intensity democracy” as a more accurate description. They argue
that the low-intensity democracies that emerged towards the end of the twentieth century
“have preserved ossified political and economic structures from an authoritarian past.”118
Other undemocratic features include militaries that remain powerful and independent,
continued human rights abuses on a large scale and a failure to carry out socio-economic
reform. Examples of low-intensity democracy include South Korea, the Philippines,
Argentina and Guatemala following their shifts from authoritarianism to elected rule in
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the 1980s. In these states, democracy was “confined to the level of formal electoral
participation,” while the military remained a highly influential political actor and human
rights abuses remained a problem.119 Gills, Rocamora and Wilson assert that the change
in US policy from backing authoritarians to supporting low-intensity democracies arose
from “the realisation that authoritarianism could not sustain itself indefinitely and that
democratisation was inevitable in the long term.” If Washington could, however, “gain a
guiding influence in the process of democratisation” then it could prevent revolutionary
outcomes detrimental to US interests along the lines of the collapse of the Somoza
dictatorship in Nicaragua and the fall of the Shah’s regime in Iran.120
The US recognised that authoritarianism was unsustainable, but it was leery of too
much democracy appearing in its stead. Low-intensity democracy, which “could pre-
empt more radical change by incorporating broad popular forces in electoral
participation,” while at the same time ensuring policy continuity, was the solution.121 It
was this belief in the benefits of attenuated forms of democracy that convinced
Washington in the eighties to withdraw support from pro-American dictators in the
Philippines, South Korea, Haiti, Chile and Paraguay.122 Gills, Rocamora and Wilson do
not see the shift to promoting limited forms of democracy as a change in US foreign
policy objectives; it is rather a different means to the same end. The end they identify is
US leadership of an international capitalist economic order, with the developing world
playing its traditional role as a provider of cheap resources and markets for the world’s
industrialised states. This was, and remains, the goal of American foreign policy: “In the
Old/New World Order, under the auspices of American hegemonic power, the Third
World is subordinated in the international division of labour as a source of raw materials
and cheaper manufactured commodities, and as a market.” The biggest threat to US
economic objectives is the appearance of “any nationalistic regime responsive to popular
demands for immediate improvement in standards of living.”123 Genuine democracy is
therefore forcefully opposed by the United States, as it is likely to run counter to its
economic goals.
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Another critic of United States democracy promotion is Noam Chomsky.
According to Chomsky, the principal objective of US foreign policy has long been US
leadership of an international capitalist economic order, with the developing world acting
as a source of raw materials and a market for the world’s industrialised economies.
Describing the US-financed reconstruction of Japan, Germany and Western Europe after
World War 2, Chomsky writes that “the prime concern was to establish a state capitalist
order under the traditional conservative elites, within the global framework of US power,
which would guarantee the ability to exploit the various regions that were to fulfill their
functions as markets and sources of raw materials.”124 The “various regions” to which he
refers are the Third World. The international order favoured by the US, however, implies
the generation of inequalities in wealth, between and within societies, which leads to
social discontent and demands from marginalised sectors for different policies. Thus,
Chomsky asserts that the United States is strongly opposed to genuine democracy, which
he defines in substantive terms as “a system in which citizens may play some meaningful
part in the management of public affairs,”125 as poor majorities might well adopt policies
that are at odds with US economic interests. It follows that “A persistent concern of
Western elites is that popular organizations [in the Third World] might lay the basis for
meaningful democracy and social reform, threatening the prerogatives of the
privileged.”126 Such organisations need to be crushed, by force if necessary. Chomsky
contends that history bears out his claim that Washington is opposed to real democracy:
“Even a cursory inspection of the historical record reveals that a persistent theme in
American foreign policy has been the subversion and overthrow of parliamentary regimes,
and the resort to violence to destroy popular organizations that might offer the majority of
the population an opportunity to enter the political arena.”127
Chomsky does not argue, however, that the US is antipathetic to democratic
institutions like frequent, procedurally fair elections. Indeed, he emphasises that its
“relations with the industrial world show clearly that the US government is not opposed
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to democratic forms as such.”128 Chomsky’s contention is that the United States is quite
willing to tolerate the existence of the institutions of democracy, so long as the right
people end up in power. The right people are “elements of the oligarchy, business
community and military who understand and serve US priorities.” They are charged with
keeping citizens of developing countries pliant and “under control.” He continues, “If
these goals can be attained with democratic forms, that is fine, even preferable, if only for
propaganda purposes. If not, then other ways must be found, and in the Third World
domains there need be no delicacy about the choice of methods.”129 In short, the US
tolerates democratic forms, but it is nonetheless firmly against democracy in the more
substantive sense. From the perspective of many policymakers in Washington,
government should be the province of elites, who must be left to do their job without
being troubled by the masses. These arguments are evident in Chomsky’s discussion of
Washington’s attitude towards democracy in present-day Iraq. He argues that because of
Iraq’s great economic significance, “authentic sovereignty and even limited democracy
would be too dangerous to be easily accepted [by the United States]. If at all possible,
Iraq must be kept under [American] control.”130 Therefore, the only sort of democracy
that “will be welcomed” by the US is “the conventional “top-down” form that leaves
elites supportive of US goals in power.”131
Like the other critical writers mentioned above Steve Smith points out that
Washington has an inglorious history of subverting elected regimes and supporting
dictators in the Third World. This aversion to democracy “is most evident in the case of
Latin and Central America, for whom there must be disbelief at the notion that the US
has a long-standing commitment to the promotion of democracy.”132 In so far as the
United States does promote democracy, it promotes “a very limited form,” which also
happens to be “the type of democracy that best suits US economic interests.”133 The US
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advocates free trade and neoliberalism, which imply a reduced role for the state in
economic affairs. Not coincidentally, the “low-intensity democracies” favoured by the
United States have weak political institutions and a low level of popular control, and are
consequently well-adapted to the neoliberal project promoted by Washington. More
substantive forms of democracy would be far less welcome to the US, as “Such models
would focus more on the values underlying democracy, and would therefore see political
democracy as incompatible with [the] massive socioeconomic inequalities” caused by
neoliberalism.134 Democracy promotion should therefore be viewed as a tool employed
by the US to advance its economic objectives, rather than as an end in itself. Smith’s
emphasis on the primacy of American economic goals leads him to the conclusion that
“there has been a considerable continuity in US policy, since the previous policies of
shoring up authoritarian regimes was also done to protect and promote US economic
interests.”135
Conclusions
Neither of the approaches to US democracy promotion described above is entirely
convincing. An obvious problem with the mainstream literature is that it is difficult to
reconcile the widely-held view that the United States truly wants to promote foreign
democracy with instances where Washington has clearly opposed popularly elected
regimes. The cases of Guatemala in 1954, when a CIA-orchestrated invasion toppled the
country’s elected president, Jacobo Arbenz, and Chile in the 1970s, when the CIA
worked to remove the elected president, Salvador Allende, are well-known stains on
Washington’s record. Nor has the US been averse to maintaining friendly relations with
authoritarian regimes, a reality that should be plain to anyone who follows United States
policy in the Middle East. Even presidents who have been portrayed as great champions
of democracy have on occasion pursued antidemocratic policies. Woodrow Wilson, for
instance, sent US Marines to occupy Haiti, where they proceeded to dissolve the
country’s parliament due to its refusal to ratify a constitution drawn up by the US.
134 Ibid, p. 80.
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Democracy has in fact almost never had the slightest influence on US policy in Haiti. Yet,
while criticism can be levelled at mainstream scholars for being overly credulous of the
pro-democracy pretensions of American officials, there are certainly grounds for arguing
that the critical literature exaggerates America’s hostility towards democracy in foreign
states. Washington has generally enjoyed good relations with the nations of Western
Europe, a region which is home to many of the world’s most democratic states, since the
Second World War. The US relationship with the country to its north, Canada, provides
further evidence that Washington is by no means invariably opposed to democracy in
other countries.
The mainstream literature on United States democracy promotion also suffers
from its reliance on a narrow definition of democracy. By defining the word in
procedural terms, mainstream scholars of democracy promotion are liable to arrive at
erroneous conclusions. We saw above how low is the threshold at which a state may be
considered democratic. Colombia, a country beset by human rights abuses by the security
forces and the infiltration of drugs mafias into the country’s political institutions, has
nonetheless been described as democratic on the basis of its regular elections. This
inadequate conception of democracy leads mainstream scholars to the conclusion that by
pushing for elections, no matter how flawed, the United States demonstrates support for
democracy in other countries. An example, and one I will cover in more detail in the next
chapter, is American policy towards El Salvador in the 1980s. The Reagan administration
supposedly sought to promote democracy in this Central American nation by pressuring
its allies in the Salvadorian military – the real locus of power - to hold elections. A very
persuasive case can be made that Salvadorian democracy was by no means an American
objective, however, for Washington was at the same time providing the Salvadorian
security forces with considerable amounts of military aid, even as they and their allies in
the right-wing death squads were murdering thousands of civilians. Human rights, a vital
component of democracy, were clearly of low importance to the Reagan administration.
The critical literature is superior in this respect. By defining democracy in substantive
terms, critical scholars can provide a more rigorous test of US democracy promotion
policies. El Salvador, for instance, is not viewed as a triumph for the Reagan
administration, but as a human rights disaster that had terrible implications for democracy.
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While critical scholars are to be applauded for employing a broader definition of
democracy and for their scepticism regarding the importance attached to democracy
promotion by American officials, their work suffers at times from an over-emphasis on
economics as the principal factor guiding United States foreign policy. I do not deny that
economic interests often shape American foreign policy. As we shall see in chapter four,
economic concerns can even have an influence on US policy towards a state as
economically insignificant as Haiti, where the Clinton administration was so eager to
push through neoliberal economic reforms that it froze aid when the Haitians refused to
privatise certain state enterprises. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to assume, as some
critical scholars have, that the US under Clinton became so heavily involved in Haiti
because it was determined to export neoliberalism to that state. The decision to send
American forces to Haiti in 1994 was partly a function of Clinton’s desire to promote
democracy in Haiti, and also reflected his need to mollify those in the United States
demanding a tougher approach to the Haitian junta. It was not a consequence of the
administration’s enthusiasm for spreading neoliberal economics. In short, then, while
economic considerations usually inform US foreign policy to some degree, and at times
dominate America’s relations with another country, it does not follow that economics is
always the primary factor governing policy.
We can therefore say that both approaches to the subject of United States
democracy promotion, critical and mainstream, have something to offer, although both
also suffer from limitations. Their main weakness lies in their exclusivity. My thesis
corrects this flaw by assimilating the most persuasive arguments of both schools of
thought. It is now time to move on to the case studies, the first of which concerns the
Reagan administration’s policies towards Nicaragua.
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3. The Reagan Presidency: “Restoring” Democracy to Nicaragua
This first case study concerns President Ronald Reagan’s policies towards the
Central American state of Nicaragua. The chapter is broken down into six parts. I shall
begin by providing an outline of US-Nicaragua relations up to 1981, when Reagan took
office, before moving on to consider the foreign policy perspective of the president and
his top advisers. This is followed by a long review of US policy towards Nicaragua under
Reagan’s stewardship. I devote the fourth part to the question of whether the United
States succeeded in advancing democracy in Nicaragua during Reagan’s tenure; this is
followed in the fifth section by a discussion of whether democracy promotion was in fact
a significant US policy objective in Nicaragua. In the concluding part of the chapter I
assess the Reagan administration’s overall record on democracy promotion.
Historical Background: US-Nicaragua Relations
The history of Nicaragua, like that of most of the states in Central America, has
been strongly influenced by its interactions with the United States. During the second half
of the nineteenth century Nicaragua was of interest to the US as a potential location for a
canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. While Panama was ultimately chosen as
the site of the canal, Nicaragua nonetheless continued to attract the attention of
Washington, as evidenced by the fact that the country was under almost permanent
military occupation by the United States from 1912 to 1933. However, a rebellion led by
the Nicaraguan nationalist Augusto César Sandino, starting in 1927, wore the US down
and eventually persuaded policymakers in Washington that the costs of occupation were
prohibitive. Sandino had little time to enjoy the fruits of victory, however, for he was
murdered in 1934 by the US-trained National Guard (GN), the corrupt and brutal security
force Washington left behind to maintain order in Nicaragua. The National Guard went
on to become “the personal bodyguard of the Somoza family,” the dictatorial dynasty
which ruled Nicaragua for over forty years until the revolution of July 1979.136 For a
136 Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle, 4th Edition (Boulder, CO: Westview
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succession of American presidents and foreign policy officials the Somozas were handy,
if disreputable, clients, who could be counted on to provide many useful services. The
second Somoza, Luis Somoza Debayle, consented to the use of Nicaragua as the base for
the CIA’s disastrous surrogate invasion of Cuba in 1961, and they generally pursued a
foreign policy that was “virtually indistinguishable” from that of the US.137
By the 1970s, however, the Somoza dynasty was in serious trouble. The third
Somoza, Anastasio Jr., also known as “Tachito,” pocketed much of the massive inflow of
international aid that was sent to Nicaragua in the aftermath of the December 1972
earthquake.138 In so doing, Tachito managed to make enemies of many in the Nicaraguan
business class, who were being deprived of a share of the action. A bold operation in
1974 by the left-wing revolutionaries of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN),
which involved taking hostage a group of wealthy pro-Somoza figures at a Christmas
party, enraged Tachito, who responded by announcing a state of siege and letting the
National Guard loose on the population. The GN was merciless in its repression. As
William LeoGrande has commented, “For two years, people in the northern provinces
were subjected to a systematic campaign of torture, murder, and forced relocation.”139
This wave of violence did not go down well in Washington, where Jimmy Carter, who
had taken over as president in January 1977, responded by suspending economic aid to
Nicaragua.
Events began to spiral out of control in 1978. The popular opposition figure and
journalist, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, was murdered in January, precipitating riots, mass
strikes and civil uprisings. The Sandinistas exacerbated Somoza’s worries by launching
assaults on a number of National Guard garrisons around the country. The regime
retaliated with an orgy of violence, which included the aerial bombing of recalcitrant
cities. In a two-week period in September, the GN killed three thousand Nicaraguans.
The Carter administration was left between a rock and a hard place. While American
policymakers knew that Tachito might fall, they were nevertheless loath to prod him into
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stepping down, for his departure might herald the establishment of a government
dominated by the guerrillas of the FSLN. As a consequence, the solution initially hit upon
by Carter administration officials was to keep Somoza in office until elections scheduled
for 1981. The bloodletting of September convinced Washington that this was impossible,
however, so Carter fell back on an Organisation of American States (OAS) mediation
effort, launched in October, which aimed at convincing Somoza to “turn over power to a
transitional government headed by some figure within the regime who was not a member
of the Somoza family.”140 Somoza refused to take the bait, though, and the mediation
effort collapsed. Notwithstanding this reversal, the US did not give up on the OAS as an
instrument for solving the crisis in Nicaragua. Thus, when the Sandinistas launched their
“final offensive” in May 1979 and made rapid gains, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
called for intervention in the form of an OAS “peacekeeping force.” Unfortunately for
Washington, Vance’s gambit “was widely condemned as a transparent effort to justify
intervention against the FSLN,” and was summarily rejected by the other members of the
OAS.141 As it finally dawned on the Carter administration that a Sandinista victory was
inevitable they desperately sought guarantees that the National Guard would remain
intact. This demand was refused, leaving Carter with no option but to accept defeat. On
July 19, 1979, the insurgents of the FSLN entered the capital, Managua, and the five
member Junta of National Reconstruction assumed power.
The Carter administration, although wary of the Sandinistas, did not adopt the
overtly confrontational approach to the revolution that would later characterise Reagan’s
presidency. In the words of Thomas Walker, Carter’s strategy was to use economic aid to
“co-opt the revolution from within.”142 In late 1979, Carter asked the United States
Congress for $75 million for Nicaragua. Although Congress appropriated the full amount,
the aid package came with “grossly insulting conditions,” like the stipulation that “none
of the $75 million was to go to health and education programs in which Cubans were
involved.” Additionally, one percent of the aid “was to be spent on publicly advertising
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the fact that the United States had given it.”143 There were other, more clandestine, ways
in which the administration attempted to influence the situation in Nicaragua. Carter
authorised the CIA to channel money to so-called “moderates” in Nicaragua, namely the
business group the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), the newspaper La
Prensa and two small trade unions.144 The Carter administration also declined to use “its
considerable influence” with the government of Honduras, Nicaragua’s northern
neighbour, to bring about the closure of the scattered camps of exiled GN officers that
had appeared along the Nicaraguan-Honduran border.145 Then, in January 1981, Carter
froze economic aid to Nicaragua after it was alleged that the Sandinistas were supplying
arms to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas in El Salvador,
who were fighting to bring down that country’s government. The decision to suspend
economic aid set the stage for the incoming Republican administration’s campaign to
bring the Nicaraguan revolution to an abrupt end.
World View of the Reagan Administration
Unapologetic anti-communism was the order of the day once Ronald Reagan
replaced Carter as president. Reagan and his senior foreign policy advisers were diehard
Cold Warriors, who viewed détente as a strategic error, and who advocated the rollback
of the Soviet empire. Their world view was simple: the Soviet Union, its satellites and
other “communist” states were dedicated to disruption, terrorism and other forms of
aggression and it was up to the United States and its allies - “the Free World” – to resist
them. Reagan’s administration became a byword for fervent anti-communism.
Reagan and his advisers deemed the Carter years to have been a disaster for the
United States: not only had steadfast American allies like the Shah of Iran and
Nicaragua’s Somoza been overthrown, but the US itself bore a large part of the
responsibility for such setbacks. According to the Reagan team, Carter had facilitated the
ouster of these pro-US leaders by lecturing them on human rights when he should have
been backing them unreservedly in their fights against their many opponents. Moreover,
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Reagan and his colleagues castigated Carter for failing to stand up to the resurgent
Soviets, who were accused of causing mayhem in the Third World, most obviously in
Afghanistan, which Soviet forces had invaded in December 1979. Reagan lamented that
while Carter was in office America “had seemed to accept as inevitable the advance of
Soviet expansionism.” The new president was determined that this would change while
he was in occupation of the White House and that the United States would recover its
assertiveness and stand up to the Soviets. “As the foundation of my foreign policy,”
Reagan later wrote, “I decided we had to send as powerful a message as we could to the
Russians that we weren’t going to stand by anymore while they armed and financed
terrorists and subverted democratic governments.” He wanted “to say some frank things
about the Russians, to let them know there were some new fellows in Washington who
had a realistic view of what they were up to and weren’t going to let them keep it up.”
When the Russians carped about the new president’s hostile remarks Reagan told
Secretary of State Alexander Haig to make it plain to the Soviet ambassador in
Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, that there was “a new management in the White House
along with a new realism regarding the Russians, and until they behaved themselves, they
could expect more of the same.”146
Alexander Haig’s perspective on international affairs was practically
indistinguishable from Reagan’s. He too believed that the 1970s had been calamitous for
the United States, exemplified by the defeat in Vietnam and the fall of the Shah. The
overthrow of the latter, a “steadfast ally,” had been “humiliating” for the US. These
reversals meant that Reagan was taking over at a time when “deep doubts existed about
the United States and its capacity to project its power in defense of its own interests.”
Haig thought therefore that it was time to send “a plain warning” to the Soviets,
America’s main rivals, “that their time of unresisted adventuring in the Third World was
over, and that America’s capacity to tolerate the mischief of Moscow’s proxies, Cuba and
Libya, had been exceeded.” In Haig’s eyes the Soviets only respected force, so “a
credible show of will and strength” was necessary to convince them “to accommodate to
146 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (London: Hutchinson, 1990), pp. 266-7, 269.
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the United States and the West.”147 Another important foreign policy official was UN
ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, who had impressed the future president with her 1979
article “Dictatorships and Double Standards.” Kirkpatrick condemned Carter’s foreign
policy for the same reasons as Haig and Reagan, claiming that his administration had
“actively collaborated in the replacement of moderate autocrats friendly to American
interests with less friendly autocrats of extremist persuasion.”148 Like the president and
the secretary of state, Kirkpatrick had no time for Carter’s human rights agenda. As
William LeoGrande has explained, she believed that “Carter’s policy of promoting
human rights and reform in the Third World was not only ineffectual but downright
dangerous,” while the “idea that the United States could successfully promote democratic
change was little more than an imperial conceit.”149 In short, if US interests mandated
backing unsavoury dictators, so be it. Kirkpatrick gained notoriety in December 1980
when she reacted to the rape and murder of four American nuns by members of El
Salvador’s National Guard by stating that “The nuns were not just nuns. The nuns were
also political activists…on behalf of the Frente [Revolutionary Democratic Front].”150 In
truth, the nuns had no connection to the Frente, although that would hardly have excused
the horrific acts committed against them.
Reagan’s choice as director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Casey,
was another major player in administration foreign policy. Casey was an ardent anti-
communist who wanted to use the CIA to lend support to insurgents around the globe that
were waging war against communist regimes. According to George Shultz, who
succeeded Haig as secretary of state in 1982, Casey was particularly exercised by the
crisis in Central America. In his memoirs, Shultz claimed that Casey considered the
region “by far the most important foreign policy problem confronting the nation.”151
Nicaragua, where anti-Sandinista armed bands were forming, seemed tailor-made for a
CIA covert assistance campaign to unseat a “communist” government close to the
southern border of the United States. Casey’s anti-communism was so extreme that he
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was even disposed to look favourably upon the apartheid regime running South Africa.
He saw the South Africans, who were embroiled in various wars in their region, as
kindred spirits in the fight against communism and was eager to help their Angolan
clients, the murderous rebel movement known as UNITA.152 Notwithstanding acts of
terrorism by UNITA that included bombing hotels and the shooting down of civilian
airliners, other Reagan administration officials also expressed admiration for the group
and its leader, Jonas Savimbi. George Shultz spoke of UNITA’s “courageous stand
against Soviet aggression,” while Jeane Kirkpatrick lauded Jonas Savimbi as “one of the
few authentic heroes of our times.”153
Casey’s obsession with Central America was shared by other figures in the
administration, and was symptomatic of their worldview. The likes of Reagan and Haig
saw the hand of the USSR and its allies in all of the world’s crises, and Central America
was no exception. In his memoirs, Haig wrote that the civil war in El Salvador was “a
symptom of dangerous conditions in the Americas – Cuban adventurism, Soviet strategic
ambition.”154According to Haig, Reagan was “sympathetic” to his reading of the crisis
and “understood the problem. He knew that Moscow and Havana were behind the
troubles in Central America.”155 Reagan himself wrote after leaving office that “the
Soviets and Fidel Castro were targeting all of Central America for a Communist takeover.
El Salvador and Nicaragua were only a down payment. Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa
Rica were next, and then would come Mexico.”156 This interpretation of the turmoil in
Central America recalled the “domino theory” of previous US policymakers. When
questioned whether this was indeed his view by the House Foreign Affairs Committee in
March 1981, Haig said he preferred to call it “a hit list…for the ultimate takeover of
Central America.”157 Given the region’s proximity to the United States, and the fact that
US supremacy had long been unchallenged in its “backyard,” it was practically inevitable
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that it would be here that the Reagan administration would make the “credible show of
will and strength” alluded to by Alexander Haig.
George Shultz, who replaced the combative Haig in mid-1982, was often looked
upon as the “moderate” in Reagan’s foreign policy team. Yet Shultz brought to
Washington a very similar mind-set to the president and his predecessor as secretary of
state. Like Haig and Reagan, Shultz believed that the Soviets were threatening stability
around the world and that America was on the back foot. He later summed up the
situation as he entered office in stark terms: “Moscow’s military might grew yearly. The
nuclear arms race proceeded unharnessed. The Soviet army’s invading forces were
grinding through Afghan villages. So much for détente.” 158 Shultz believed that
Washington had to put the Soviets back in their place. “The Soviets,” he commented,
“had to be made to realize that they could not succeed with aggression, nor could they
win an arms race.” What was needed was “will and resolve” on the part of the US, in
order “to contain Soviet aggression and challenge its ideology.”159 Shultz, like the others,
reckoned the Soviets were to blame for the upheavals in Central America. He considered
the level of Soviet and Cuban influence in the region to be “alarming” and raised the
spectre of the Soviets gaining a foothold in Nicaragua or El Salvador: “If the Soviets
consolidated a Communist regime on the mainland of the Americas, they could tie us
down and preoccupy us right on our southern border in the hope that we would not attend
adequately to Soviet challenges in the farther reaches of the world.” And as Shultz put it,
“anything rotten [in Central America] could infect the United States.”160
US Policy towards Nicaragua under President Reagan
The Contras
There were very clear signs during Reagan’s first months in office that the US
was preparing to confront the Sandinistas. In February, the State Department released a
white paper entitled “Communist Interference in El Salvador,” which pinpointed
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Nicaragua as one of the states guilty of assisting the Salvadorian rebels. Economic aid to
Nicaragua, which had been frozen by Carter in January, was terminated outright in April.
Most significantly of all, in March 1981 Reagan secretly authorised a plan devised by
CIA Director Casey to expand covert CIA operations in Central America. The main
purpose was to bolster the floundering government of José Napoleón Duarte in El
Salvador, an objective which had implications for Nicaragua, for Casey’s scheme
envisioned the creation of a paramilitary force that would curb the flow of arms allegedly
moving from Nicaragua and Honduras into El Salvador. The plan also provided for
continuation of the covert funding of the aforementioned “moderates” in Nicaragua. A
presidential finding outlining the plan in vague terms was approved by the congressional
intelligence committees.161
The March finding laid the groundwork for the policy towards Nicaragua that
would be pursued throughout Reagan’s presidency. Paradoxical as it might sound,
establishing a paramilitary body to harass the Sandinistas became the administration’s
principal instrument for promoting democracy in Nicaragua. In December Casey was
obliged to return to the intelligence committees to present another presidential finding,
which this time focused entirely on Nicaragua. Casey explained to the committee
members that his scheme was aimed at clamping down on the arms pipeline that the
administration claimed was running from Nicaragua to the FMLN. The committees were
told that the CIA proposed to employ a paramilitary force of no more than five hundred
Nicaraguan exiles to accomplish this, and that the CIA’s partners in this enterprise, the
Argentine military dictatorship, had already set the ball rolling. Casey’s message was that
the CIA was “buying in” to an operation that was already far advanced.162 He assured the
congressmen that the paramilitaries would not hit economic targets as part of their arms
interception efforts.163 What the committees were not aware of was that Reagan had
signed National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD 17) the month before, which
161 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, pp. 114-5.
162 Christopher Dickey, With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua (London: Faber and Faber,
1986), p. 112.
163 Peter Kornbluh, “The Covert War,” in Thomas W. Walker, ed., Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The
Undeclared War on Nicaragua (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 24.
63
authorised “a much broader set of covert operations than was indicated in the Finding.”164
Included within the scope of this expanded operation were “political and paramilitary
operations against the Cuban presence and the Cuban-Sandinista support structure in
Nicaragua,” along with an effort to create “popular support…for an opposition front that
would be nationalistic, anti-Cuban and anti-Somoza.”165
The arrangement with Argentina was for the US to put up the money while the
Argentines provided the training and managed paramilitary operations. The third country
involved in the anti-Sandinista campaign was Honduras, which was to provide the base
for the force of Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries, known more commonly as “contras.”
The Argentines were already training Nicaraguan exiles in Buenos Aires and Honduras
and had also provided their clients with hard cash, with ex-National Guardsman Enrique
Bermúdez, the leader of a nascent rebel group called the 15th of September Legion and a
man who would later serve as a senior contra commander, a notable recipient.166 The
Argentines, along with the CIA, leaned on Bermúdez’s group and another faction to
merge their organisations, the upshot of which was the formation of the Nicaraguan
Democratic Forces (FDN) in August 1981.167 Edgar Chamorro, who served on the FDN’s
political directorate, a body put together by the CIA, from 1982 to 1984, described the
abject state of the exile groups prior to the merger in written testimony for the World
Court. He declared that “the ex-national guardsmen were divided into several small bands
operating along the Nicaragua-Honduras border…The bands were poorly armed and
equipped, and thoroughly disorganized. They were not an effective military force and
represented no more than a minor irritant to the Nicaraguan government.” 168 The
relationship between the US and Argentina was to disintegrate following Argentina’s ill-
fated invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982, and the Argentines ultimately ended their
involvement with the contras in 1984.
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President Reagan would later eulogise the contras as “freedom fighters struggling
to bring democracy to their country,” a strange description in light of their origins as
protégés of the Argentine military junta.169 The neo-fascist military rulers of Argentina
had after all waged a ruthless war on home-grown enemies after taking power in 1976,
although these opponents were mostly of the unarmed variety: students, teachers,
journalists, trade unionists and other suspected left-wingers. Up to 30,000 people are
believed to have been killed by the junta.170 However, the Reagan administration was not
ill-disposed towards the Argentine generals. “A few officials in the Reagan
administration displayed a certain admiration for the efficiency with which the Argentine
military had solved the problem of leftist insurgency,” notes William LeoGrande.171 UN
ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick was a notable member of this group, along with the
president himself. Reagan had given a radio broadcast in August 1979 in which he
declared that “Argentina is at peace, the terrorist threat nearly eliminated.” He accepted
that “the process of bringing stability to a terrorized nation” had resulted in some being
“caught in the crossfire, among them a few innocents,” but his reading of the situation
was that “the average Argentine-in-the-street” would probably be “pleased, not seething,
about the way things are going.”172 It should be noted that when Reagan spoke of “the
terrorist threat,” he was not referring to the terrorism of the junta, but that of the left-wing
rebels who had fought in the 1970s. The contras themselves seem to have had fewer
illusions about the nature of their Argentine masters. One of the more prominent contra
civilians, Aristides Sánchez, once remarked that “a lot of them were Nazis.”173
Another important, and unpleasant, figure in the contra war was the Honduran
Gustavo Álvarez, a man who once said that “Everything you do to destroy a Marxist
regime is moral.”174 Álvarez was a graduate of the Argentine military academy and he
shared their anti-communist fervour. While he was head of the public security forces,
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Hondurans began to disappear, a disturbing trend that increased when Álvarez took
control of the military in early 1982. Several hundred people were killed by the Honduran
security forces in the early 1980s.175 Álvarez was, like the Argentines, a valued ally of the
US in the war against the Sandinistas. US Ambassador to Honduras John Negroponte
praised Álvarez as “a model professional,”176 and it was pressure from the CIA that
induced Honduran President Roberto Suazo to nominate him as armed forces chief in
1982.177 He was the key Honduran in the contra campaign: as long as Álvarez occupied a
senior position in the army, Washington could be assured of Honduras’ support for the
war.
The congressional intelligence committees had signed up to the Reagan
administration’s covert initiative for Nicaragua in the belief that they were approving the
creation of a force of 500 paramilitaries who would be intercepting arms travelling
between Nicaragua and El Salvador. They soon deduced that William Casey hadn’t told
them the whole story. The size of the force supposedly engaged in arms interdiction had
shot up far above its supposed ceiling, with contra numbers reaching 4,000 just a year
after NSDD 17.178 In addition, the arms interception rationale was looking decidedly
shaky. In December 1982, the FDN’s military leader, Enrique Bermúdez, publicly
disavowed the goal of seizing weapons: “It is not acceptable to us to carry out missions to
interdict Cuban and Russian supply lines to El Salvador. We are Nicaraguans and our
objective is to overthrow the Communists.”179 Such statements were unhelpful, as was
“the fact that as of late 1983 no arms whatsoever had been intercepted.”180 Worse still,
the US government’s own intelligence agencies produced reports that directly
contradicted the administration’s claims about the contra program. A July 1982 report by
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) listed various actions carried out by the contras,
including the “Sabotage of highway bridges and attempted destruction of fuel tanks,”
“the assassination of minor government officials and a Cuban adviser,” “attacks against
small military patrols,” and the “Burning of a customs warehouse, buildings belonging to
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the Ministry of Construction, and crops.”181 These actions were clearly at odds with the
assurance Casey had given to the intelligence committees that the contras would not
attack economic targets, and obviously had nothing to do with intercepting arms.
The facts mentioned above made Democrats in the House of Representatives
suspicious of Reagan administration claims that the contras were doing no more than
capturing weapons moving from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Their response was the first
“Boland Amendment” of December 1982, named for its sponsor, Representative Edward
Boland, which forbade the US government from providing military support to any group
seeking to overthrow the Sandinistas or provoke a conflict between Honduras and
Nicaragua.182 The idea was to limit the operation to arms interdiction, a curious concept
given the absence of any evidence that arms were in fact going from Nicaragua to El
Salvador. It was passed 411-0 by the House, but would only apply for a year, and proved
to be an ineffectual measure. As long as the Reagan administration denied that the war
was aimed at unseating the Sandinistas and affirmed the arms interdiction rationale,
support for the contras could, and did, continue.
The CIA instructed the new FDN political directorate, which it had hastily
assembled in December 1982, to propagate the arms interdiction myth. Edgar Chamorro,
who was one of the seven individuals hand-picked by the Agency to serve on the
directorate, testified to the World Court that after the Boland Amendment became law in
December 1982, “the CIA instructed us that, if asked, we should say that our objective
was to interdict arms supposedly being smuggled from Nicaragua to El Salvador.”
According to Chamorro, however, both the FDN and the CIA knew this was a fraud. He
explained that “our goal, and that of the CIA as well (as we were repeatedly assured in
private), was to overthrow the government of Nicaragua…It was never our objective to
stop the supposed flow of arms, of which we never saw any evidence in the first place.”
As for the “public statements by United States government officials about the arms flow,”
he was told by the CIA that these “were necessary to maintain the support of the
Congress and should not be taken seriously by us.”183
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FDN offensives aimed at capturing an area of “liberated” territory in 1982 and
1983 ended in failure. In fact, the contras proved to be an inept fighting force, and they
fell back on the easier option of terrorising civilians. As Peter Kornbluh has put it, “The
contras proved adept at vanquishing undefended villages and killing unarmed civilians,
but they were incapable of establishing themselves as a viable guerrilla force.” 184
Notwithstanding the high-flown words of President Reagan, the CIA’s proxies were not
“freedom fighters” but rather ruthless killers, whose odd brand of patriotism allowed for
the deliberate murder of Nicaraguan non-combatants. The respected human rights
organisation Americas Watch painted a grim picture of the rebels, concluding in a report
published in 1985 that “contra forces have systematically violated the applicable laws of
war throughout the conflict. They have attacked civilians indiscriminately; they have
tortured and mutilated prisoners; they have murdered those placed hors de combat by
their wounds…and they have committed outrages against personal dignity.” 185 With
regard to the FDN, Americas Watch accused them of making “deliberate use of terror
tactics to disrupt the coffee harvest.” Destroying the coffee crop had been the FDN’s
“primary objective” from late 1984; the other contra groups were also reproached for
hitting economic targets. Americas Watch noted that the “FDN has been responsible for a
variety of attacks on unarmed civilians, including kidnappings and murders, and has
attacked humanitarian vehicles clearly marked as such.” There was also “credible
testimony” that the FDN had “finished off” wounded adversaries. One incident cited in
the report involved an FDN raid on a state farm in the department of Jinotega in
November 1982. After overcoming resistance from a score of armed civilians, the FDN
proceeded to “kill the wounded defenders with their bayonet knives. In all, 14 armed
civilians died there.”186
The FDN’s military hierarchy was packed with former members of Somoza’s
despised National Guard. Its military chief, the aforementioned Enrique Bermúdez, was a
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GN veteran who had served as Somoza’s military attaché in Washington prior to the
dictator’s downfall.187 As for the contra civilians, the chairman of the FDN political
directorate, Adolfo Calero, was a long-standing CIA asset and a defender of attacks on
civilian targets. Calero once declared that “There is no line at all, not even a fine line,
between a civilian farm owned by the government and a Sandinista military outpost.”188
Internal documents reveal that US officials themselves were privately unimpressed with
their underlings. One such doubter was Robert Owen, who served as Oliver North’s
liaison with the contras after North became the principal US official involved in the
contra operation. According to Owen, Calero exercised total control over the other
civilians. He told North that Calero was “the strong man and the only one who counts in
the FDN; what he says is law.” He described Calero not as an authentic nationalist but as
“a creation of the USG [United States Government].” As for those “who he keeps around
him,” “they are liars and greed and power motivated. They are not the people to rebuild a
new Nicaragua. In fact, the FDN has done a good job of keeping competent people out of
the organization.”189
Edgar Chamorro, who supervised FDN public relations and served on the group’s
political directorate, was candid about the contras’ deplorable human rights record. Part
of his job involved attempting “to improve the image of the FDN forces,” a task he
considered “challenging,” for “it was standard FDN practice to kill prisoners and
suspected Sandinista collaborators.” According to Chamorro, the CIA “did not
discourage such tactics” and “the agency severely criticized me when I admitted to the
press that the FDN had regularly kidnapped and executed agrarian reform workers and
civilians.”190 Chamorro also revealed that while some Nicaraguans signed up to join the
FDN of their own volition, many others “were recruited forcibly.” The recruitment
process went like this: “FDN units would arrive at an undefended village, assemble all
the residents in the town square and then proceed to kill – in full view of the others – all
persons suspected of working for the Nicaraguan government or the FSLN…In this
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atmosphere, it was not difficult to persuade those able-bodied men left alive to return
with the FDN units to their base camps in Honduras and enlist in the force.” This,
according to Chamorro, “was, unfortunately, a widespread practice that accounted for
many recruits.”191
In light of the above, it is surprising that the contras were portrayed as a
democratic movement and the main means by which the United States planned to bring
democracy to Nicaragua. The esteem in which the contras were held by the
administration is evident from Reagan’s description of them as “our brothers” and “the
moral equal of our Founding Fathers and the brave men and women of the French
Resistance.”192 Interestingly, the president claimed that the US was not just helping the
contras to bring democracy to Nicaragua, but to “restore” democracy there. This was an
odd choice of words, for it implied that what existed before the Sandinistas took power,
namely the dictatorial Somoza dynasty, was a democracy. He told two journalists from
the New York Times that the US had “made it plain to Nicaragua” that American support
for the contras would cease “when they keep their promise and restore a democratic rule
and have elections”(my italics).193 The idea of using the contras as a tool for bringing
democracy to Nicaragua was also underlined by Secretary of State George Shultz. In his
memoirs, Shultz wrote that the rebels “were ready to put military pressure on the regime
in Managua and hoped to force it at least to hold honest elections.” They constituted “a
source of pressure to further our true objectives: democracy in Nicaragua and peace in
Central America,” he added. 194 And yet there can be no doubt that administration
officials were aware that the contras were responsible for appalling atrocities. The July
1982 DIA briefing revealed as much, and there were countless reports in the media and
by human rights groups detailing abuses.
The contras’ military inadequacies necessitated a heightened role for the CIA and
in mid-1983 the Agency decided to attack Nicaragua’s oil infrastructure. To carry out the
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sabotage of Nicaragua’s oil facilities, the CIA used commandos known as UCLAs
(Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets). UCLAs blew up the oil pipeline at Puerto
Sandino in September and again in October. They also destroyed five oil storage tanks in
the port city of Corinto, an action that forced the evacuation of 25,000 residents.195 Not
content with these acts of destruction, Reagan approved in December a plan to mine
Nicaragua’s harbours.196 In the first three months of 1984, UCLAs planted mines the
harbours of Nicaragua’s main ports, the intention of which was “to severely disrupt the
flow of shipping essential to Nicaraguan trade during the peak export period,” NSC
staffers Oliver North and Constantine Menges told their boss, National Security Adviser
Robert McFarlane.197 As per instructions, the FDN and another contra organisation, the
Costa Rica-based Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), duly claimed
responsibility for the minings.198 The decision to lay the mines backfired badly, however.
As word of the CIA’s role leaked, the administration was condemned in Congress.
According to the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, it was Casey’s responsibility to
keep the intelligence committees informed about planned CIA actions, but he neglected
to inform the House committee about the mining until January 31, roughly four weeks
after the first mines were laid. Casey waited until March, some two months after the
operation started, before apprising the Senate committee and even then he was hardly
forthcoming, failing as he did to mention that the mines had been placed by CIA
agents.199
The Reagan administration’s duplicity had caused a great amount of anger in
Congress, even before the mining controversy. As noted above, the House had tried in
December 1982 to restrict the contra war to its stated objective of arms interdiction.
During 1983, numerous senators and representatives came to the accurate conclusion that
the administration was deceiving them, and that the contras were doing a lot more than
intercepting arms, if indeed they were doing that at all. In January 1983, Senator Patrick
Leahy, a Democrat, travelled to Central America on behalf of the Senate Intelligence
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Committee. The contras’ Honduran cheerleader, General Álvarez, told Leahy that “We’re
going to be in Managua by Christmas,” while the CIA’s Ray Doty, who was running the
contra operation on the ground, informed the senator that “If [the Sandinistas] fall of their
own weight, we don’t care.”200 Leahy “returned to Washington convinced that the contra
operation violated the spirit if not the letter of the Boland amendment.”201 Other members
of Congress shared Leahy’s view, and in July the House voted to terminate the contra aid
program; during the debate, Boland described the CIA’s activities in Nicaragua as
“illegal.” Boland’s assessment was shared by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the ranking
Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, who asserted that there was “evidence
every night on television” that the administration was breaking the law.202 The Senate
was unwilling to shut off aid, however, forcing House Democrats to agree to a
compromise whereby the administration would get US$24 million for its war in
Nicaragua, a significantly smaller figure than hoped for by the president and his
advisers.203
To mollify his critics in Congress, Reagan signed a new presidential finding in
September 1983. Although it was more detailed than the finding presented to the
intelligence committees in December 1981, the listed objectives were mostly the same:
arms interdiction, pressuring the Sandinistas to negotiate, inducing Cuba and the
Sandinistas to stop supporting regional insurgencies. However, the new finding differed
from its predecessor by making democracy in Nicaragua an official policy goal. It stated
that US aid to the contras would cease “at such time as it is verified that…the
Government of Nicaragua is demonstrating a commitment to provide…
nondiscriminatory participation in the Nicaraguan political process by all
Nicaraguans.” 204 Although the new finding was sufficient to ensure that Congress
appropriated the $24 million, it by no means guaranteed long-term congressional support.
For in the wake of the revelations about CIA involvement in the mining of Nicaragua’s
harbours, congressional backing for the contras atrophied. The House again voted down
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contra aid in May 1984 and the Senate this time did not come to the administration’s
rescue. Under the terms of the second Boland Amendment, which was signed into law in
October 1984, no funds available to the US government could be used to provide support
to any group conducting military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, including the
contras. Thus, as Boland himself said, the bill “clearly ends U.S. support for the war in
Nicaragua.”205 Or at least it should have.
The 1984 Elections
The Reagan administration demonised the Sandinistas for their supposed refusal
to hold elections, which was put forward as firm evidence of Nicaragua’s totalitarian
character. US officials often justified their backing of the contras by arguing that they
were only trying to pressure the Sandinistas into “restoring” democracy, and democracy
couldn’t exist without the ballot box. In March 1984, Reagan said that the US would rein
in the contras if the Sandinistas would only “keep their promise and restore a democratic
rule and have elections.” George Shultz likewise asserted that the insurgents were
fighting the Nicaraguan government “to force it at least to hold honest elections.” The
charge that the FSLN would not submit itself to electoral competition was a staple of the
president’s speeches. In a showpiece address on US policy in Central America that was
shown live on American TV in May 1984, he berated the Sandinistas for their “outright
refusal to hold genuine elections, coupled with the continual promise to do so.”206 The
problem confronting the Reagan administration, however, was that the Sandinistas had in
fact been saying for years that they intended for such a contest to eventually take place.
As Andrew Reding has observed, “the Nicaraguan junta never wavered from plans to
hold national elections,” plans that had been spelled out as early as 1979, with 1985 set as
the provisional date for the contest. To show that they were serious, the Nicaraguan
legislature spent two years discussing a Law of Political Parties which, when passed in
August 1983, enshrined the right to form political parties of any hue, “apart from a
prohibition on advocating the return of a Somoza-style dictatorship,” and which
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“recognized the right of all such parties to contend for power.” Special commissions were
sent to the US, Europe and Latin America for advice on electoral laws, and the
information they gathered was used to write the Electoral Law passed in March 1984.207
The Reagan administration’s assertion that the Sandinistas were adamantly opposed to
the holding of elections was thus clearly unfounded.
As the date of the ballot, which was brought forward to November 1984,
approached, US officials resorted to disparaging the upcoming contest. President Reagan
went on the offensive very early on, telling the New York Times in March that “there isn’t
anything yet to indicate that that election will be anything but the kind of rubberstamp
that we see in any totalitarian government.”208 His disdain for the Nicaraguan elections
was again in evidence in July when he gave a speech in which he warned the Sandinistas
that “No person committed to democracy will be taken in by a Soviet-style sham.”209 To
complement this strategy of publicly deriding the approaching elections, the United
States set about building up the Coordinadora Democrática (Democratic Coordinator), a
pro-US and pro-contra conservative opposition group, which administration officials
planned to depict as the only opposition in Nicaragua. Having talked up the Coordinadora,
the US would then convince them to nobly refuse to participate, thereby discrediting the
contest. This would not be difficult, for the leading figures in the Coordinadora were
themselves unwilling to compete. Portraying the Coordinadora as a significant political
force was, however, extremely disingenuous. It consisted of the business confederation
COSEP, four political parties, one of which was not even legally registered, and two tiny
trade unions that encompassed a mere 2% of organised Nicaraguan workers. 210
According to Dennis Gilbert, the four political parties were “weak, some existing only on
paper, others compromised by their performance under the old regime.” The conclusion
of the US-based Latin American Studies Association (LASA), which sent observers to
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the Nicaraguan elections, was that “there was never any credible evidence that…the
Coordinadora had a broad popular following in Nicaragua.”211
In 1984 Arturo Cruz was barely known in Nicaragua, due to the fact that he had
spent many years in the United States. He had at one time been a part of the Sandinista
government, but he quickly became disenchanted and headed back to the US. Cruz, who
was on the CIA payroll,212 signed on as the Coordinadora’s candidate in July 1984. He
only arrived in Nicaragua on July 22, and promptly endorsed the Coordinadora’s nine
demands for participation in the elections, a few of which were considered “killers” by
US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Craig Johnstone. 213
Johnstone’s belief that the nine points were sure to be rejected by the Sandinistas was
shared by a senior US diplomat in Central America who was interviewed by LASA; his
view was that “the content of that statement showed that they had already decided not to
participate. These were things that the Sandinistas would never accept.”214 It was not at
all surprising that the Sandinistas rejected these conditions, for they were not merely
aimed at ensuring a fair vote but also included demands for “major changes in the
political system and reorientation of the FSLN government’s policies, before the
elections”(italics in original).215 One of the Coordinadora’s most unrealistic demands was
that the government open negotiations with the contras. Just days after his arrival, Cruz
withdrew from the presidential race, while opting to carry on campaigning nonetheless.
However, after a series of rallies that witnessed clashes between pro-Sandinista mobs and
Cruz loyalists, Cruz “returned to Washington, and for five weeks suspended his
campaign.”216 When he returned to Nicaragua it was to conduct fruitless eleventh-hour
negotiations with high-level Sandinista officials on the Coordinadora’s participation, but
these talks ended in October in mutual recrimination.
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The evidence suggests that the Reagan administration had no intention of
allowing Cruz to go forward and face almost certain defeat. This was made clear by a US
official who told the New York Times in October that “the administration never
contemplated letting Cruz stay in the race, because then the Sandinistas could justifiably
claim that the elections were legitimate, making it much harder for the United States to
oppose the Nicaraguan Government.”217 Still, according to Roy Gutman, there were some
US policymakers who wanted Cruz to participate, albeit with reservations, but they were
fighting a losing battle within the administration. Craig Johnstone and the State
Department apparently thought “Cruz should run if he could get fair conditions.”
Administration “hard-liners” like William Casey, Constantine Menges and Oliver North
had no time for elections of any sort, though, believing that “force was the only way to
bring about democracy in Nicaragua…They supported Cruz in the expectation he would
not participate in the elections, thereby discrediting them.”218
The administration’s strategy for derailing the elections also included pressuring
the six non-Sandinista political parties that had registered to compete into withdrawing.
Virgilio Godoy, the presidential candidate of the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), was
visited repeatedly by US officials. He withdrew from the contest on October 21, a day
after receiving US Ambassador to Nicaragua Harry Berghold at his house. Although
Godoy denied that his decision had been influenced by the hostility of the United States
towards the elections, he did say that Berghold had told him that “this was not the best
time to hold elections.” A friend of Godoy’s told LASA that “I think he was subject to
terrible pressure from the Embassy.” 219 The PLI split into abstentionist and non-
abstentionist factions, with the latter group competing on November 4. Charges of US
foul play were also made by Clemente Guido, the presidential candidate of the
Democratic Conservative Party (PCD), who claimed that the US embassy had bribed his
campaign manager to bow out of the contest. Guido himself chose to remain in the
race.220 US efforts to disrupt the elections came in other forms as well. To deprive the
vote of international legitimacy, the State Department leaned on other countries not to
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send observers to monitor the balloting, while the US military “during the week before
the election began daily supersonic overflights of Nicaragua,” causing “loud sonic booms
across much of the national territory and a sense of near panic among the population.”221
When election day arrived, Reagan dismissed it as “a phony,” while George
Shultz’s spokesman called it “The Sandinista electoral farce.”222 The reality, however,
was rather different. As Andrew Reding has remarked, in this “farce” Nicaraguans “were
offered a range of choices as broad as those available in Western Europe, ranging from
the Far Left to the PCD, whose platform coincided in many respects with that of the CDN
[the Coordinadora], and some of whose candidates openly expressed sympathy for the
armed counterrevolution.”223 Many voters did indeed cast ballots for parties other than
the FSLN. The Sandinistas won 67% of the vote, a result which, as the Latin American
Studies Association observed, was “a far cry from a totalitarian political system that has
frozen out all legitimate opposition.”224 The three parties to the right of the FSLN won a
29.2% share, while the three parties to the Sandinistas’ left picked up a dismal 3.8%. In
spite of their miserable performance, the three left-wing parties were all awarded seats in
the National Assembly, beneficiaries of an electoral system designed to promote
pluralism. According to the Electoral Law, the threshold for party representation in the
National Assembly was just 1 percent of the overall vote, enabling the small parties to
make it into the legislature, 225 an outcome that would not have occurred in many
respected democracies. Turnout was also impressive at 75%, but was hampered in the
north of the country by the ongoing war. Those international delegations that braved the
State Department’s wrath and travelled to Nicaragua to observe the polling “agreed that
the process through which the votes had been cast and counted on election day was
beyond reproach.”226 These facts suggest either that the US government was simply
misinformed or, more likely, that it was wilfully misrepresenting what had occurred.
It is true that the 1984 electoral process suffered from certain deficiencies, not the
least of which was the fact that the contras endeavoured to sabotage it. They killed a total
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of eight election workers, one of whom was murdered on polling day.227 They also issued
death threats to potential voters: “From a radio station in Costa Rica, the contras were
broadcasting a very clear message: people who vote, and their families, would be marked
for killing by the contras.”228 The state of emergency also remained in place, although it
was eased. There was some press censorship, but “a high level of freedom of the press
and free speech prevailed overall.”229 No restrictions were placed on Nicaragua’s 39
radio stations, and each political party was provided with free and uncensored radio and
television time. Each party also received an equal amount of funding from the
government with which to conduct its campaign.230 Furthermore, “With the exception of
the disturbances around Cruz,” who was not even a real candidate, “the campaign
proceeded virtually without incident.” 231 In conclusion, LASA stated that “by Latin
American standards,” the Nicaraguan elections were “a model of probity and fairness.”232
And yet to the Reagan administration it was as if they had never taken pace. In a speech
given by the president in April 1985, just five months later, the Sandinistas were
denounced as “a Communist dictatorship” ruling a “police state.”233 Reagan continued to
describe “our goal” and that of the “freedom fighters” as well as “a democracy in which
the people of Nicaragua choose their own government.”234 The fact that they had done so
in November 1984 had been swept under the carpet.
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The Secret War
As congressional funding for the contras dried up in 1984 and it became apparent
that no more money would be forthcoming, management of the operation was transferred
from the CIA to the staff of the National Security Council, with Lieutenant Colonel
Oliver North the key figure. In early 1984, National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane
was tasked by Reagan with keeping the contras together “body and soul.” He relayed this
message to his subordinate North,235who apparently gave the FDN an “assurance of
continued United States government support, notwithstanding the refusal of the Congress
to appropriate more funds.”236 In a meeting in early 1984 attended by various CIA
officials and “a contra leader,” CIA Director Casey emphasised first that the
administration would not leave its Nicaraguan proxies high and dry were Congress to
terminate aid, and second, that North would be the principal figure in this new contra
support effort. Casey informed those present that Reagan himself had agreed to this plan.
In meetings with North and two top CIA officials, Duane Clarridge and Vincent
Cannistraro, FDN chief Adolfo Calero was apprised of the shake-up: North was taking
the place of the CIA.237
The task given to North was demanding, to say the least. He had to find sources of
funding for the contras, ensure that they continued to receive arms, and provide them
with intelligence. There was no way he could do this alone, so he hired numerous
individuals from outside the government, many of whom had military or CIA
backgrounds, to assist him. On Casey’s advice, North approached retired US Air Force
General Richard Secord and asked him to purchase arms for the contras. Secord used
arms dealers in Canada and Portugal to procure the weapons and also undertook the job
of moving the arms to Central America. By mid-1985, Secord had bought US$9 million
of weapons on behalf of the contras, with a tidy profit of US$2.3million for himself and
his business partner, Albert Hakim, into the bargain.238 In July 1985, North, who had
grown tired of the contras’ incompetence and corruption, gave Secord and Hakim the
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added responsibility of taking care of the contras’ finances; he also instructed Secord to
organise airdrops to the contras in the field. It was this air resupply operation that
eventually led to the exposure of North’s secret network, which Secord and Hakim had
named “the Enterprise.”239
Secord turned to another ex-US Air Force man, Richard Gadd, to provide the
planes and men for the air resupply. Gadd had been of use to Secord previously, moving
arms bought by the Enterprise to Central America.240 At the same time he was working
for Secord, Gadd was also flying nonlethal “humanitarian” supplies to the contras on
behalf of the US State Department’s Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office
(NHAO). The NHAO had been set up following Congress’ decision in July 1985 to
provide the contras with US$27million in so-called “humanitarian aid,” like food, clothes,
and medicine. In a coup of truly remarkable proportions, North had succeeded in
arranging for Gadd’s company Air Mach, which had no planes, to deliver the supplies.
NHAO was thus co-opted by the Enterprise. Air Mach would fly nonlethal supplies to
Central America for the NHAO before turning to the task of supplying the contras with
weapons.241 The Salvadorian military was talked into allowing its base at Ilopango to be
used as the Enterprise’s air resupply hub. To “smooth relations with the Salvadoran
military,” the Enterprise enlisted the services of Colonel James Steele, commander of the
US Military Group in El Salvador.242
Several US officials in Costa Rica were implicated in a scheme to extend the
resupply operation to contra groups based in that country, a plan which necessitated the
building of an airstrip in the north of the country. The US Ambassador to Costa Rica,
Lewis Tambs, was heavily involved in this effort. Internal CIA documents reveal that
after becoming ambassador in 1985 Tambs quickly reached an agreement with Costa
Rican President Luis Alberto Monge for Costa Rica to “clandestinely support the
resupply.”243 The ambassador made further contributions to the project. The land chosen
for the airstrip was owned by an American, Joseph Hamilton, who agreed to sell it to an
239 Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, p. 126; LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, pp. 402-3.
240 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, p. 403; Draper, A Very Thin Line, p. 39.
241 Draper, A Very Thin Line, p. 49; Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, p. 125.
242 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, p. 405
243 CIA Office of the Inspector General, Cole Black and George Jameson, “CIA Interview with Joseph
Fernandez,” 24 January 1987, in Kornbluh and Byrne, The Iran-Contra Scandal, p. 156.
80
Enterprise front called Udall Research Corporation, whose “directors” were North,
Secord and a man named William Haskell, who had served with North in Vietnam.244
Hamilton was suspicious of Haskell, obliging Tambs to call Hamilton and offer “his
personal assurances” as to the latter’s integrity.245 Other US officials who knew about the
airstrip were the CIA’s top man in Costa Rica, Joseph Fernandez, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams, and Alan Fiers, the head of CIA
operations in Central America.246 The airfield was ready by May 1986, but was not in
service for very long due to the exposure of the secret air resupply effort in October 1986.
Following the passage of the second Boland Amendment the US government was
forced to turn to other countries for money to keep the contras going. However, soliciting
aid from third countries was of dubious legality and was therefore kept from Congress.
The search for alternative sources of funding began even before the aid cutoff of October
1984 and the matter was debated at a meeting of the National Security Planning Group
(NSPG), attended by Reagan’s top foreign policy advisers, on 25 June 1984. Several of
those present underscored the urgency of securing funds for the contras from abroad.
Jeane Kirkpatrick, for instance, remarked that “If we can’t get the money for the anti-
Sandinistas [from Congress], then we should make the maximum effort to find the money
elsewhere.” William Casey was of the same opinion, arguing that while the
administration should certainly continue to pressure Congress to finance the contras, they
should also focus on “trying to help obtain funding for the anti-Sandinistas from other
sources.” Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger likewise deemed that the
administration “should facilitate third country support for the anti-Sandinista groups.”247
Although Casey expressed confidence that soliciting funds for the contras from third
parties was above board, his interpretation was by no means shared by all. Secretary of
State Shultz declared that Reagan’s chief of staff, James Baker, had “said that if we go
out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense.”248 Baker was
not present at this meeting, but he testified before the Senate committee investigating the
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Iran-Contra affair that “it was my view that we could not do indirectly what we could not
do directly.” As Theodore Draper comments, this “suggests that Baker had serious
doubts” about the legality of asking for contributions from third parties.249 It appears that
the president himself also had concerns. In response to McFarlane’s comment at the
NSPG meeting that “I certainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any
way,” Reagan remarked that “If such a story gets out, we’ll all be hanging by our thumbs
in front of the White House until we find out who did it.”250
As Theodore Draper has observed, Reagan’s remark was “peculiar,” and “has
seemed in need of interpretation.” According to Draper, “The point would seem to be that
third-country support in place of congressional appropriation needed unusual secrecy
because it was constitutionally or politically dubious or even indefensible.” 251 The
question of third-country funding was referred to the office of the US attorney general,
William French Smith. His assistant Mary Lawton gave the opinion that solicitation of
money for the contras from third countries was legally acceptable providing it was not
accompanied by “any monetary promises or inducements from the United States.” Smith
concurred, asserting that a third country funding the contras “could not look to the United
States to repay that commitment in the future.”252 The legal view was therefore that the
administration could approach other countries about supporting the contras, but it could
not offer a “quid pro quo.” In other words, those countries choosing to back the contras
could not expect anything from the US in return.
Although the administration was now armed with legal opinions that at least gave
it a case that requests for third country funding were permissible, these evidently did not
dispel the doubts. In the summer of 1985 reports appeared in the US media alleging
continued US government involvement in the contra war. In an effort to get some
answers, Lee Hamilton, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, and Michael
Barnes, who headed the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, wrote
letters to McFarlane. In his reply to Hamilton, dated 5 September, McFarlane lied that
“We did not solicit funds or other support for military or paramilitary activities [in
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Nicaragua] either from Americans or third parties.” 253 He assured Barnes on 12
September that “none of us has solicited funds,” or “facilitated contacts for prospective
potential donors” for the contras.254 McFarlane had in fact already approached Prince
Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador in Washington, for money. He had met Bandar
in May 1984 and told him that Reagan was facing “defeat” in Congress on contra
appropriations, a reversal that “would represent a substantial loss for the President.”
Bandar informed McFarlane that the Saudis would give the contras US$1 million a
month. 255 In early 1985, McFarlane once again asked Prince Bandar for help, a request
that produced results when the Saudi monarch, King Fahd, told President Reagan during
a meeting in Washington that he would double the amount of money the Saudis were
paying the contras.256 As Theodore Draper notes, both Reagan and McFarlane avoided
asking the Saudis outright for money. McFarlane later claimed that the message he
wanted to transmit to Bandar was that “if anyone with any gumption could manage
without being led or asked, then a contribution would have been welcome.” He continued,
“I think it became pretty obvious to the ambassador that his country, to gain a
considerable amount of favour…would provide the support when the Congress cut it
off.”257 As for Reagan, he stated that while he wanted third countries to help the contras,
“I didn’t want to be on record as doing it.”258
Another official, Elliott Abrams, tapped a foreign donor for money for the
Nicaraguan rebels. In August 1986, Abrams, who was using an alias, met the foreign
minister of Brunei in a park in London. He asked for US$10 million for the contras and
told him that Brunei could expect something in return: “The President will know of this,
and you will have the gratitude of the secretary [of state] and the president for helping us
out in a jam.” Although the foreign minister agreed to hand over the money, there was a
foul up with the bank account number and the contras never received a dime.259 Abrams
wanted to keep the transaction a secret. In November 1986, he lied to the Senate
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Intelligence Committee about the administration’s fund-raising activities, declaring
before the senators that “we’re not in the fundraising business.” He added that “the State
Department’s function in this has not been to raise money, other than to try to raise it
from Congress.” 260 Abrams, like McFarlane, was later convicted of withholding
information from Congress.261
In his memoirs, Reagan wrote the following in relation to his administration’s
approaches to third countries: “I knew that there must be among our allies other countries
that shared our concern about the threat to democracy in Latin America…Several
countries responded and extended help – a case of friendly nations believing we all had a
stake in fighting for democracy.”262 The idea that Saudi Arabia, Brunei and Taiwan
(which donated US$2 million) doled out money for the contras out of “concern about the
threat to democracy in Latin America” is perverse, although it does perhaps underline the
hollowness of Reagan’s conception of democracy. About the only thing these states had
in common was their authoritarian character. Why did these three states hand over money
for the contras? Theodore Draper offers as good an answer as any: “The money was an
investment in the gratitude of President Reagan and Secretary Shultz, because the three
countries did not have the slightest interest or stake in the fate of Nicaragua.”263
The Reagan administration needed more than just foreign money to keep the
contras alive after Congress terminated aid, however. Prosecuting the war necessitated
the involvement of Nicaragua’s neighbours. Guatemala, which is separated from
Nicaragua by Honduras, provided numerous valuable services, the most important of
which was the provision of end user certificates for contra weapons purchases. In a memo
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written in March 1985, Oliver North informed McFarlane that end user certificates
provided by Guatemala had been used to buy “nearly $8 million worth of munitions to be
delivered to the FDN.” Arms destined for the contras were shipped to Guatemala, where
they were transferred to contra representatives. 264 Guatemala’s military even provided
security for the journey through Guatemala, which had its own problems with leftist
guerrillas. A noteworthy example was when the contras ordered a batch of anti-aircraft
missiles from China, which presumably did not know that by arming the contras it was
“promoting democracy.” This deal had been helped along by North, who met a Chinese
official in November 1984 in an effort to cajole the Chinese into going through with the
sale. North’s intervention met with success and the missiles were sent to Guatemala. The
army then “provided helicopters and an armed escort to trek the missiles all across
Guatemala so that they would not fall into the hands of Guatemalan guerrillas.”265
Guatemala expected some kind of compensation in return for its part in the secret
war. This is clear from US government documents, which reveal that McFarlane went to
Central America in January 1985 “to discuss with his counterparts in those countries their
continued willingness to support the [Nicaraguan] Resistance.” He “was advised before
his departure that Guatemala would continue to support the Resistance, provided that it
received a quid pro quo from the United States in the form of foreign assistance funds or
credits, diplomatic support or other forms of assistance.”266 North alluded to the need to
“compensate the Guatemalans for the extraordinary assistance they are providing to the
Nicaraguan freedom fighters” in his aforementioned March 1985 memo to McFarlane.
He included in his memo a “wish list” of goods sought by Guatemala for its war against
the guerrillas and any others deemed subversive.267 Guatemala was indeed rewarded
when, “In May 1985, President Reagan personally approved increased U.S. special
support to Honduras and Guatemala for joint programs with these countries.”268 Another
state that contributed to the contra cause was El Salvador, which, as we saw above,
allowed the contras and the Enterprise to use the air force base at Ilopango. As with
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Guatemala, there were rewards for the Salvadorians for these services. In May 1986,
Reagan wrote letters to Salvadorian President José Napoleón Duarte and his Honduran
counterpart, José Azcona Hoyo, “thanking them for their support for the Resistance.” In
his letter to Duarte, “Reagan announced that he would propose legislation that Duarte had
sought extending U.S. participation in an international trade agreement of benefit to El
Salvador.”269
Peace Processes
The Reagan administration’s war in Nicaragua co-existed with regional efforts to
bring that conflict, and others in El Salvador and Guatemala, to a halt. Despite paying lip
service to the objective of peace in Central America, the United States government spent
years attempting to thwart such initiatives. One of the clearest examples of this trend was
the administration’s campaign to sabotage the Contadora peace process, which had begun
in January 1983 when the foreign ministers of Panama, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela
met on the Panamanian island of Contadora. They issued “an urgent appeal to all Central
American countries to reduce tensions,” and called on “all nations to abstain from actions
which could worsen the situation and create the danger of a general conflict which could
extend throughout the region.”270 By September 1984, the Contadora states had produced
a final treaty, which Nicaragua announced it would sign. Nicaragua was denounced by
the US for having done so, although Reagan himself was on record as stating that “The
United States fully supports the objectives of that process.” Once the US had made clear
its hostility to the September 1984 treaty, its regional allies, which had initially backed
the document, did an about turn and demanded revisions.271 A similar tale unfolded in
1986. In the face of an anti-Sandinista rhetorical offensive led by the president the House
of Representatives in June voted to appropriate US$100 million for the contras, of which
US$70 million was lethal aid. The House vote came “five days after Nicaragua had
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accepted the latest draft of the Contadora treaty, rejected by the U.S. and its clients.”272
The Senate, which had been more or less steadfast in its support of Reagan on Nicaragua,
approved the aid package in August.
One of the tools employed by the administration to derail regional peace
negotiations was to insist upon democratization in Nicaragua, which proved to be a very
convenient way of undermining peace talks, for it quickly became apparent that there was
nothing the Nicaraguan government could do to satisfy the United States in this respect.
This was clear from the administration’s refusal to judge the 1984 elections on their
merits. The administration was playing with fire, however, for there was always a chance
that the Nicaraguans might sign up to a peace agreement that contained language
regarding democratization. This is precisely what occurred in August 1987, when
Nicaragua and its neighbours signed a peace accord known as the Esquipulas agreement,
which called on the five states “to promote an authentic democratic, pluralist and
participatory process” and “to carry out…those measures leading to the establishment,
or…the improvement of representative and pluralist democratic systems.” 273 The
Esquipulas agreement did not go down at all well within the Reagan administration, for it
made the assertion that the Sandinistas were opposed to democracy even more
implausible. According to George Shultz, his plan to send peace envoy Philip Habib to
Central America to follow up on the accord “met a storm of opposition [inside the
administration] as the hard-liners caught their breath and tried to reverse course.” Elliott
Abrams was totally opposed to the accord, and he enlisted Secretary of Defence
Weinberger and National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci to persuade Reagan to
denounce it.274 The president declined to endorse Shultz’s scheme, prompting Habib to
hand in his resignation. Habib hadn’t understood that he was, in Abrams’ words, “just a
symbol.”275
The administration’s disdain for the Esquipulas agreement was evident both in
the public statements of administration officials and their actions. Reagan derided the
agreement as “fatally flawed,” and emphasised that there “should be no uncertainty of our
272 Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism, p. 12.
273 Quoted in Sklar, Washington’s War on Nicaragua, p. 402.
274 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 961; Gutman, Banana Diplomacy, pp. 350-1.
275 Quoted in Gutman, Banana Diplomacy, p. 353.
87
unswerving commitment to the contras.” 276 In September, the administration asked
Congress to appropriate US$270 million for the contras to cover a period of 18 months.
By taking this step, the administration was announcing its intent to ignore the terms of the
accord, which demanded an end to all aid to “irregular forces or insurrectionist
movements” in the region. Terminating such assistance was described in the agreement
as “an indispensable element for achieving a stable and lasting peace in the region.”277 Of
the five signatories “only Nicaragua made a serious effort to implement the accords,”278 a
fact that was conveniently overlooked by the Reagan administration. Guatemala’s
attitude was encapsulated by defence minister Héctor Gramajo’s remark that the accord
“does not apply to our country.” 279 However, notwithstanding the Reagan
administration’s antipathy towards the Esquipulas agreement, and the ambivalence of the
likes of Guatemala, the accord did not collapse and the regional peace process persisted
after Reagan left Washington in 1989.
Democracy Promotion in Nicaragua: Success or Failure?
Reagan left office in January 1989 with the Sandinistas still in power. The
following year, however, saw the electoral defeat of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega
by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, whose victory finally brought an end to the contra war.
Chamorro’s was a hollow triumph, though, for the country had been ruined by the
conflict. More than 30,000 Nicaraguans, several thousand of whom were civilians, had
died as a result of the war, a loss of life equivalent to 0.9% of the population. Nicaragua
is of course a small country, with a population of just a few million, so a comparison with
the United States provides some perspective: “An equivalent loss for the United States
would be 2.25 million or over thirty-eight times the U.S. death toll in the entire Vietnam
War.”280 The economy was in tatters. By 1987, “property destruction from CIA/contra
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attacks totaled $221.6 million; production losses, $984.5 million.”281 The devastation
directly attributable to the war was exacerbated by the implementation of an embargo by
the US in 1985, the inability of the Sandinistas to borrow from international financial
institutions, due to US vetoes, and the fact that other nations were pressured by
Washington not to give aid to the Sandinistas. This left Nicaragua the poorest country in
Latin America.
If we apply the democracy metric outlined in chapter two we can see that
Nicaragua’s performance was, at least in terms of elections, actually fairly commendable.
The elections of 1984 were contested by seven parties, whose ideologies extended across
the political spectrum. Several international monitoring groups witnessed the vote and
concluded that it was not fraudulent. Citizens aged sixteen and over were granted the
right to vote and had at least some means to make an informed decision, as each political
party was provided with free and uncensored radio and television time, while Nicaragua’s
many radio stations were able to broadcast freely. Other forms of campaigning also went
ahead. “At the height of the campaign even minor opposition parties were able to hold
street rallies and demonstrations with fewer impediments than such activity would
encounter in the United States,” notes Karl Bermann, who witnessed the election.282
Admittedly, the ability of citizens to make a well-informed choice was hampered by the
dearth of newspapers, especially unbiased newspapers, in Nicaragua. “Only the
independent pro-Sandinista paper Nuevo Diario made a serious effort to devote space to
all parties” in its coverage of the 1984 electoral process, writes Bermann.283 Furthermore,
all three papers had a very small circulation: the stridently anti-Sandinista La Prensa,
which had the largest circulation, “printed only about 55,000 copies daily for a nation of
nearly three million people.”284 The election undoubtedly failed to meet the final criteria
of a genuinely free and fair contest, that it be free of intimidation. The contras killed
election workers and issued threats to voters, while the US military conducted overflights
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of Nicaragua in the run-up to polling day, causing sonic booms which terrorised the
population.
In terms of human rights, the 1987 constitution enshrined all the rights necessary
for democracy: the rights to vote, to life, to freedom of expression, to freedom of
association, to freedom of assembly, to education and to an adequate standard of living,
specifically the rights to housing and of protection against hunger. However, although the
government made great strides in some areas, it was unable to guarantee several of these
rights in practice, and its overall record on civil and political rights was not impressive.
The right to life was seriously compromised, with thousands of civilians killed as a
consequence of the government’s war against the contras. The contras bear most of the
responsibility for this loss of life, as they had a deliberate policy of targeting civilians,
although government forces also committed atrocities, the most serious of which were
against the Miskito Indians in 1981 and 1982. As we have seen, citizens were able to
exercise their right to vote, but strict limits were placed on the freedoms of speech,
assembly and association due to the exigencies of fighting the war. La Prensa was
repeatedly censored and even shut down, although, in mitigation, it was by no means an
objective publication. Prior to the 1984 vote, La Prensa “only printed articles attacking
the electoral process as a whole” and “even refused to give coverage to the opposition
parties that were participating, portraying them as Sandinista puppets – something they
clearly were not.” Its editor came out in open support of the contras in 1986. 285
Nevertheless, Nicaragua still “had one of the freest presses in Central America,” with
political parties and Nicaragua-based human rights groups free to publish reports and
newsletters uncensored.286
The Sandinistas could point to major advances in social and economic rights
while they ruled Nicaragua, although their achievements proved unsustainable. In terms
of education, the 1980 Literacy Crusade saw the rate of adult literacy soar from a pre-
revolutionary level of 50 percent to 88 percent. There was a dramatic increase in school
enrolment, with the number of children attending primary and senior school almost
285 Bermann, Under the Big Stick, p. 289; Linfield, “Human Rights,” p. 280.
286 Linfield, “Human Rights,” pp. 279, 281.
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doubling between 1978, the year before the Somoza dynasty fell, and 1984. 287 The
government also built many news schools, and “gave special attention to underserved
rural areas and to the construction of secondary schools in underserved areas of the
interior.”288 However, as the war wore on, these achievements proved hard to sustain.
“Government-sponsored school construction came to a complete halt in the late 1980s,”
notes Thomas Walker, and by 1991, the year after the Sandinistas were defeated in
elections, just 70 percent of children were enrolled at primary school.289 The government
also made efforts to improve the standard of living of poor Nicaraguans. For example, it
“placed a high priority on making basic staples available to all at reasonable prices,” and
by 1983 could point to some successes, for consumption of rice had risen by 66 percent
compared to the 1977 level, while “the intake of eggs, cooking oil, and poultry were up
21, 30, and 80 percent, respectively.”290 Thousands of new houses were built, and the
government introduced policies aimed at “facilitating housing for the very poor.”291 As
with education, though, these advances proved unsustainable due to the war. “Urban
housing programs were overwhelmed and incapacitated by hundreds of thousands of
destitute war refugees who poured into the cities to seek safety and a better life,” while
“basic food distribution programs were ended in the late 1980s.”292 Nonetheless, in light
of the Sandinistas’ early accomplishments, one scholar has concluded that “if we include
under fundamental human rights a person’s right to the necessities of life – food, shelter,
health care – then the Sandinista record was better than that of almost any other Latin
American or Third World country.”293
Nicaragua fulfilled the third condition of genuine democracy outlined in chapter
two. The government and the legislature emerged from elections that met five of the six
criteria of genuinely free and fair elections, and were not in thrall to any unelected actors.
They were therefore legitimate.
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Nicaragua’s limited democratic achievements were emphatically not assisted by
the United States government. The Reagan administration strove to derail the 1984
elections. As for human rights, the United States’ contribution amounted to backing a
brutal rebel force that murdered civilians, in addition to wrecking the economy and
forcing the Sandinistas to divert money from socio-economic programs to defence.
Nonetheless, some scholars have still argued that the Reagan administration deserves
some, and perhaps much, credit for promoting democracy in Nicaragua. This facile
argument rests on the view that the Sandinistas were forced by the US into holding
elections in 1990. To quote Abraham Lowenthal, “The Nicaraguan presidential elections
of 1990…took place to a significant extent because of U.S. pressure, and it is therefore
commonly cited as an example of Washington’s successful promotion of democracy.”294
Tony Smith has written that “the administration could claim that the Reagan Doctrine
directly aided the expansion of democracy in Central America, by forcing the Sandinistas
to hold elections in early 1990, which they lost.”295 Such a conclusion does not reflect the
facts. The Sandinistas had already held credible elections in 1984, so it is misleading to
suggest that they converted to the concept in the latter part of the decade under American
coercion. In addition, the scheduling of elections for 1990 corresponded to the timetable
established by the Nicaraguan constitution of 1987, which stipulated that they would be
held every six years. Again, this had nothing to do with the actions of the United States.
Thomas Carothers has also found at least an element of truth in the claim that the
US successfully promoted democracy in Nicaragua. Like Smith, Carothers focuses on the
1990 elections, and posits the question of who was responsible for convincing the
Sandinistas to hold the elections that led to their ouster. He outlines two possible
responses: either the US, due to its support of the contras and its use of economic
sanctions, deserves the credit, or it should go instead to Costa Rican President Oscar
Arias, the driving force behind the Central American peace process. According to
Carothers, “the answer lies somewhere in between.” While “Arias certainly deserves
credit for forging the regional peace process,” and for insisting that Nicaragua agree to
elections, his contribution to Nicaraguan democracy was complemented by the policies of
294 Lowenthal, “The United States and Latin American Democracy: Learning from History,” p. 273.
295 Smith, America’s Mission, p. 301.
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the Reagan administration. In Carothers’ words, the Sandinistas “entered into the regional
peace negotiations with other Central American governments, and ultimately agreed to
hold elections, primarily as a way of ending U.S. pressure against Nicaragua.” 296
Carothers, however, asks the wrong question. As we saw above, the Sandinistas had
always planned to engage in electoral competition, regardless of the demands of the
United States and Oscar Arias.297
Even if it were true that the Sandinistas caved in to American intimidation in 1990
and scheduled a vote in response, it would still strain credibility to argue that the Reagan
administration successfully promoted democracy in Nicaragua. The United States
practically destroyed Nicaragua in the 1980s. Not only was this morally reprehensible, it
also had serious implications for Nicaraguan democracy. Citizens cannot enjoy their
political rights if they do not have the right to life, and this is precisely what was
threatened in Nicaragua, because the United States government was funding terrorists
who targeted civilians. The Reagan administration also realised its objective of ruining
the Nicaraguan economy, thus preventing the Sandinistas from carrying forward their
socio-economic programs, which had achieved impressive results in their early years in
power. The US was culpable of making the lives of Nicaraguans less secure, which can
only have negative implications for democracy. Citizens who are barely subsisting or
who must worry about their physical safety are less likely to play a part in political life,
as they have more urgent concerns to attend to. In short, then, it defies logic to assert that
the United States furthered democracy in Nicaragua while Reagan was president.
Democracy Promotion in Nicaragua: An Important US Policy Objective?
The historical overview of US-Nicaragua relations at the start of the chapter
showed that the state of democracy in Nicaragua was traditionally of minimal importance
to the United States. Still, this does not preclude the possibility that the Reagan
296 Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America In the Reagan Years
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 104-5.
297 Carothers ultimately concludes that while a case can be made that Reagan’s policy had positive political
effects in Nicaragua, this does not justify the policy. In his words, the “many costs, particularly the human
and economic costs to Nicaragua, outweighed whatever political benefits to Nicaragua one might attribute
to the policy.” Ibid, p. 108.
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administration turned policy on its head. As we have seen, Reagan administration
officials were at pains to cast their Nicaragua policy in pro-democracy terms, so perhaps
they genuinely meant what they said. However, in light of the facts, and by using the
criteria outlined in chapter two, we can say with some certainty that democracy
promotion was not a factor in US policy towards Nicaragua in the 1980s.
It will be remembered that the first strand of democracy promotion involves
supporting legitimate electoral processes. The first question to ask in this respect is did
the US assist political parties, NGOs, trade unions and other civil society organisations in
Nicaragua? Actually, it did, although in a wholly partisan manner. “Virtually every
element of the opposition – the press, the church, the private sector, trade unions, and
political parties – received financial support from the CIA.” In addition to the CIA, which
provided about $10 million a year to these groups in the mid-1980s, the National
Endowment for Democracy “funnelled about $2 million into Nicaragua between 1984
and 1988,” with the newspaper La Prensa receiving half the money and the rest going to
“the constituent groups of the opposition coalition that boycotted the 1984 election.”298
This aid was aimed at bringing about the ouster of the government, and cannot be viewed
as evidence that the US was genuinely trying to promote democracy in Nicaragua.
Another test of a government’s commitment to promoting democracy is whether or not it
supported election monitoring bodies in the country in question. In Nicaragua, the US
failed this test, for the State Department actively sought to prevent observer groups from
monitoring the 1984 contest. As for intimidation of voters or candidates during these
elections, the Reagan administration and its contra allies themselves engaged in
intimidatory practices, including deafening overflights of Nicaraguan territory by US
aircraft and death threats broadcast over the radio by the contras. The US also failed to
treat the election on its merits. US officials ridiculed the contest as a “farce” and a
“phony,” notwithstanding ample evidence pointing to the opposite conclusion. As for the
final test of a state’s support for free and fair elections, that it highlight evidence of fraud,
this is not applicable in the case in question, as the elections were not fraudulent.
The second test of a state’s democracy promotion credentials is whether it
opposes any practices that undermine the legitimacy of a state’s political institutions.
298 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, pp. 542-3.
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This is not applicable here, as the Nicaraguan government and legislature were legitimate.
Nor is the question of whether the US attached democracy-related conditions to any aid
relevant in this case, for the Reagan administration terminated all aid to Nicaragua in
April 1981.
We can, however, determine whether or not the US sought to promote citizens’
enjoyment of the political, civil, and socio-economic rights that are crucial to democracy.
The evidence suggests that advancing human rights was far from being a priority of the
Reagan administration. While President Reagan made a habit of chiding the Sandinistas
for assorted human rights abuses, some of which the administration had simply
invented,299 his government nonetheless saw fit to rally support for, fund and direct the
contras. These rebels were not pro-democracy “freedom fighters” but vicious killers who,
in the words of Americas Watch, “attacked civilians indiscriminately,” “tortured and
mutilated prisoners” and “murdered those placed hors de combat by their wounds.”
Nicaraguans engaged in health and education were among their favourite targets. “One
hundred and thirty teachers, 40 doctors and nurses, 152 technicians and 41 other
professionals were killed” by the contras, notes Thomas Walker.300 President Reagan,
however, denied outright that the contras had even committed such outrages, dismissing
in a speech in April 1985 the “so-called atrocities” attributed to the rebels.301 In light of
the above, we can conclude that promoting the right to life of Nicaraguans was clearly
not an objective of the US. Still, it could be argued that through its funding of the
opposition newspaper La Prensa and two tiny trade union federations, the US sought to
promote free speech and freedom of association in Nicaragua. However, as we saw above,
La Prensa was not an objective publication. Indeed, “the traditional goal of La Prensa
always was to overthrow the existing political order.”302 Financing it therefore did not
signal America’s desire to advance free speech; the intention was rather to use it as
299 A minor example was Reagan’s claim that the Nicaraguan government had “engaged in anti-Semitic
acts against the Jewish community.” In response, Americas Watch stated that “There is not a policy of anti-
Semitism” and dismissed the more general charge of religious persecution as “without substance.” See
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another means of effecting the downfall of the Sandinistas. The same logic applied to US
funding of other elements of the Nicaraguan opposition. “Most Reagan officials…
[viewed] CIA support for the civic opposition… [as] an ancillary part of the contra war,”
remarks William LeoGrande.303
The final test of a state’s commitment to promoting democracy, whether or not it
sought to effect the replacement of a dictatorial regime with an elected one, is again not
applicable in this case. The Sandinistas from as far back as 1979 emphasised that they
planned to hold elections, and did so five years later.
There are further, context-specific, reasons to believe that the United States under
President Reagan was not serious about promoting democracy in Nicaragua. The Reagan
administration opposed the Esquipulas agreement of 1987, the terms of which required
the signatories, including Nicaragua, “to promote an authentic democratic, pluralist and
participatory process.” The opposition of the US to this agreement is hard to reconcile
with its self-professed commitment to Nicaraguan democratization. Furthermore, in its
desperation to bring down the government of Nicaragua the Reagan administration
resorted to illegal means that undermined the democracy of the United States itself. The
administration ignored the first Boland Amendment of December 1982, which forbade
US support for any group seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, and
continued to aid the various contra organisations. As contra leader Edgar Chamorro later
testified, while the contras were told by their CIA handlers after the Boland Amendment
was passed to emphasise that they were trying to intercept arms, “our goal, and that of the
CIA as well (as we were repeatedly assured in private), was to overthrow the government
of Nicaragua.” When Congress tried to terminate US involvement in the war in October
1984, the administration secretly transferred control of the contra support effort from the
CIA to the NSC staff, which was far less visible and not subject to congressional
oversight. To keep the contras going senior US officials, including the president, solicited
money from third countries and agreed to quid pro quos with various Central American
states to ensure their collaboration, actions which were of doubtful legality. The likes of
Elliott Abrams and Robert McFarlane lied to Congress about the continuing US role in
the war. This pattern of deception and disdain for the democratic procedures of the
303 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, p. 543.
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United States raises doubts about the administration’s commitment to advancing
democracy abroad, for why should a government that exhibits so little respect for
democracy in its own country care about the state of democracy elsewhere?
Notwithstanding the fact that the Reagan administration tried to sabotage the
Nicaraguan elections of 1984, undermined human rights in that country, rejected a peace
agreement signed by the Sandinistas which included language committing them to
democratization, and showed disdain for the democratic procedures and the laws of the
United States while conducting its Nicaragua policy, certain scholars have nonetheless
asserted that democracy promotion was a real goal of the United States. Thomas
Carothers has argued that while it is “probably correct” that the administration’s
“democracy rationale” was in the early part of the decade “a cynical, rhetorical cover for
a militant anticommunist crusade,” from the mid-1980s the “pro-democracy rhetoric
associated with the policy grew more intense and began to take on some real meaning.”
According to Carothers, “many of the U.S. officials involved in the Nicaragua policy
from roughly 1984 on sincerely believed that the policy was increasing the chances of
democracy.” While Carothers does add that these officials “were misguided in their
understanding of how to promote democracy and were motivated primarily by
anticommunism,” they nevertheless “believed the policy was prodemocratic.”304 This
conclusion is hard to credit, however. Given the attitude of the administration to the 1984
elections and its support for the contras, it is difficult to believe that these officials were
guided by the objective of furthering Nicaraguan democracy. A more reasonable
conclusion has been offered by Laurence Whitehead, according to whom the “policy of
intimidation [against Nicaragua] was motivated by a variety of considerations, among
which concern over the quality of democratic governance in Nicaragua was not, to put it
mildly, always foremost.”305 President Reagan’s policies in Nicaragua were designed to
bring down the Sandinista government, and had nothing to do with effecting that
country’s democratization.
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Democracy Promotion under Reagan: The Overall Record
In June 1982 Reagan announced “a crusade for freedom” before the British
parliament. “For the sake of peace and justice, let us move toward a world in which all
people are at last free to determine their own destiny,” he proclaimed.306 By the end of his
presidency, there seemed to be considerable evidence to suggest that Reagan’s “crusade
for freedom” had reached fruition, notwithstanding the Nicaraguan debacle, for the
Soviet Union was on its last legs and dictators the world over were falling like dominoes.
As George Shultz put it in his memoirs, “Ronald Reagan from his first day in office and I
from the day I became secretary of state a year and a half later were consistent advocates
of political and economic freedom… [We] heralded the march toward democracy that
occurred during the Reagan presidency, in our hemisphere and beyond.”307 Numerous
scholars have indeed acclaimed Reagan as a great promoter of global freedom and
democracy. G. John Ikenberry, for example, has remarked that Reagan “pursued policies
that reflected a strong commitment to the expansion of democracy, markets, and the rule
of law. The Reagan administration’s involvements in El Salvador, the Philippines, Chile,
and elsewhere all reflected this orientation.” Reagan, he adds, adopted “a human rights
and democracy promotion agenda,” premised on the belief that “the regime type of other
states matters, and if they are democracies they will be less threatening to the United
States.” 308 In the estimation of Tony Smith, “No administration since [Woodrow]
Wilson’s has been as vigorous or as consistent in its dedication to the promotion of
democracy abroad as that of Ronald Reagan.”309
Let us consider the three cases mentioned by Ikenberry, cases “that reflected a
strong commitment to the expansion of democracy.” The first of these was El Salvador,
which received several billion dollars of US aid during Reagan’s tenure, much of which
was intended for the Salvadorian military and police, which fought a war against the
FMLN guerrillas throughout the 1980s. The Salvadorian security forces received this
306Quoted in Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), p.
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windfall despite a truly horrific record of human rights violations. In 1981, Reagan’s first
year in office, at least 13,000 people were killed as a result of the war in El Salvador,
with most of these deaths attributable to the security forces and the death squads with
which they were associated. By the time the conflict ended in 1992, “some 80,000 people
[had] died, most of them innocent civilians killed by the military and the government’s
security forces, armed and bankrolled by Washington.”310 Evidently, therefore, human
rights were not the Reagan administration’s top priority in El Salvador.
Despite the horrific death toll, Reagan in 1984 lauded El Salvador as a country
that “has made great progress toward democracy.” The president made this judgement on
the basis that El Salvador “has held three elections.”311 The US did indeed pressure its
Salvadorian allies to hold elections, but these contests were flawed. The March 1982 vote
for a constituent assembly took place in “the absence of an opposition press, free speech,
or freedom of assembly, not to mention the military’s close watch on individual voting in
the ballot places.”312 Leftist candidates did not participate for fear that they would be
killed. Furthermore, the US saw a role for itself in determining the winner. The CIA
provided the Christian Democrats with US$2 million to help their cause, not enough to
sway the result, as it turned out, for a coalition of right-wing parties emerged victorious.
At that point, US Ambassador to El Salvador Deane Hinton was forced to intervene,
convincing the army to impose a president acceptable to themselves and the US on the
political parties.313 The 1984 contest was, in the words of Thomas Walker, an “unsavory
example” of the Central American version of democracy. Voters were given numbered,
translucent ballot papers which they were obliged to deposit in clear ballot boxes. In
addition, “some voting booths were not fully curtained,” while voters, who were legally
required to vote, had their ID cards stamped to prove they had done so. The US provided
Christian Democrat presidential candidate José Napoleón Duarte with US$1.4 million to
increase his hopes of victory, and this time the expenditure paid off.314
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Walter LaFeber has written that “The ultimate test of a democracy is the
protection of individual life and liberty.”315 In light of the tens of thousands of deaths in
Nicaragua and El Salvador, Tony Smith’s assertion that “the Reagan Doctrine did indeed
serve the end of bringing about democracy in Central America” 316 is therefore
questionable. Smith of course restricts his understanding of democracy to “free
elections,” but even if we accept such a definition, there is scant evidence to support his
conclusion. President Reagan and his foreign policy team opposed elections in Nicaragua,
and the contests they promoted in El Salvador were clearly flawed. In short, the Reagan
Doctrine did not bring about meaningful democracy in Central America, and was instead
a major reason for the destruction and upheaval in the region in the 1980s. LaFeber offers
a far more realistic summation of what occurred in Central America in that decade,
observing that “the years from 1979 to 1991 turned out to be the bloodiest, most violent,
and most destructive era in Central America’s post-1820 history.” Noting that a minimum
of 200,000 people were killed in the region’s various wars and that millions were
displaced or became refugees, he concludes that it was a “catastrophe.”317
Tony Smith has commended the Reagan administration for its “unparalleled
Wilsonianism in its commitment to the promotion of democracy worldwide.”318 This is
hard to support, and not just because of US policy in Nicaragua and El Salvador. The
administration also supported the government of Guatemala, which, like its counterpart in
El Salvador, slaughtered tens of thousands of its own citizens as part of its war against
Guatemala’s own leftist guerrillas. Reagan was an admirer of the Guatemalan generals.
On a visit to Latin America in December 1982, he described the leader of the Guatemalan
military dictatorship, General Ríos Montt, as “a man of great personal integrity” and
affirmed that he was “inclined to believe that [the generals had] been given a bum rap” on
human rights.319 This regime in the early eighties “unleashed one of the most vicious
counterinsurgency campaigns in Latin American history.”320 Reagan’s government also
had good relations with Panama, a country the US president considered one of “Central
315 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions, p. 365.
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America’s democratic neighbors,”321 despite the holding of a fraudulent election in 1984.
Panama was ruled by a strongman, General Manuel Antonio Noriega, who was himself
the target of a later US democracy promotion effort in 1989-90. In the early and mid-
eighties, however, Noriega was a very useful American ally and a CIA asset of many
years, whose services in aid of the contras were particularly well received in Washington.
Noriega had rigged the vote in 1984 to ensure victory for his candidate, Nicolás Ardito
Barletta. The US knew the election had been stolen, but George Shultz attended
Barletta’s inauguration nonetheless.322 The administration also maintained very cordial
relations with assorted authoritarian rulers and regimes further afield, like Saudi Arabia’s
King Fahd, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Zaire’s Mobutu Seke Soso, and the Kuomintang in
Taiwan.
Returning to the three cases of democracy promotion cited by Ikenberry, the
administration’s policies towards the Philippines and Chile offer more support for
Ikenberry’s claims. Reagan was very close to Ferdinand Marcos, the dictator of the
Philippines, and relations were very good early on in Reagan’s tenure. When Marcos
attempted to steal the 1986 election from his opponent, Cory Aquino, Reagan was loath
to cast off his embattled friend. When questioned about the electoral fraud Reagan opined
that it might have occurred “on both sides.”323 By this stage, however, most of his
administration had come to accept that Marcos was an embarrassment and had to go, and
the president was eventually brought round to the realisation that Marcos needed to step
down. As Francis Fukuyama has remarked, the US ended up playing “a critical role in
easing Ferdinand Marcos out of office.” As for Chile, President Reagan had considerable
respect for the Chilean leader, General Augusto Pinochet. Reagan liked him on the
grounds that he was a zealous anti-communist, so zealous in fact that he was willing to
“disappear” suspected subversives. Indeed, “the administration warmly supported
Pinochet until persistent unrest in Chile and Pinochet’s unyielding response raised
concerns of a long-term polarization of Chilean society.”324 In light of these fears, “in
1988 Washington quietly dropped its support for…Pinochet when he unexpectedly called
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for a referendum on his rule, and pressed him to accept the results of the “no” vote.325
This policy shift occurred despite the reluctance of Reagan to distance the US from
Pinochet.326 The Reagan administration also backed democratic transitions in erstwhile
allies South Korea, Paraguay, and Haiti in the mid- and late-1980s. In sum, then, the
record of the Reagan administration was mixed, although its policies towards the likes of
Nicaragua and El Salvador show that the assertions of Tony Smith and Ikenberry are
undoubtedly overblown.
325 Fukuyama, After the Neocons, p. 135.
326 Towards the end of his presidency, and long after numerous members of the administration began
advocating the Chilean dictator’s ouster, Reagan told a group of officials that “Pinochet saved Chile from
communism” and that “we should have him here on a state visit.” Quoted in Ibid, p. 156.
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4. The Clinton Presidency: “Upholding” Democracy in Haiti
This chapter concerns the role of democracy promotion in President Bill Clinton’s
foreign policy. The chapter is divided into seven parts. The first section consists of an
overview of Haitian history up to and including the tumultuous events that occurred in
the early 1990s, while George H.W. Bush was in the White House. This is followed by a
look at the world view of the incoming Clinton foreign policy team. The third part of the
chapter involves a review of US policy towards Haiti up to the reinstatement of the exiled
Haitian president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, in October 1994, with the fourth section
continuing the story up until Clinton’s departure from Washington in January 2001. In
the next part I discuss whether the administration’s attempts to further democracy in Haiti
were successful; this is followed by some conclusions regarding the relative importance
of democracy promotion in Clinton’s Haiti policy. In the final section I broaden the
analysis to Clinton’s foreign policy as a whole.
Historical Background: US-Haiti Relations
Considering Haiti’s present woes (incompetent and self-interested leaders, a
feeble state, mass unemployment, deforestation, soil erosion, drugs running, endemic
corruption, extreme levels of poverty, and an AIDS crisis), it is remarkable that during
the eighteenth century it was the richest colony in the world.327 The French overlords of
Saint Domingue, as the western third of the island of Hispaniola was then known,
established a plantation economy based on sugar, cotton, coffee and other products,
generating fabulous riches. This wealth was only achievable through the ruthless
exploitation of the slave workforce, which the French imported from West Africa and
literally worked to death. A successful slave revolt put an end to French rule, with
Haitian independence declared in 1804. The new state was treated as an international
327 Haiti’s troubles are pithily summed up by President Clinton’s second secretary of state, Madeleine
Albright, in her memoirs: “Perhaps 75 percent of its people are ill-fed, ill-housed, ill-clad, or just plain ill.
Its population is seven million and rising; experts say its land can support a population of three million.
Most of its trees were long ago burned for charcoal.” Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir
(London: Pan Books, 2004), p. 156.
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outcast, however, due to its unique status as a country of freed slaves in a world
dominated by slave-owning nations, and its future financial misery was set in motion
when “Haiti agreed, in 1825, to pay its old colonial master a ‘compensation’ of some 150
million francs for the loss of its slaves…and to grant punishing commercial discounts.”328
Needless to say, these payments, which could only be made by borrowing from French
banks and which continued until 1947,329 “had a catastrophic effect on the new nation’s
delicate economy.”330
Politics in Haiti in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by
severe instability, and it was with the avowed aim of putting an end to such chaos that the
United States invaded in 1915. One of US President Woodrow Wilson’s ostensible
attempts to teach those south of the border “to elect good men,” the nineteen year US
occupation was in fact characterised by some deeply undemocratic actions.
Notwithstanding his pro-democracy pretensions, Wilson, who was a racist,331 “sent in a
High Commissioner to directly rule the country, which became not a mere protectorate,
but an outright colony.” In addition to “excluding all blacks from public life,” the
American occupiers also dissolved the Haitian parliament when it refused to ratify a
constitution drawn up by the US, and reinstituted forced labour.332 As the occupation
came to an end in 1934, responsibility for law and order passed from the occupiers to the
US-trained Haitian army, an institution which, like the National Guard in Nicaragua,
became notorious for its corruption and proclivity for employing wanton violence against
the country’s inhabitants.
In 1957 François “Papa Doc” Duvalier became president of Haiti and established
“a despotic tyranny,” in which “Fear occasioned by state-sponsored terrorism was the
order of the day.”333 In order to shield himself from potential overthrow by the army and
328 Peter Hallward, “Option Zero in Haiti,” New Left Review, vol. 27 (May/June 2004), p. 26.
329 Ibid, p. 26.
330 Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 3rd Edition (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2006), p. 67.
331 The historian Margaret MacMillan has commented, with some understatement, that “Wilson…was not
especially enlightened when it came to race.” Wilson’s distaste for blacks was evident from the fact that he
“refused to allow black combat troops to fight alongside white Americans in the [first world] war,
preferring to place them under French command.” Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months that
Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 319.
332 Farmer, Uses of Haiti, p. 81; Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, pp. 264-5.
333 Jean-Germain Gros, “Haiti: The Political Economy and Sociology of Decay and Renewal,” Latin
American Research Review, vol. 35, no. 3 (2000), p. 216.
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to carry out the violent repression of real or imagined opponents, Duvalier established his
own body of thugs known as the Tonton Macoutes. Some 50,000 Haitians are believed to
have killed by François Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude,334 who also went by the
sobriquet “Baby Doc,” and who took over as “president for life” in 1971 aged nineteen.
Notwithstanding their callous disdain for the lives of their subjects, the Duvaliers were
considered useful Cold War allies by Washington, for regardless of their flaws, they were
at least staunch anti-communists. 335 US aid, both military and economic, played an
important role in shoring up the Duvalier family dynasty, although it should be
mentioned that “relations between the Duvaliers and Washington became highly strained
at certain moments, particularly in the early years of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress and
under Jimmy Carter’s “human rights” policy.”336
The elder Duvalier’s rule witnessed the political ascendancy of a small section of
the majority black population, who pushed aside the traditionally dominant mulatto
minority.337 Under “Baby Doc,” however, this newly empowered black bourgeoisie was
supplanted by mulatto “technocrats,” arousing the enmity of erstwhile supporters of the
regime. “Baby Doc” launched an ill-fated economic liberalisation program in the 1970s,
precipitating an economic crisis which was only made worse by the president-for-life’s
rash decision to embark on a tentative political opening. As dissident voices appeared
Duvalier inevitably resorted to harsh repression, eventually leading to nationwide protests
in 1985. With the military and the Haitian elite fearing that the continued existence of the
state, rather than simply the regime, was imperilled, they withdrew their support for
Duvalier, and he fled into exile in February 1986.338 The Reagan administration, which
for several years had viewed Jean-Claude Duvalier “as a net positive” on the basis of his
334 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p. 268.
335 François Duvalier passed laws which deemed “Communist activities” to be “crimes against the security
of the state, in whatsoever form,” and which stipulated further that “The authors and accomplices of these
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anti-communism, was unprepared for his fall and waited until January 1986 before
calling for his departure.339
Any hope that Haitians may have felt in the wake of Duvalier’s exit was soon
squashed by the reactionary military regimes that followed. Then, in 1990, elections were
held, with former Salesian priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide trouncing his opponents to win
the presidency with 67 percent of the vote. However, while Aristide was undoubtedly an
icon of the impoverished majority he was by no means universally popular. His calls for
social justice and defiant broadsides against the army and the bourgeoisie had earned him
the hostility of these formidable sectors of Haitian society. Aristide was also deeply
critical of the United States, which he considered an imperialist nation and which he
referred to as the “cold country to the north.”340 It should therefore come as no shock that
policymakers in Washington were less than overjoyed at the prospect of Aristide
governing Haiti, and chose to back presidential candidate Marc Bazin in 1990.341 Bazin
fared poorly at the polls, however, securing just 14% of votes cast. Amazingly, however,
Haitian politicians later alleged that despite the voters’ overwhelming endorsement of
Aristide, and notwithstanding President George H.W. Bush’s public endorsement of the
goal of promoting democracy, “the United States had such a difficult time countenancing
[Aristide’s] 1990 victory that a delegation headed by Jimmy Carter asked him to desist in
favor of Marc Bazin the very night of his electoral triumph.”342
Aristide’s presidency was destined to be short-lived, for in September 1991 the
army staged a coup led by General Raoul Cédras, whom Aristide, displaying questionable
judgment, had himself appointed to the position of army chief of staff. Aristide fled to
Venezuela, then the United States, where he would spend three years agitating for
international support for his return. Although the Bush administration publicly
condemned Aristide’s ouster, and voted at the Organisation of American States for an
embargo against the newly installed Haitian junta, Washington’s attitude towards the
coup was in fact most ambiguous. Less than two weeks after the coup the New York
339 Carothers, In the Name of Democracy, pp. 183-4.
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Times reported that US officials had “signaled privately that they were moving away
from their unequivocal support of Father Aristide in light of concerns over his human
rights record.” 343 Then, in February 1992, the Bush administration exempted US
companies involved in the assembly sector in Haiti from the embargo, an action which, in
David Malone’s words, “seriously undermined sanctions aimed at compelling [Aristide’s]
return to Haiti.”344 Also, whereas other states ended all non-humanitarian aid to Haiti
while the junta was in power, USAID “took the opportunity to work extensively and
safely with pro-regime people and groups who were not part of the democratic
movement,” prompting Oxfam America to complain to the House Appropriations
Committee that “allegations have been made…that USAID funded projects have been
knowingly or unknowingly…politically and financially manipulated by the military
regime and its civilian supporters.”345 USAID was known to have qualms about Aristide,
and had opposed his plan to raise the minimum wage, fearing this would undermine
Haiti’s comparative economic advantage in ultra-cheap labour.346
One player in the US foreign policy bureaucracy that was working assiduously
against Aristide’s return was the CIA. The Agency had long-standing links with senior
figures in the Haitian military; indeed, Cédras and several of his co-conspirators had been
paid CIA informants prior to the coup of 1991.347 In July 1992, the CIA’s Brian Latell, a
specialist on Latin America, visited Haiti and on his return wrote a report praising Cédras
as “a conscientious military leader who genuinely wishes to minimize his role in politics”;
he also claimed that “there is no systematic or frequent lethal violence aimed at
civilians,”348 despite abundant evidence to the contrary published in the media and by
human rights groups. In the wake of the coup, the CIA recruited a man named Emmanuel
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believed to have been murdered by the junta. See Charles Arthur, Haiti in Focus: A Guide to the People,
Politics and Culture (London: Latin America Bureau, 2002), p. 25.
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“Toto” Constant, who would go on to found the murderous Haitian paramilitary
organisation FRAPH (Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti). According to
David Grann, “Constant’s relationship with U.S. intelligence, according to both Constant
and several CIA officials, continued undisturbed until the spring of 1994,” long after
FRAPH had been implicated in numerous cases of murder, torture and rape.349
It is not at all surprising that Aristide’s overthrow engendered such mixed feelings
within the US foreign policy bureaucracy. Although the US was officially committed to
supporting democracy in the Western Hemisphere, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was just the
sort of leftist leader that Washington had spent decades undermining during the Cold War.
As John Shattuck, who headed the State Department’s human rights bureau under Clinton,
has observed, “American Cold War arrangements lingered on in Haiti, shaping U.S.
views about both the Aristide and Cedras camps.”350 There were as a result quite a few
US officials who eyed Aristide with considerable suspicion. Any plans that president-
elect Clinton had for promoting democracy in Haiti and restoring Aristide would face
considerable opposition from powerful actors in the American foreign policy-making
process.
World View of the Clinton Administration
As the first president to enter office after the end of the Cold War, Bill Clinton
was faced with an international political environment that offered grounds both for
optimism and concern. The implosion of the United States’ erstwhile rival, the USSR,
meant that Washington now faced no state to rival its political and military power,
offering American policymakers the opportunity to turn the new realities of the
international system to America’s advantage. On the other hand, there still existed
outposts of hostility to the United States, most notably in that perennial hotspot, the
Middle East, as well as the danger that the ethnic conflict consuming the former
Yugoslavia would spiral even further out of control. These ambiguities were emphasised
349 Grann, “Giving “the devil” his due.” There have been allegations that the CIA encouraged the
formation of FRAPH. See Ibid; Farmer, Uses of Haiti, pp. 321-2.
350 John Shattuck, Freedom on Fire: Human Rights Wars and America’s Response (Cambridge, MA:
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by Clinton’s first secretary of state, Warren Christopher, in his confirmation hearings
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January 1993. In his opening
statement, Christopher emphasised that “we have arrived at a uniquely promising
moment…The Cold War is over…The tide of democratic aspirations is rising from Tibet
to Central America.” Having explained his reasons for optimism Christopher then
proceeded to temper this hopeful message, warning that the end of the Cold War had
“lifted the lid on many cauldrons of long-simmering conflict.” Furthermore, there
remained a number of “ruthless and expansionist despots” hostile to the US, such as Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein.351
Christopher outlined what he called “three pillars” of American foreign policy
under Clinton. These three foreign policy priorities included making “America’s
economic security…a primary goal” of foreign policy, maintaining America’s military
preponderance, and “promoting the spread of democracy and markets abroad.” 352
Christopher’s testimony corresponded to the message Clinton had presented during the
1992 presidential campaign, when “Clinton had outlined what he considered to be the
three foreign policy priorities that the next commander in chief would confront: updating
and restructuring American military and security capabilities, elevating the role of
economics in international affairs, and promoting democracy abroad.”353 More specific
policy goals pinpointed by Christopher included aiding Russia’s transition from failed
communist behemoth to capitalist democracy, ensuring that NATO remained intact and
relevant, getting tough with Serbia, which was seen as the villain in the conflict in the
Balkans, and adopting “a vigilant stance toward both Iraq and Iran,” which, Christopher
asserted, “seem determined to sow violence and disorder throughout [the Middle East]
and even beyond.”354
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There can be no doubt that pursuing American economic interests was at the heart
of Clinton’s foreign policy, which is hardly surprising when we consider the importance
the president had attached to reviving the US economy while a presidential candidate.
What is noteworthy is that Clinton and his foreign policy team believed that the pursuit of
American economic objectives was entirely compatible with the goal of spreading
democracy abroad. In fact, the two were considered mutually reinforcing: the US
economic interests of promoting free trade and convincing other states to adopt free
market principles were viewed as concomitants of democracy promotion. As Douglas
Brinkley has put it, Clinton “advanced the view that democracy would prevail in the post-
Cold War world through trade pacts as much as ballot boxes.”355 The logic was that
economic liberalisation would inevitably lead to a political liberalisation as well, which
explains why the administration had such high hopes for democracy in authoritarian
countries like China that were opening up their economies while still refusing to embrace
democratization.
Democracy promotion occupied a central place in the Clinton administration’s
foreign policy strategy, rhetorically at least. Indeed, democratic “enlargement” was at
times presented as the goal of Clinton’s foreign policy, with the president’s first national
security adviser, Tony Lake, making the following statement in September 1993: “The
successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement – enlargement
of the world’s free community of market democracies.”356 It was offered as a reason for
which the United States might resort to military force: in October 1994, Lake gave a
speech at Harvard University in which he outlined seven criteria for the application of
force, one of which was to “preserve, promote and defend democracy, which in turn
enhances our security and the spread of our values.”357 As mentioned in chapter two,
high-ranking members of the Clinton administration were adherents of the democratic
peace thesis propounded by Michael Doyle, Bruce Russett and other scholars; they
justified their declared commitment to democracy promotion by alluding to the alleged
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security benefits that would derive from an international system full of democratic states.
Democracies do not go to war with each other, administration officials asserted, so a
world community of democratic states would be safer. This line of thinking was
elucidated by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in a 1996 article in Foreign
Affairs. Talbott claimed that Clinton had made “the support of democracy a priority of his
administration’s diplomacy in Latin America, Asia, Africa, Central Europe, and the
former Soviet Union,” because he believed that democracies were “more likely…to be
reliable partners in trade and diplomacy, and less likely to threaten the peace.”358 He
argued that the presence of more democracies would make the US more prosperous and
secure, as “democracies are demonstrably more likely to maintain their international
commitments, less likely to engage in terrorism or wreak environmental damage, and less
likely to make war on each other.”359 The theme was also highlighted by Secretary of
State Christopher, who in June 1993 told the World Conference on Human Rights in
Vienna that “Democracy is the best way to advance lasting peace and prosperity in the
world,” with the promotion of democracy constituting “the front line of global
security.”360
Embracing the goal of promoting democracy internationally had the additional
advantage of dovetailing with the traditional US commitment to liberal and democratic
values, although it should not be forgotten that Washington historically has been willing
to sacrifice its ideals when its national interests have been at stake. Whatever the Clinton
administration’s reasons for elevating democracy promotion to the top of the foreign
policy agenda, it faced a serious test in this regard as soon as the new president took
power. The test lay in Haiti, where a democratically elected president had been
overthrown by a military junta that had then launched a wave of atrocities against the
Haitian population, driving thousands to embark on perilous journeys over the water
towards Florida. The Bush administration had shown little inclination to make a
concerted effort to face down Haiti’s military rulers; time would tell whether Clinton
would live up to his own pro-democracy rhetoric in Haiti.
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Clinton’s Policy in Haiti up to the Reinstatement of Aristide
As a presidential candidate Clinton had castigated George H.W. Bush for his
policy of forcibly repatriating Haitian boat people fleeing the violence in their country.
Expectations were therefore high that policy would shift under the new president.
However, even before his inauguration Clinton was obliged to perform an embarrassing
volte-face, announcing in January 1993 that he would continue Bush’s policy of returning
Haitian refugees without processing their asylum requests.361According to John Shattuck,
who served as Clinton’s assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian
affairs, the president’s change of heart was the result of “political realities”: “According
to seasoned Washington observers, December 1992 intelligence reports indicated that
Clinton’s campaign charge against Bush of coddling dictators had raised the hopes of
Haitians that the United States would open its doors to refugees fleeing the Cedras
regime.” The intelligence warned that “hundreds of thousands” of refugees might head
for Florida if Clinton didn’t reverse his position.362 Clinton has since tried to explain this
about turn by alluding to humanitarian imperatives, claiming he “was concerned that
large numbers of [Haitians] would perish in trying to get here in rickety boats on the high
seas.”363 Clinton’s professed concern for the refugees’ safety would have been more
believable were it not for the fact that there was abundant evidence that “large numbers”
of Haitians were perishing in Haiti at the hands of the junta, and the new president was
sending them straight back to face more of the same. The decision was naturally quite
controversial, so to soften the blow to the deposed Haitian president, “Clinton reportedly
promised that he would eventually restore Aristide to power.”364
In March 1993 Clinton held a meeting with Aristide at the White House. In a
statement to the press afterwards, Clinton underscored his support for Aristide’s return to
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Haiti as president: “To those who have blocked the restoration of democracy, I want to
make it clear in the strongest terms that we will not now or ever support the continuation
of an illegal Government in Haiti.” It was what he said next that was really significant,
however. The president declared that “we want to step up dramatically the pace of
negotiations to restore President Aristide under conditions of national reconciliation and
mutual respect for human rights with a program of genuine economic progress.”365 While
the word “reconciliation” sounded innocuous, it had important implications. “Translated,
“reconciliation” meant an amnesty for and no popular reprisals against the coup leaders
and those who killed, tortured, raped, and mutilated Haitian citizens during the three
years of the junta,” notes Alex Dupuy.366 As for Clinton’s reference to “a program of
genuine economic progress,” this was an anodyne way of saying that Aristide should
consent to neoliberal economic reforms, which Washington and the main international
lending agencies would later spend considerable time foisting on him. The important
point is that although the US government publicly backed Aristide’s return, this support
was not unequivocal. Human rights abuses by the junta were to be downplayed, and
international lenders, rather than the Haitian government, were to decide upon economic
policy if and when Aristide’s presidency resumed.
It is not at all surprising that the Clinton administration’s approach to the Haitian
crisis was notable for its equivocation. As we saw above, when Bush was president
various actors within the foreign policy bureaucracy had sought to prevent Aristide’s
reinstatement. This hostility was carried over into the Clinton administration. As John
Shattuck has observed, there existed “defense and intelligence interests inside the U.S.
government that were aligned with the status quo in Haiti,” and who feared that any plan
to restore the exiled president would jeopardise “U.S. military and intelligence ties to
those in Haiti who opposed Aristide.”367 CIA analyst Brian Latell, relaying rumours
concocted by the Haitian junta, told sympathetic members of the United States Congress
that Aristide was mentally ill and had once been forced to seek psychiatric help. This
confirmed the suspicions of Republican opponents of Aristide like Senator Jesse Helms,
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who publicly denounced Aristide as “a psychopath.” 368 The claims were in fact
fabrications, but they served to discredit Aristide. The CIA and congressional
Republicans were joined in their dislike of Aristide by the Pentagon, which was also
extremely leery of efforts to restore the Haitian president, believing that parachuting a
left-wing populist back into office was not the sort of goal US soldiers should be asked to
risk their lives for.
Despite the opposition of powerful institutions like the CIA and the Pentagon, the
Clinton administration nonetheless quickly distinguished itself from its predecessor by
demonstrating a willingness to expend a considerable amount of effort searching for a
settlement in Haiti. Shortly after taking office Clinton appointed Lawrence Pezzullo to
serve as his special envoy to Haiti. Pezzullo, along with UN/OAS envoy Dante Caputo,
set about fashioning a plan acceptable to both Aristide and the junta. In May 1993
Pezzullo and Caputo attempted to cajole the junta into accepting an international military
and police presence in Haiti of between five hundred and one thousand soldiers and
police; this force would help to ensure security during a transition back to civilian rule,
with Aristide returning as president. Cédras, however, spurned the offer, infuriating the
US government in the process.369 In the words of Alex Dupuy, “Clinton and members of
his administration, who had believed that the junta wanted a deal, felt double-crossed and
angered by its defiance.”370 Washington made its displeasure plain by strengthening its
own sanctions against the Cédras regime with an asset freeze on the coup leaders and
their most prominent supporters, and took the lead in pushing through UN Security
Council Resolution 841 of 16 June 1993, which banned oil and weapons exports to
Haiti.371
The imposition of UN mandatory sanctions was enough to convince the Haitian
dictatorship of the wisdom of participating in internationally mediated talks in New York
at the end of June 1993. After a week of indirect contacts (Aristide wouldn’t meet Cédras
in person),372 the Haitian parties signed an accord which came to be known as the
Governor’s Island Agreement. Under the terms of the accord Aristide was to nominate a
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prime minister, who was to be approved by the Haitian parliament, after which UN
sanctions would end, an international military and police force would be sent to Haiti, the
coup-plotters would be granted amnesty for crimes committed after the president’s ouster,
and Aristide would be reinstated as president. A good deal of persuasion was required
before Aristide agreed to put his name to the deal: US Vice-President Al Gore, Warren
Christopher and Tony Lake all phoned the Haitian president in order to induce him to
sign.373 The Governor’s Island Agreement was subjected to withering criticism by human
rights groups working in Haiti. Colin Granderson, the head of the UN/OAS International
Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), which was responsible for monitoring the military
regime’s human rights performance, later lamented the fact that MICIVIH had been
excluded from the negotiations, and criticised the accord for having “made no mention of
the need for the military to improve the human rights situation.” Granderson added that
“This political marginalization of the mission and human rights undoubtedly reinforced
the military in its belief that human rights were not a priority for the international
community.”374
Granderson’s doubts were very well-founded, for, as Paul Farmer has observed,
“the Governor’s Island agreement seemed only to trigger a rash of disappearances and
summary executions as the military took advantage of their new-found legitimacy.”375
When the US navy ship the Harlan County attempted to dock in the capital, Port-au-
Prince, on October 11, 1993, carrying troops which were to form part of the international
force provided for in the Governor’s Island Agreement, ruffians from the paramilitary
group FRAPH, led by CIA asset “Toto” Constant, hurled abuse and threats from the
harbour. The prospect of a confrontation was too much for a US administration still
recovering from the debacle in Somalia just days earlier, when eighteen American
soldiers had been killed in another “humanitarian” operation, and the Harlan County was
ordered to turn back. With such clear evidence that Cédras and his colleagues had no
intention of living up to their side of the bargain reached in New York, the Clinton
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administration pushed for the restoration of UN sanctions, and secured the approval of
the Security Council for a naval blockade of Haiti.376
The Harlan County incident was emblematic of the shambolic nature of US
policy at this point. There was no consensus within the administration for sending US
troops to Haiti, with the Defence Department and the CIA firmly against such a
deployment. According to Shattuck, “In the first week of October, Secretary of Defence
Les Aspin told Tony Lake and Warren Christopher that he was against taking any further
steps to prepare the way for Aristide’s return,” on the basis of a CIA report indicating that
Haiti’s military “did not intend to live up to their commitments and were preparing to
disrupt U.S. military operations.”377 When the decision was finally made to send the
Harlan County to Haiti the Pentagon delayed its departure without informing the State
Department. As the New York Times reported: “Some State Department officials said that
they felt the Pentagon was throwing up unnecessary roadblocks for a mission of which
the US military is wary.”378 FRAPH leader Constant claimed that “he had informed his
U.S. employers ahead of time that his organization was planning to demonstrate against
the Harlan County, but that FRAPH members had no intention of fighting and would
pose no threat whatsoever” (italics in original). Nonetheless, the CIA advised
Washington that US troops would be at risk if they landed, “presumably to scare Clinton
administration policymakers and thereby forestall the return of an Aristide they did not
like.”379 As we saw above, the CIA was contemptuous of the exiled Haitian president and,
according to former Los Angeles Times Caribbean bureau chief Kenneth Freed, who was
interviewed by Philippe Girard, even planned to make Toto Constant president in his
stead: “The CIA hoped that Constant had a chance of beating Aristide in a popularity
contest and that he would one day replace Aristide as President of Haiti.”380
Numerous members of the Clinton administration had by this stage accepted that
the Haitian military dictatorship was unlikely ever to relinquish power of its own volition.
In his memoirs, Warren Christopher wrote that in the wake of the collapse of the
Governor’s Island Agreement, “many of us began to understand that no matter what
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Cédras said, he would never leave power until forced to do so.” 381 Likewise, UN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright has stated that the lesson of the Harlan County fiasco
was that “the military leaders had no intention of keeping their word. If they were going
to go, they would have to be pushed.”382 It was sentiments such as these that led some
officials in the days after the humiliation in Port-au-Prince to briefly advocate military
action, before settling for sanctions and a naval blockade. To quote Philippe Girard: “On
14 October, according to interviews with participants, the White House was veering
toward intervention at the instigation of Gore, Lake and Christopher.” However, as then-
NSC Latin American affairs chief Richard Feinberg told Girard, “the military was dead
against the use of force, so there was no invasion then.” Nonetheless, Feinberg added that
the embarrassing retreat of the Harlan County was ultimately “critical”: “It resulted in
tremendous political criticism and contributed to the decision to intervene a year later.”383
Following the Harlan County’s embarrassing failure to dock in Haiti the Clinton
administration began to distance itself from the man it was ostensibly working to
reinstate, President Aristide. In December 1993, the Haitian prime minister, Robert
Malval, whom Aristide had nominated as part of the Governor’s Island Agreement,
visited the US and outlined his scheme for ending the crisis, which involved holding a
conference of interested parties in Haiti and advancing a solution based on the accord
reached at Governor’s Island. Aristide rejected Malval’s plan, enraging officials in
Washington. To quote David Malone, “The USA was intensely irritated that Aristide had
torpedoed the initiative and was soon reassessing its support for the Haitian President, a
move signalled in press leaks.”384 Aristide angered the US administration yet further in
early 1994 when he dismissed out of hand the so-called “Monde Plan.” The Monde Plan
was brought to Washington by a delegation from the Haitian parliament, and was named
after one of its members, who was a founding member of the feared paramilitary
organisation FRAPH.385 The delegation’s independence was compromised by the fact
that its members had been selected by the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince. In addition, the
plan itself had been drafted by the State Department, while the trip was paid for with
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money from USAID.386 Alex Dupuy has described this gambit as an attempted “coup”
against Aristide: “The whole affair was a hoax designed by Pezzullo and the State
Department to dupe Aristide into accepting a deal that neutralized him but protected the
coup leaders.”387 Washington’s exasperation with the Haitian president was also evident
from a draft UN Security Council resolution it put forward in February, which would
have empowered the UN secretary general to lift the sanctions against Haiti “if he
deemed that the military rulers showed signs of cooperation and Aristide did not.” The
proposed resolution also called on Aristide to name a new prime minister “without any
guarantee for his own return.”388
Having contemplated discarding Aristide entirely in late 1993 and early 1994, the
Clinton administration swung its policy back the other way in the spring of 1994.
Although there were important political constituencies vehemently opposed to the Haitian
president, such as most Republicans in the US Congress, Clinton was also subjected to
countervailing domestic pressure to end the forced repatriation of Haitian refugees and
“restore democracy” to Haiti. The forty-member Congressional Black Caucus (CBC)
denounced the president’s forcible repatriation of Haitian refugees and advocated military
action to remove the military dictatorship and return Aristide. Clinton’s problems were
compounded in April when Randall Robinson, the head of the lobbying group
TransAfrica, began a hunger-strike in protest at Clinton’s treatment of the refugees.
Clinton responded to this wave of discontent by removing Pezzullo, and making William
Gray, the African-American president of the United Negro Fund, his special envoy to
Haiti.389 The president also tightened US sanctions against the junta in May and June
1994; these actions coincided with the US taking the lead in securing approval of UN
Security Council Resolution 917 of 6 May 1994, which banned air travel to and from
Haiti, imposed an embargo on all trade except for food and medicine, and placed a travel
ban on the Haitian military and plotters and supporters of the coup.390 The administration
386 Dupuy, Haiti in the New World Order, p. 155; Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council, p.
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387 Dupuy, Haiti in the New World Order, pp. 153, 155.
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also announced that month that all Haitian refugees would receive asylum hearings rather
than being sent straight back home, bringing Robinson’s hunger-strike to a close.391
On 2 May 1994 Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott emphasised in a senior
staff meeting that “we are dead serious about getting Cedras out and Aristide in.”392 By
this stage, a number of senior officials had concluded that the use, or at least the threat, of
force was inevitable if this outcome were to be realised. Talbott was one such official, as
was National Security Adviser Tony Lake. The president publicly refused to rule out the
use of force, also on 2 May, while William Gray was equally vague, issuing a “thinly
veiled threat” in June when he declared that “the military option is on the table.”393
Nonetheless, there still existed considerable opposition within the government to such a
policy, notably in the Defence Department, where officials “continued to see Haiti as
another Mogadishu,”394 a reference to the botched operation in Somalia in October 1993
that saw 18 US combat deaths. Many members of Congress were likewise extremely
leery of sending American soldiers to Haiti, with many Republicans mystified by
Clinton’s apparent willingness to put US forces in harm’s way for the sake of Jean-
Bertrand Aristide. According to Shattuck, the hostility exhibited by Congress and the
Department of Defence was critical in persuading Clinton to delay military action.395
Despite the scepticism felt by many in the Pentagon and Congress, the
administration was moving inexorably towards threatening, and if necessary, employing
force to oust Haiti’s military dictatorship. The junta was becoming even more recalcitrant
around this time, as evidenced by its decision in July to expel MICIVIH. Meanwhile,
Clinton’s decision to relax immigration restrictions against Haitian refugees, combined
with yet more state-sponsored repression in Haiti, had caused a flood of Haitian refugees
to take to the seas. With other options exhausted, UN Ambassador Albright “spent most
of July 1994 persuading the Security Council to authorize the use of “all necessary means
– code for force – to restore Haitian democracy by moving Cedras out and Aristide back
391 Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council, p. 104.
392 Quoted in Shattuck, Freedom on Fire, p. 100-1.
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394 Shattuck, Freedom on Fire, p. 101.
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in.”396 Her efforts met with success, and on 31 July 1994 the Security Council passed
Resolution 940, which authorised the establishment of “a multinational force…to use all
necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership” and
effect “the prompt return of the legitimately elected President.”397 Still, the junta showed
no signs of departing willingly, forcing the Clinton administration to come to a
determination on whether or nor to go ahead and send in US troops. Even at this point,
there was no unanimity within the administration for an invasion. According to Clinton,
most of his top foreign policy advisers favoured a military assault, but Secretary of
Defence William Perry and the Pentagon were still not convinced. The president,
however, “was fed up” with Cédras. “It was time to throw him out.”398
Clinton was nevertheless still chary of invading, in spite of the Haitian’s army’s
total inability to resist any attack. His hesitancy at this late stage was induced by the
vocal and widespread opposition in Congress to the proposed invasion.399 So, in order to
drum up support for the planned attack on Haiti, Clinton went on national TV on 15
September to lay out his case. He excoriated “Cédras and his armed thugs” for carrying
out “a reign of terror, executing children, raping women, killing priests,” and warned:
“The message of the United States to the Haitian dictators is clear. Your time is up. Leave
now, or we will force you from power.”400 In addition to the need to end the junta’s
human rights abuses, Clinton offered a number of other reasons for the proposed invasion,
including the refugee crisis and the need to demonstrate US credibility. However, as
Philippe Girard has noted, Clinton was clear that “the need to restore democracy was the
single most important explanation for his decision to invade Haiti.”401 His tough talk
notwithstanding, Clinton was, at the eleventh hour, looking for a way out of a seemingly
unavoidable clash with Haiti’s feeble armed forces and he therefore agreed to former
President Jimmy Carter’s suggestion that he lead a mission to Haiti to coax Cédras into
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stepping down without a fight. As Clinton described it in his memoirs, “Carter
desperately wanted to avoid a forced invasion. So did I. Haiti had no military capability;
it would be like shooting fish in a barrel.”402 Carter duly persuaded Cédras and his
colleagues to stand down within a month, in return for an amnesty. The junta pledged not
to resist the deployment of US forces, while Carter guaranteed that the military activities
of the US-led Multinational Force (MNF) would be coordinated with the Haitian army.403
The stage was thus set for Aristide’s return and the “restoration” of Haitian democracy.
The US-dominated military mission codenamed “Operation Uphold Democracy”
began on 19 September 1994 with the arrival in Haiti of American soldiers, whose
numbers quickly reached a peak of 21,000.404 US troops faced no resistance from the
Haitian army (FADH – Armed Forces of Haiti) or indeed from paramilitary groups like
FRAPH and were greeted as saviours by the downtrodden Haitian people. President
Clinton foresaw a brief stay for the MNF, anticipating that it would soon be replaced by a
smaller United Nations peacekeeping force. The president’s desire to pull the bulk of US
forces out of Haiti as soon as possible reflected his awareness of the hostility within
Congress towards the Haiti mission. Clinton’s concerns were written into Security
Council Resolution 940, which stated that the MNF would “terminate its mission…when
a secure and stable environment has been established” and at that point hand over
responsibility to the United Nations force, UNMIH (United Nations Mission in Haiti).405
However, whereas those drafting Resolution 940 had assumed the MNF would have to
subdue the Haitian army, and would consequently bear sole responsibility for maintaining
security, the situation had changed following Carter’s agreement with the dictatorship, to
the effect that US troops were now expected to work with Haitian soldiers.
Notwithstanding the operation’s purported pro-democracy and human rights slant,
American commanders were not averse to this arrangement. Operation Uphold
Democracy’s military leadership was reluctant to jeopardise the safety of American
soldiers, and they were thus content to leave police duties to the FADH. 406 As the
commander of US forces in Haiti, General Henry Shelton, put it, the FADH “could
402 Ibid, p. 3; Clinton, My Life, p. 617.
403 The terms of the agreement are in Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council, p. 112.
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provide…some amount of stability in the country…I had a personal interest in trying to
keep the FAD’H from collapsing totally and complete anarchy taking over.”407 While
using the Haitian army to impose law and order was at variance with the declared goal of
promoting democracy this contradiction was quickly overcome, for the FADH
disintegrated in October.
US Policy following the Return of Aristide
Jean-Bertrand Aristide reappeared in Haiti on 15 October 1994, two days after
General Cédras had fled the country. With foreign troops present in the country, the
security situation improved dramatically. Paul Farmer, a critic of US policy and a
resident of Haiti, wrote at the time that “the level of personal security was at an all-time
high,” an opinion reciprocated by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who in
January 1995 stated that “Haiti has not enjoyed this level of security for a very long
time.”408 With stability and security apparently achieved in Haiti, UNMIH peacekeepers
were deployed and the MNF took its leave on 31 March 1995, allowing President Clinton
to withdraw the vast majority of American soldiers.409 The US then turned its attention to
a number of democracy promotion initiatives. One of these was helping to ensure the
dramatic improvement in security was maintained. Citizens cannot exercise their political
rights in conditions of dire insecurity, so the basis of any pro-democracy policy had to be
maintaining the vastly more secure environment established by the MNF, with the
deployment of over two thousand American soldiers as part of UNMIH a contribution to
that end. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the FADH had collapsed, necessitating the
establishment of some Haitian police body. A temporary solution had been found while
the MNF was still in Haiti, with Washington dispatching the US Justice Department’s
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to train an
407 Quoted in Ibid, p. 112.
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409 At its peak, UNMIH comprised 6,106 soldiers and 874 international police, with an overall US
contribution of around 2,300 men and women. Granderson, “Military-Humanitarian Ambiguities in Haiti,”
p. 113; Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council, p. 123.
122
Interim Public Security Force (IPSF).410 Most of the interim police were ‘rehabilitated’
soldiers, although there was reason to doubt that they had turned over a new leaf. As
Farmer has commented, “The cornerstone of the rehabilitation seemed to be a six-day
training course and the replacement of the soldiers’ hats with baseball caps.”411 3,400
former soldiers were joined in the interim police force by 900 Haitian asylum seekers
who had been held at the US military base at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba.412
The IPSF was, as its name suggested, not a long-term solution. ICITAP was
subsequently charged with setting up a new force, which was to be called the Haitian
National Police (HNP). ICITAP oversaw “the recruitment, training and deployment of
the new police force,” an effort that concluded in February 1996, by which time police
numbers had reached about 5,000.413 Again, however, large numbers of ex-soldiers found
their way onto the supposedly reformed police force, so it should come as little surprise
that the new police did not distinguish themselves. The limitations of the “reformed”
police were in fact clear at a very early stage, with the Washington Post reporting in
January 1996 that “the police have been accused of shooting unarmed civilians and
taking part in political murders.”414 One such incident occurred on 6 March 1996, when
the HNP massacred 8 people in the Port-au-Prince slum of Cité Soleil.415 In October 1997,
new UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in a report to the Security Council, “made clear
that the HNP was in no shape to stand on its own feet yet.”416 By Clinton’s final year in
office, Haiti’s police force was in a deplorable state. Human Rights Watch accused the
HNP of effectively acting as a tool of the government by not intervening to stop violent
demonstrations and attacks on opposition activists by supporters of the ruling Famni
Lavalas party, in addition to arresting opposition figures on spurious charges. There were
“sixty-six suspicious killings by the police in 1999, including several possible
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extrajudicial executions,” while the police were also accused of carrying out beatings and
torturing criminal suspects. Additionally, official figures from the Haitian government
revealed that no fewer than 673 members of the HNP had been sacked since 1995 – an
extremely high percentage – with human rights abuses “committed in at least 130
cases.”417
“The promotion of free and fair elections was at the core of U.S. political strategy
in Haiti,” argues Mark Peceny.418 The Clinton administration was certainly eager to see
elections held, as shown by the fact that the US government spent $18.8 million in
support of the 1995 contests.419 However, the June 1995 legislative and local elections
were marred by serious logistical difficulties: “Voter and candidate registration was
chaotic and last-minute modifications to the candidate lists resulted in many errors in the
ballots,” with some candidates omitted, while “some polling stations opened late, not at
all, or were relocated unannounced.” 420 In addition, a million electoral cards
disappeared.421 On the day of the vote, one candidate was killed, while a polling station
was attacked in the capital. Human Rights Watch denounced an “electoral debacle”
characterised by “chaos on election day,” while OAS Secretary-General César Gaviria,
although conceding that “there was no evidence of organized fraud,” nonetheless asserted
that “it is very difficult for us to say that this was free and fair.”422 A presidential election
followed in December 1995. Although constitutionally barred from a second successive
stint as president, as the election neared Aristide began sending out mixed messages on
whether he would leave office. The Clinton administration was very much opposed to
Aristide standing again, and Clinton’s national security adviser, Tony Lake, was
dispatched to Haiti, where he managed to persuade Aristide to abide by his earlier
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commitment not to seek another term. 423 The few Haitians who turned out to vote
delivered a crushing victory to Aristide’s former prime minister, René Préval.424
The woefully low turnout by voters in December 1995, together with the highly
imperfect June 1995 ballot, provided Republican opponents of Clinton with considerable
evidence with which to deride the president’s policy. Congressional Republicans “harshly
criticized the June 1995 elections” and “questioned whether the December 1995
presidential elections were truly free and fair, given that less than 30 percent of the
population voted and the winning candidate received 88 percent of the vote.”425 The
Clinton administration, however, had resolved to depict the flawed elections as positively
as possible. J. Brian Atwood, the director of USAID and the head of the US observer
mission that monitored the June 1995 elections, saluted the “truly impressive”
achievement of a “peaceful balloting process…in a country where violence has so often
marked past elections.”426 As for the December 1995 presidential contest, Atwood, who
again headed the US observer mission, called it “a crucial milestone in Haiti’s progress
toward an enduring democratic order.” Regarding the embarrassingly low turnout,
Atwood declared that it “does not in any way harm or destroy the legitimacy of this
process.”427 Robert Fatton has asserted that “the Clinton administration backed the results
of both the presidential and legislative elections of 1995,” the aforementioned flaws
notwithstanding, on the “assumption…that President Préval and his government would
implement the program of [economic] structural adjustment advanced by the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund and strongly supported by the United States,” of
which more later.428 The administration’s unduly upbeat response to the elections was
also a product of the need to deflect Republican attacks.
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The administration’s Haiti policy was strongly influenced and constrained by the
Republican majority in Congress. Clinton, aware of Republican opposition to his policy,
was keen to see UNMIH end in February 1996, as originally planned, and although the
US did agree to the mission’s extension, Clinton withdrew the last US peacekeepers from
UNMIH in April 1996.429 As Daniel Erikson has commented, the president “made sure to
scale back the U.S. presence in Haiti in time for the 1996 [US presidential] elections,” in
order to deprive the Republicans of the chance to attack him on the issue. 430
Congressional Republicans were also able to restrict the president’s room for manoeuvre
on Haiti by using their control of the budget. In late 1995 Senate majority leader Bob
Dole, who would run as the Republican candidate in the 1996 presidential election,
proposed legislation terminating aid to Haiti unless Clinton certified to Congress that the
Haitian government was making a serious effort to investigate a number of alleged
political killings.431 The so-called Dole Amendment became law in January 1996, and
stipulated that, with the exception of humanitarian and electoral assistance, all aid to the
Haitian government would be suspended unless Clinton provided the aforementioned
certification, although the president could waive the restrictions if he deemed it to be “in
the national interest of the United States.”432 Some $65 million in aid was suspended.433
The administration also had to contend with the publication of inflammatory reports by
Republican congressional staffers in April and October 1996, which implicated the
Haitian government in politically-motivated murders and accusing the Clinton
administration of covering up Haiti’s obstruction of FBI efforts to investigate the
killings.434
The withholding of funds under the Dole Amendment was not the first occasion
the US had frozen aid to Haiti. In October 1995, US$4.6 million in USAID support (as
well as US$100 million from the International Monetary Fund) was suspended when
Aristide’s government decided to back out of the planned privatisation of the state-owned
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cement and flour companies. Aristide and his representatives had committed to these
measures in Paris in August 1994 and January 1995, when international donors had
pledged $1.2 billion in aid to Haiti, so long as Aristide agreed to various neoliberal
reforms, including the privatisation of nine state-owned companies. According to Lisa
McGowan, by holding up this money Washington had fired “a shot across the bow of the
Haitian government, warning it of the U.S. government’s unambiguous – one might even
say obsessive – support for a fast-paced privatization process.” 435 The Clinton
administration was indeed a strong proponent of Haitian privatisation and had in been
pushing such neoliberal economic reforms on Aristide since even before his return to
Haiti in October 1994. In the words of Mark Peceny, the Clinton administration had,
prior to the intervention by US forces, “extracted important concessions from Aristide,”
one of which involved persuading him “to abandon his radical economic platform in
favor of an IMF, World Bank, and AID-sponsored commitment to sound money, limited
government intervention in the economy, and free trade.”436 US Vice-President Al Gore
visited Haiti in October 1995 to extol the benefits of privatisation, while USAID awarded
a US$900,000 contract to a public relations firm “to “sell” the idea of privatisation to the
Haitian public.”437
In his first term Clinton touted Haiti as a foreign policy success. By 1997,
however, such claims were looking outlandish. Parliamentary elections in April 1997
proved a fiasco, with a mere 5% of voters turning out in a contest that was “plagued by
irregularities and declared fraudulent by international observers.” 438 Even the US
government was losing patience with Haiti’s leaders: a June 1997 story in the
Washington Post revealed that run-off elections had been “postponed…indefinitely” after
“U.S. Ambassador [to Haiti] William Swing told Préval that unless the [electoral] council
held a new vote in areas affected by fraud, the United States would not recognize the
results.”439 That month Haiti’s prime minister, Rosny Smarth, who was wildly unpopular
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among Haitians for supporting neoliberal economic reforms,440 resigned, ushering in a
prolonged period of political turmoil. The Haitian legislature continually refused to
accept President Préval’s nominees for prime minister, leaving Haiti without a
government. One consequence of the political crisis was that by the end of the year $120
million in foreign aid was being withheld by donors.441 Matters did not improve the
following year either. The continued political impasse (there was no government in Haiti
until January 1999) brought US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the country in
April 1998. She stated that “frankly, we have been disappointed that Haiti’s political
leaders have taken so long to resolve their differences,” but nonetheless deemed US
policy towards Haiti “a success.”442
In August 1999 the US administration decided to pull out the 500 American
troops who comprised the US Support Group in Haiti, which had been carrying out
humanitarian tasks and public works projects since May 1996. The decision was
unsurprising, given that General Charles E. Wilhelm, the commander of US forces in the
region, had testified before Congress in March that “American forces have not been able
to create stability in the volatile nation and are now at risk.”443 Calls from Haitian
businessmen for the US not to withdraw its soldiers were “overwhelmed by strong views
at the Pentagon and among Republican leaders in Congress” in favour of the mission’s
termination.444 The Republicans had long objected to the presence of the Support Group
in Haiti, as exemplified by an October 1997 letter from the chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, to Secretary of State Albright. Helms
asserted that “I see little to be gained, and much to be risked, in leaving a relatively small
number of US troops as a trip-wire in Haiti…to prop up an incompetent government and
salvage a totally flawed policy.”445 Congressional Republicans were also dismayed when
President Préval moved to break the political deadlock in January 1999 by dissolving
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parliament and unilaterally appointing a government. As the Washington Post reported,
“some Republicans, long leery of the initial occupation, decried the move as a step
toward dictatorship.”446 The Republicans in fact had many reasons to doubt Clinton’s
claims of “success” in Haiti, only one of which was Préval’s dissolution of the legislature:
as the end of the year approached, hundreds of millions of dollars in international aid was
still frozen due to the absence of a parliament and a budget, unemployment was
presumed to be in the region of 50-70%, and the country was developing into a major
transhipment point for cocaine.447 Such facts were hard to gloss over, so it was little
wonder that William Swing’s successor as US ambassador in Port-au-Prince, Timothy
Carney, should comment in September 1999 that “Haiti is a long way from getting
democracy. It lacks nearly all of the elements that make up a democracy…Overall, our
expectations were too high.”448
Under “enormous pressure” from the Clinton administration, Préval’s government
finally held new parliamentary and local elections in May 2000.449 The fact that these
elections had been postponed five times gives an indication of the gravity of the political
crisis in Haiti at the time.450 The Clinton administration’s enthusiasm for new elections
was not shared by many congressional Republicans, however, as demonstrated by the
Republican-controlled Senate’s decision in March to suspend tens of millions of dollars
in aid, including electoral support funds, an action taken “to punish the Haitian
government for fining a U.S. firm caught illegally importing rice into [Haiti].”451 The
elections went ahead nonetheless, and were won handily by former president Aristide’s
Famni Lavalas party. First reactions to the May 21 vote were remarkably upbeat, with a
turnout of around 60 percent in generally peaceful conditions inducing international
observer delegations to commend the poll as free and fair. However, when it emerged
that Haiti’s Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) had used an illegal and unconstitutional
method for counting the votes, thereby awarding undeserved first-round victories to a
number of Famni Lavalas candidates for the Senate, the OAS, the United States, and
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other international actors backtracked, and demanded a recount. The aftermath of the
election saw mob violence by Famni Lavalas supporters, the arrests of thirty five
opposition candidates and supporters “on flimsy pretexts,” and the flight from Haiti of the
head of the electoral council, Léon Manus, who claimed to have received death threats
after ultimately concluding that the elections were in fact fraudulent.452
The United States cut off funding for the Haitian government in the wake of the
disputed elections of May 2000. Congress passed a bill stipulating that no aid would be
provided unless new legislative elections were held and the US “drug czar” certified that
Haiti was not providing a safe-haven for drug dealers. Around US$70 million in aid
would be set aside for Haiti, but would go through non-governmental organisations.
Clinton signed the bill into law on 6 November 2000.453 In a further blow to the Clinton
administration, a presidential election was due in Haiti that very month and there was
only one candidate with a hope of victory: Jean-Bertrand Aristide. With only months to
go before Clinton’s departure from the White House, the administration had come full
circle: having risked the lives of American soldiers in 1994 to restore Aristide, Clinton
administration officials had veered towards the Republicans’ position of feeling little but
loathing for him. The Washington Post had reported in May that Aristide’s anticipated
victory in the presidential vote was “being viewed with trepidation by U.S. officials,” in
consequence of “his sometimes radical liberation theology and ambiguous record on
condemning political violence.” 454 The presidential election did indeed deliver a
resounding triumph to Aristide, but in surreal circumstances. Most opposition parties
decided against contesting the vote, leaving Aristide to battle it out with virtual unknowns.
Aristide limited himself to a solitary public appearance during the campaign. Turnout
was hotly disputed, with estimates varying from 5 to 60 percent. Assuming that the lower
figure was more accurate, the poor turnout may have been the result of fear: over a dozen
bombs went off in Port-au-Prince the week before polling day.455
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Congressional Republicans made the most of Haiti’s electoral woes. Three
leading Republicans, including Jesse Helms, released a statement deploring Aristide’s
win as “a tragic day in Haiti’s long and troubled quest for pluralism and representative
democracy.” It had been “a sham election with the sole purpose of delivering absolute
control over Haiti’s government to Mr. Jean-Bertrand Aristide,” they declared.456 The
White House was hardly more conciliatory, urging Aristide to come to terms with the
defiant Haitian opposition grouping known as the Democratic Convergence, which had
coalesced following the May 2000 elections and was demanding reruns of both the
legislative and presidential elections. Clinton dispatched former national security adviser
Tony Lake and the State Department’s Donald Steinberg to meet with Aristide and
demand that he “confirm in writing his commitment to creating a government of national
consensus.” 457 Aristide did so, only to see the Democratic Convergence dismiss his
proposals out of hand. As Clinton’s presidency came to an end, therefore, Aristide was
faced with an intransigent opposition, an almost certainly hostile incoming Republican
administration in Washington, in addition to all of Haiti’s manifold socioeconomic
troubles.
Democracy Promotion in Haiti: Success or Failure?
It can be argued that in the short-term the Clinton administration made a
substantial contribution to the cause of democracy in Haiti, and some scholars have
indeed done so. In an article published in 1996, Robert Rotberg described Haiti as “the
rare jewel in President Bill Clinton’s foreign policy crown,” basing his claim on Clinton’s
removal of Cédras and the huge decline in violence that followed the junta’s exit, as well
as Aristide’s return and the peaceful and democratic transfer of the presidency to René
Préval in 1996.458 Irwin Stotzky has also emphasised the significance of the handover
from Aristide to Préval, pronouncing it an “incredible feat,” “a milestone for democracy”
November 2000. Fatton considers the 60% figure “highly improbable”; he states that “most impartial
observers estimated that participation did not exceed 20 percent but was not as low as the 5 percent bandied
about by the opposition.” Fatton, Haiti’s Predatory Republic, p. 110.
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in Haiti and “a clear success for U.S. policy.”459 Michael Mandelbaum, although a critic
of Clinton’s foreign policy, was willing to attribute “modest success” to the president’s
Haiti policy, on the grounds that at the end of 1995 Haitians “were better off, or at least
less likely to be killed, than had been the case 15 months earlier.”460 There is clearly
some evidence that the US successfully promoted democracy in Haiti during Clinton’s
first term: the democratically elected president was reinstated thanks to US intervention,
a brutal dictatorship was forced out, and as a result of the dramatically improved security
situation Haitians were to a certain extent able to exercise their political rights. Moreover,
as Robert Fatton has observed, these achievements were only possible because President
Clinton dispatched United States military forces. As he has put it, “the U.S. intervention
was the only means capable of ending the military dictatorship.”461
We can form stronger conclusions about the level of democracy in Haiti by
employing our democracy metric. Haiti failed to meet several of the criteria of genuinely
free and fair elections. On the positive side, Haitians above the age of 18 had the right to
vote, with the exception of prisoners,462 and Haitians had many parties to choose from
when casting their ballots, although it should be acknowledged that these parties were
weak, divided and obscure. As Jean-Germain Gros wrote in 1997, Haitian parties were
“wracked by petty infighting” and “lack[ed] appeal among ordinary voters.”463 Or, as
Charles Arthur put it, “many of Haiti’s political parties are one-man bands created to
serve the personal interests and ambitions of a wealthy individual.”464 There were issues
relating to election monitoring. Although the majority of contests that were held during
the period in question were observed by monitors from the Organisation of American
States, the OAS refused to monitor the second round of legislative elections in 2000 and
the subsequent presidential vote on the grounds that problems relating to the first round in
2000 had not been resolved satisfactorily. Another failing related to fraud, which marred
elections in both 1997 and 2000. It was also difficult for Haitians to make an informed
459 Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti, p. 158.
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judgement when voting. There was a serious absence of campaigning at times, notably
before the 2000 presidential election when Aristide “remained in utter seclusion, and
virtually never campaigned.”465 Print media was also in short supply and of no use to
many citizens anyway. The US State Department’s report on human rights in Haiti in
2000 noted that the “written press is beyond the reach of many citizens, due to language
differences, illiteracy, and cost.” The country’s two French newspapers had a circulation
of below 20,000. These deficiencies were mitigated somewhat by the many private radio
stations broadcasting in Haiti.466 A particularly serious weakness of Haiti’s elections was
the intimidation and violence that accompanied election campaigns and voting. There
was “a spate of assassinations” in the period leading up to the legislative elections held in
May 2000, which “claimed the lives of at least 15 people, mainly opposition activists,”
with the most notorious killing that of the respected radio journalist Jean Dominique.467
Other violence associated with the election included a gang setting fire to the
headquarters of an opposition party, and an attack by thugs on the offices of another
opposition party the day after the vote.468 There was “an overall climate of intimidation”
in the lead-up to the presidential election won by Aristide later that year, with bombings
in Port-au-Prince and attacks on opposition political meetings.469
Moving on to the second element of democracy, human rights, Haiti performed
poorly. While the rights to life, to vote, to freedom of speech, to freedom of assembly, to
freedom of association, to an education, and to an adequate standard of living were
incorporated in the 1987 constitution, many Haitians did not benefit from these rights in
practice. As the political death toll accompanying the elections in 2000 suggests, the
Haitian government was not capable of guaranteeing the right to life of many Haitians.
Although violence against the person had undoubtedly declined since the horrific
situation that existed under the military dictatorship, security within Haiti was
undermined by the incompetence and corruption of the new police force, mob violence,
and “the proliferation of armed gangs involved in the trafficking of drugs and other
465 Fatton, Haiti’s Predatory Republic, p. 110.
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criminal activities.”470 The police proved “incapable of protecting citizens,” convincing
wealthier Haitians to employ private security firms for their protection.471 Freedom of
speech was also significantly limited in practice. The US State Department reported that
following the 2000 presidential elections “death threats proliferated against media figures
who questioned the electoral process or outcomes…Three radio stations were forced to
stop temporarily news programming for brief periods in late November and December as
a direct result of threats against the stations for their coverage of the elections.”472
Haitians were also at times unable to exercise their rights to freedom of assembly and
association. For example, in September 2000 a unionist named Elison Merzilus “was
taken from his home by a group of 10 armed men” and later found dead. “Around the
same time, 10 other union members were informed that their names were blacklisted and
spent several months in hiding.”473
In reality, large segments of the population did not possess crucial social and
economic rights enumerated in the constitution. Article 22 “recognizes the right of every
citizen to decent housing, education, food and social security,”474 but the reality of life in
Haiti did not correspond to the constitutional ideal. For example, although article 32-3 of
the constitution states that primary schooling is “compulsory,” just 56 percent of Haitian
children were enrolled in primary schools in 1997, according to figures cited by Charles
Arthur.475 The US State Department estimated the rate of adult literacy at “only about 20
percent.”476 Most Haitians did not, and still do not, have an adequate standard of living
either. “Chronic malnutrition is widespread among the most vulnerable,” according to the
World Food Programme, while “daily food insecurity affects 40 percent of Haitian
homes.”477 As for housing, the World Bank reported in 1998 that “two-thirds of the
population of Port-au-Prince lives in slums.”478
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The political crisis that engulfed Haiti from 1997 onwards had serious
implications for the legitimacy of Haiti’s political institutions. With the legislature
repeatedly refusing to approve President René Préval’s nominations for prime minister
the country was left without a government until January 1999, at which point Préval took
the drastic step of dismissing the legislature, and unilaterally appointed a government that
ruled by decree until the flawed elections of May 2000. While the dissolution of the
legislature was defensible in a sense, as it enabled Préval to bring an end to the political
deadlock that had left Haiti without a government, the president’s action left Haiti with
an illegitimate government, one that had not even been indirectly elected by Haitian
voters. During this period, then, the third requirement of democracy was not satisfied in
Haiti.
Democracy Promotion in Haiti: An Important US Policy Objective?
In answering this question it is useful to separate US policy into two parts: pre-
October 1994, when Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned to Haiti, and post-October 1994. A
strong case can be made that the US genuinely sought to promote democracy in Haiti
prior to October 1994. In an effort to restore the elected Haitian president the Clinton
administration employed diplomacy, tightened sanctions against the junta, and eventually
dispatched American soldiers when it seemed that all other options had failed. Its policies
therefore met the fifth criteria of genuine democracy promotion, which applies only when
an authoritarian regime is in place. However, if we test the Clinton administration on its
commitment to human rights in Haiti, the third criteria of genuine democracy promotion,
the picture becomes more opaque. While the administration aimed to improve the
desperate human rights situation in Haiti by removing the dictatorship, it displayed at the
same time a cavalier attitude to the issue of justice, as evidenced by its repeated attempts
to convince Aristide to sign up to an amnesty for the military dictatorship. We should
also bear in mind that for a time in late 1993 and early 1994 the United States seriously
considered jettisoning Aristide altogether, for at that time he was seen by many US
officials as an obstacle to a resolution of the crisis. In other words, the reinstatement of
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the president was considered less vital than securing an accord with Cédras that would
see the junta stand down without the need for US military intervention.
The ambiguities evident in the Clinton administration’s attitude towards
Aristide’s return were symptomatic of the complexities of the US foreign policy-making
process. Whereas senior foreign policy officials like Tony Lake, Warren Christopher and
Strobe Talbott firmly backed efforts to restore Aristide, important bureaucratic
institutions like the CIA and the Pentagon were able to seriously impede their plans.
While numerous policymakers no doubt shared Christopher’s view that it “seemed…the
ultimate in hypocrisy for the United States to claim that it supported democracy and not
work to restore to office a man who had been elected with nearly 70% of the vote,”479
there were more than enough countervailing voices to impede Aristide’s reinstatement.
There was a profound lack of consensus within the administration over what to do about
Haiti. The administration’s policy was also subject to considerable pressure from two
broad groups in Congress: Republicans who despised Aristide, and who disapproved of
plans to restore him to office, especially if it meant using the American military, as
opposed to the Congressional Black Caucus, whose members were strongly in favour of
returning Aristide, including if necessary through the use of force.
Most scholars are unconvinced by the administration’s pro-democracy pretensions,
at least as regards what occurred prior to October 1994. “There can be little doubt that,
while the restoration of democratic rule in Haiti was consonant with US policy towards
the Western Hemisphere in the 1990s, Clinton did not act for this reason,” argues David
Malone.480 He contends that US policy towards Haiti “was driven principally by domestic
pressures,” with the concerted lobbying effort by the CBC and others in the spring of
1994 marking “a turning-point for Clinton” and US policy.481 Jean-Germain Gros has
asserted that “the Clinton administration probably had only two objectives in mind” when
the decision was made to employ force, namely “stopping the flow of refugees into South
Florida and achieving a foreign policy victory at minor human costs, especially in U.S.
lives.” Gros also emphasises the importance of proximity: “It is a safe bet that if Haiti
were located further away from the U.S. mainland, Operation Restore Democracy would
479 Christopher, In the Stream of History, pp. 176-7.
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not have occurred.” 482 While acknowledging that domestic political pressures
“contributed to the eventual decision to take military action,” Robert Fatton has
highlighted the importance of placing the invasion “in the context of the emerging new
international order.” He suggests that “the United States was bent on reasserting its
credibility as the only remaining superpower” in the aftermath of the Cold War and the
debacle in Somalia, and Haiti “provided an irresistible opportunity” for “a triumphant
display of strength.”483 In a similar vein, Michael Mandelbaum has argued that Clinton
resorted to force in Haiti “to bolster the administration’s political standing” after
numerous embarrassing foreign policy reversals in 1993, including the aforementioned
Harlan County incident.484
It has also been suggested that the 1994 intervention was motivated by economic
factors. This argument is made by Alex Dupuy, who has written that the “primary reason
for the military occupation of Haiti…was to ensure stability in Haiti and the
implementation of Washington’s neoliberal agenda.”485 While Clinton and his advisers
were certainly enthusiastic advocates of neoliberalism, and expended a great deal of
effort endeavouring to convince Haiti’s leaders to sign up to neoliberal reforms, it would
be wrong, however, to conclude that the 1994 intervention was guided by economic
interests. After all, as one scholar has observed, “Haiti had little to no economic value for
the United States,” with US exports to Haiti after Aristide’s return totalling around
US$500-600 million a year, far less than the US$2.8 billion exported to the neighbouring
Dominican Republic in 1994, itself a minor US trading partner.486 It is highly unlikely
that the US would mount a military operation for economic reasons in a country where its
economic interests are so limited. Moreover, as Philippe Girard has commented,
“Aristide was the archetypal nationalistic, anti-American, left-leaning leader whom U.S.
businessmen have regarded as anathema,” so returning him to office “did not make much
business sense.” 487 That this was so became apparent when Aristide stalled on the
economic reforms championed by Clinton.
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Promoting democracy was certainly a factor in US policy towards Haiti before the
return of Aristide in October 1994, but Clinton’s policy was also strongly influenced by
Congress and public opinion, as shown by the fact that policy clearly shifted in April and
May 1994 in the face of a sustained lobbying campaign by influential supporters of
Aristide in the United States. Until that point, the Clinton administration had dithered and
procrastinated, asserting its support for Aristide while at the same time doing little to
bring about his return. Indeed, the US even contemplated discarding Aristide altogether at
one point. The administration firmly backed Aristide from the spring of 1994 largely
because of pressure from political groups in the US. However, although the US was now
determined to see the back of the junta it took several months for Clinton to finally decide
to send US troops to Haiti, clear evidence of his reluctance to use force. Even after he had
approved an invasion, Clinton was still looking for a way out, which was provided by
Jimmy Carter’s negotiations with the junta. It is therefore doubtful that Clinton was
motivated by a desire for an easy foreign policy success or a show of US credibility. If
these had been the president’s primary objectives, he would not have chosen to tarnish
his triumph by authorising an agreement that envisioned amnesties for Cédras and the
other coup leaders. He undoubtedly wanted the dictatorship out, but was willing to do
almost anything to avoid military conflict.
We can determine to what extent the Clinton administration was dedicated to
promoting democracy after Aristide’s return by using our democracy promotion metric.
There is clearly some evidence that the US tried to promote genuinely free and fair
elections in Haiti. USAID provided support to political parties in Haiti via the National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), a US democracy promotion NGO,
which spent $865,000 on election-related programs in 1995. NDI engaged in “political
party strengthening,” which included “political party pollwatcher training” and “political
party and consensus-building seminars.” The United States also helped to ensure that
most Haitian elections during the period in question were monitored. In 1995, for
example, the State Department provided the OAS electoral observation team with $3.7
million, while USAID gave $655,000 to the International Republican Institute (IRI),
another US democracy promotion NGO, “to train political party pollwatchers, field
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election observation missions, and document these observations.” 488 Official US
delegations also monitored the 1995 elections. In 2000, USAID “encouraged the
formation of” a Haitian election monitoring organisation called the National Council of
Observation (CNO), which “mobilized at least 7,000 citizen observers for” the May 2000
elections. However, CNO, which like the OAS refused to monitor the second round of
legislative elections in 2000 over the aforementioned allegations of first-round fraud, was
seen by many Haitians as a partisan organisation and therefore lacked credibility.489 The
US drew attention to electoral fraud in Haiti in both 1997 and 2000 and also highlighted
instances of intimidation that marred Haitian elections. However, the US government at
times failed to treat Haiti’s elections on their merits, notably in 1995 when US officials,
eager to portray Haiti as a foreign policy success, offered an overly optimistic picture of
the contests that unfolded that year. This proved a serious mistake. As Fatton has
observed, by downplaying the flaws in the 1995 elections, the US and others “opened the
door to persistent fraud and the perception that what really mattered was the regular
rituals [sic] of elections rather than popular participation or the rigors of electoral
honesty.”490
The second test of a state’s dedication to promoting democracy is whether or not
it opposes any action that undermines the legitimacy of another state’s political
institutions. By pressuring President Préval to hold new elections following his decision
to dissolve the Haitian legislature in 1999 the Clinton administration passed this test. The
Clinton administration’s attitude towards human rights in post-October 1994 Haiti is less
clear, however. Certain actions taken by the US government pointed to a clear desire to
advance human rights, especially the right to life. For instance, the US kept the MNF in
Haiti until early 1995, contributed two thousand peacekeepers to UNMIH and also
trained a new Haitian police force. USAID sought to advance the political rights of
Haitians by supporting political parties through NDI and trade unions through the
American Institute for Free Labour Development (AIFLD). However, the Clinton
administration also took decisions that called into question its dedication to human rights
in Haiti. President Clinton withdrew US soldiers from UNMIH precipitately, jeopardising
488 US GAO, “Haiti: U.S. Assistance for the Electoral Process,” pp. 22-3
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the security gains that had been made following the end of the dictatorship, while the US-
led Multinational Force did not carry out a concerted disarmament campaign, contenting
itself instead with a buy-back programme and desultory searches. By March 1995, more
than 33,000 weapons had been collected, but it was assumed that another 200,000 had not
been relinquished.491 “The failure to enforce disarmament was the main cause” of the
insecurity plaguing Haiti in the late 1990s, argues Erin Mobekk.492
Another test of a state’s dedication to promoting democracy is whether or not it
places democracy-related conditions on aid given to another state. In Haiti, the Clinton
administration made aid conditional on economic reform, rather than democratic
performance, with Haiti required to privatise certain state companies. Although the
Clinton administration and other donors may have been persuaded that privatisation was
vital for Haiti’s economic development, it was plainly antidemocratic to insist that the
Haitian government force through these measures in return for aid when the Haitian
people had no input in the formulation of the government’s economic policy and in fact
rejected the reforms outright. As one critic of the economic reforms foisted on Haiti has
argued, there was a “clear contradiction inherent in advancing democratic governance
while simultaneously dictating economic policy from above.” 493 Another critic has
observed that by insisting on unpopular economic reforms the US government “sent a
negative message about the American idea of democracy: that Haitian lawmakers (and by
extension, all voters) would not be allowed to come to decisions on their own.”494 The
US therefore failed this test of its commitment to democracy promotion.
In sum, there is undoubtedly some evidence that the US was genuinely committed
to democracy promotion in Haiti after Aristide’s return. It supported Haiti’s electoral
processes, except for those that followed the fraudulent 2000 legislative elections, reacted
to the dissolution of parliament in 1999 by demanding new elections, and took actions
indicative of a desire to promote human rights. However, President Clinton’s policy was
also significantly affected by pressures from Congress, which limited his options. This
can be seen in the amount of US aid going to Haiti. According to a report by the RAND
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Corporation, “U.S. assistance to Haiti was not generously funded, particularly compared
with the reconstruction efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo…Once U.S. peacekeepers departed
in 1996, U.S. aid to Haiti returned to preconflict levels. Indeed, U.S. assistance levels
after 1996 were not notably higher than during the Cedras regime itself.”495 The relatively
low doses of aid were the result of the hostility of the Republican-controlled Congress to
Clinton’s policy. Indeed, in his memoirs Clinton holds the Republicans partially
responsible for the failure in Haiti, noting that “after the Republicans took over Congress
in 1995, they were unwilling to give the financial assistance that might have made a
difference.” 496 So, while democracy promotion undoubtedly figured in the
administration’s thinking, the main factor influencing US policy was the resistance of the
US Congress to the president’s democracy promotion agenda in Haiti.
Democracy Promotion under Clinton: The Overall Record
Clinton’s Haiti policy was in many ways a microcosm of the administration’s
more general approach to democracy promotion. There was a great deal of rhetoric, with
US officials regularly emphasising their steadfast commitment to spreading democracy
around the world, but these assertions were at times called into question by the
administration’s antidemocratic policies in certain countries. As with the example of
Haiti, the Clinton administration in its overall foreign policy equated support for open
markets and free trade with support for democracy, although the two objectives were
arguably contradictory. Once again mirroring the example of Haiti, Clinton’s more
general efforts to advance democracy were undercut by the refusal of Republicans in the
US Congress to back the president’s policies verbally or financially. Overall, while the
United States under President Clinton did at times demonstrate support for democracy in
other nations, this goal was quickly shelved if and when vital US foreign policy interests
were on the line, and was also strongly affected by domestic politics, especially pressure
from the Republican-controlled Congress.
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As we saw above, Clinton administration officials came to Washington touting
their eagerness to promote democracy, defending the policy both in moral terms (it was
“the right thing to do”) and also in terms of cold self-interest (democracies were more
peaceful and reliable than other forms of regime). However, the reality ultimately proved
less impressive than the rhetoric. Early in Clinton’s presidency, democracy promotion
expert Thomas Carothers noted that the administration was “addicted to sweeping
statements about promoting democracy abroad that simply do not correspond to policy
reality,” while in a later retrospection on the president’s record he concluded that “the
policy has not lived up to the expansive rhetoric.”497 As evidence Carothers pointed to
the examples of the Middle East and China, where the US decided that crucial national
interests would not be served by antagonising authoritarian regimes over the issue of
democracy. Thus, China was granted most favoured nation trade status in 1994,
notwithstanding its poor record on political rights and the Chinese Communist Party’s
monopoly on political power, while close US relations with the likes of Saudi Arabia and
Egypt continued, as these states were understood to “serve U.S. interests on oil, the Arab-
Israeli peace process, and resistance to Islamic fundamentalist groups.” 498 Clinton’s
willingness to overlook concerns about political freedom when other, more significant
policy imperatives were at stake was also noted by Steven Hook. According to Hook,
democracy often came second to American economic or security interests under Clinton.
Thus, Israel, Turkey and Egypt were lavished with billions of dollars of American aid
despite their well-documented records of human rights violations, while the
administration backed China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and
ultimately awarded China permanent normal trade relations with the US.499
This is not to say that these scholars dismissed the Clinton administration’s claims
to have made supporting democracy abroad an important component of its foreign policy.
Hook noted, for instance, that under Clinton the United States increasingly attached
conditions to foreign aid requiring that recipients undertake democratic reforms.500 He
also commended Clinton for having “taken the lead in attempting to resolve” the crisis in
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Yugoslavia, and described the US push for NATO expansion as “part of a broader trend
to extend the reach of democratic governance into Eastern Europe.”501 Carothers asserted
that in Latin America and Eastern Europe Clinton generally followed pro-democracy
policies, and he also underlined that the president radically increased the amount of aid
money dedicated to promoting democracy. 502 The point is, therefore, that the
administration did make democracy promotion a policy goal and indeed achieved some
successes, but when it conflicted with other, more pivotal foreign policy aims it was
sidelined. This is well expressed by Carothers: “The core strategic approach of U.S.
policy under Clinton remains what it has been for decades…Where democracy appears to
fit in well with U.S. security and economic interests, the United States promotes
democracy. Where democracy clashes with other significant interests, it is downplayed or
even ignored.”503
Clinton’s ability to promote democracy was seriously impaired by the
obstructionism of Republicans in Congress. Republicans slashed foreign aid once they
gained control of Congress in the November 1994 elections, so that by 1999 aid levels
were down forty percent on the figure seven years earlier.504 As Hook has remarked,
Republicans in the 1990s envisioned “a more limited [foreign policy] role for the United
States based on narrowly defined national self-interests,” and their gutting of the aid
budget left the US “less capable of matching its democratic rhetoric with the material
assistance” needed to bolster democracy abroad.505 Rick Travis has argued that fear of
Republican attacks resulted in democracy promotion being “relegated to a peripheral
position” in Clinton’s overall foreign policy by 1997.506 The Republicans disliked foreign
assistance programs, as shown by the zeal with which they cut foreign spending, and the
administration ultimately concluded that actively pursuing democracy promotion was
more trouble than it was worth.507
501 Ibid, pp. 127, 117.
502 Carothers, Critical Mission, pp. 40-1, 43.
503 Ibid, p. 42.
504 Hook, “Inconsistent U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy Abroad,” p. 118.
505 Ibid, p. 120.
506 Travis, “The Promotion of Democracy at the End of the Twentieth Century: A New Polestar for
American Foreign Policy?”, p. 251.
507 Ibid, p. 262.
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A final point to consider is the relationship between free market economics and
democracy in Clinton’s foreign policy. Within the administration the two were
considered to have a symbiotic relationship, as shown by the tendency of US officials to
employ the term “market democracy.” To quote Douglas Brinkley, “[democratic]
enlargement was about spreading democracy through promoting the gospel of
geoeconomics.”508 In short, the free market was the path to democracy. The problem with
this argument is that it is not inevitable that economic liberalization will lead to
democratization. As Przeworski et al have shown, while there is a clear link between
wealth and democracy, with democracies “much more likely to survive in affluent
societies,”509 it is not apparent that economic development necessarily results in the
democratization of dictatorial regimes. Przeworski et al assert that “the causal power of
economic development in bringing down dictatorships appears paltry. The level of
development, at least as measured by per capita income, gives little information about the
chances of transition to democracy.”510 The example of China may serve as a case in
point. The United States under Clinton clearly pursued a policy aimed at opening up
China’s markets, a goal considered more important than tackling the Chinese regime on
elections and other civil and political rights. By focusing on trade, the US tacitly accepted
that the issues of civil and political rights would be mothballed. Yet if we are to adopt the
logic of Brinkley and Clinton administration officials, by working to liberalise China’s
markets the US was in fact promoting democracy in China. This assertion is debatable,
and an argument can certainly be made that the issues of human rights and political
reform should supersede market economics if democracy promotion is the objective. The
link between democracy and free market economics is not as clear-cut as Clinton and his
foreign policy team seemed to believe.
508 Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine,” p. 125.
509 Przeworski et al, Development and Democracy, p. 137.
510 Ibid, p. 98.
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5. The George W. Bush Presidency: “Defending” Democracy in Colombia
This third case study is concerned with the democracy promotion policies of the
administration of President George W. Bush, with the focus on the South American state
of Colombia. The chapter is divided into six parts, the first of which deals with the
historical relationship between the United States and Colombia, and the development of
democracy in Colombia during the twentieth century. The second part is devoted to
exploring the foreign policy priorities and ideology of the Bush administration. The third
section, which constitutes the core of the chapter, is an outline of United States policy
towards Colombia under President Bush; this is followed by a discussion of the degree of
success attributable to the US in advancing democracy in Colombia. In the fifth part I
offer conclusions regarding the relative significance of democracy promotion as a US
policy objective in Colombia, before concluding the chapter with an analysis of the Bush
administration’s democracy promotion policies elsewhere in the world.
Historical Background: US-Colombia Relations
A prominent scholar of US-Colombia relations has commented that “What is
readily apparent is that, before the United States began its drug war, the normal state of
the U.S.-Colombian relationship was relatively cordial in nature, free of much of the
suspicion and animosity that often characterised U.S. relations with other Latin American
states.”511 It is hard to square this statement with much of the historical record, however.
Indeed, for much of the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century, relations were
decidedly frosty. Tensions were evident as far back as the early nineteenth century, when
the United States angered Simón Bolívar’s South American revolutionaries by refusing to
abandon its policy of neutrality in their conflict with imperial Spain. This offence was
mitigated somewhat by Washington’s prompt recognition of the new state of Gran
Colombia, made up of present day Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador. Gran Colombia
511 Russell Crandall, Driven by Drugs: U.S. Policy Toward Colombia (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner,
2002), p. 3.
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was destined to implode within a decade, however, with Colombia going its own way in
1830 as New Granada.
A longstanding source of tension between Washington and Colombia (the name
was adopted in 1850) was the restive province of Panama in Colombia’s far north. In
1846 a treaty was signed by the two governments in which the US recognised and
committed itself to upholding Colombian sovereignty over Panama. This provided the
United States with legal cover to interfere in Panama, which it did with considerable
regularity, sending troops no fewer than thirteen times to maintain order in the half-
century following the opening of the Panama Railroad in the 1850s. During the
Colombian civil war of 1899-1902 (the War of a Thousand Days) US forces landed
unannounced and, in a brazen display of contempt for Colombian sovereignty, refused
Colombian soldiers the use of the US-owned railroad.512
Matters came to a head in Panama in 1903. After the Colombian Congress
unanimously rejected a treaty granting the US the right to build a canal across the isthmus,
Washington embraced Panama’s secessionists, recognised Panama’s independence, and
dispatched a warship to prevent Colombia from sending troops to quell the rebellion in
the province. US Secretary of State John Hay promptly signed a canal treaty with the
Panamanians. Panama’s secession was a triumph for US President Theodore Roosevelt,
who had little but disdain for Colombia and its people. He later remarked that “The
analogy of Colombians is with a group of Sicilian or Calabrian bandits” and asked
whether “the blackmailing greed of the Bogotá ring [should] stand in the way of
civilization?”513 Colombians were understandably resentful of Washington’s role in the
loss of Panama, and it wasn’t until 1921 that they were mollified, at least partially, with a
compensation payment of $25 million.
US-Colombian relations took a turn for the better with the onset of the Cold War.
US policymakers were already disposed to look favourably on Colombia as a result of its
cooperation during the Second World War, and were equally pleased when far-right
Colombian President Laureano Gómez dispatched Colombian soldiers to fight with the
US in Korea. Gómez, a member of the Conservative Party, was a rabid anti-communist
512 Ibid, p. 19; Robert W. Drexler, Colombia and the United States: Narcotics Traffic and a Failed Foreign
Policy (London: McFarland & Co., 1997), pp. 36-44.
513 Quoted in Drexler, Colombia and the United States, p. 47.
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with dictatorial tendencies. He had been elected unopposed in 1949 while a state of siege
was in effect, and proceeded to escalate the inter-party violence engulfing the Colombian
countryside at the time.514 Security concerns trumped any qualms Washington might have
had about Gómez’s authoritarian rule, with the two countries signing a military assistance
agreement in 1952. When Gómez was ousted the next year in a coup led by army chief
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla there was no discernable change in American policy. Rojas Pinilla
ingratiated himself with the United States by outlawing the Communist Party and through
his efforts to crush the communist peasant enclaves that had appeared during the civil war,
and was rewarded with military aid, including warplanes, helicopters and training for
Colombian officers.515
The leaders of the Liberal and Conservative parties, whose rural partisans had
spent much of the previous decade embroiled in a savage conflict known as La Violencia,
managed to put aside their differences to end Rojas Pinilla’s dictatorship in 1957. The
two parties fashioned a power-sharing agreement known as the National Front, under
which each would receive an equal share of all political offices except the presidency,
which was to change hands every four years. The idea was to make the costs of fighting
prohibitive, for, as the historian David Bushnell has put it, “why should members of one
party shoot up a neighboring village of opposite political persuasion when each party was
guaranteed 50 percent of the patronage jobs no matter what, without even taking
risks?” 516 Elections did take place, but voters were restricted to choosing between
candidates from one party; in the 1958 presidential election, for example, Colombians
could only vote for someone representing the Liberal Party. Perhaps unsurprisingly,
“Low electoral participation rates were an invariant feature of the National Front.”517
This fundamentally undemocratic arrangement, which precluded third-party involvement
in elections, was set to last until 1974, but effectively continued until 1986, when
President Virgilio Barco appointed an all-Liberal government.518
514 The Liberal Party refused to participate in the 1949 elections out of concern for their physical safety.
515 Drexler, Colombia and the United States, p. 74; Robin Kirk, More Terrible than Death: Violence, Drugs,
and America’s War in Colombia (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 42.
516 David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1993), p. 226.
517 Forrest Hylton, Evil Hour in Colombia (London: Verso, 2006), p. 54.
518 The restrictions on electoral participation were removed in 1974. See Bushnell, The Making of Modern
Colombia, p. 225.
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United States policymakers liked to tout Colombia under the National Front as a
successful democracy, brushing aside the political system’s aforementioned
antidemocratic features and the fact that the country was under an almost permanent state
of siege.519 Colombia was therefore showered with economic aid in the early 1960s,
including US$833 million in loans from 1961 to 1965. Washington also handed out
liberal doses of military assistance - some US$160 million between 1961 and 1967 - as
the Colombian military attempted to eradicate the armed bands of recalcitrant Liberals
and communists left over from La Violencia. Eliminating communists was a goal
Washington approved of, and US military advisers oversaw the Colombian army’s
assault on the communist peasant enclave of Marquetalia in 1964, an operation which,
however, only succeeded in driving the inhabitants of this “independent republic” further
into the countryside.520
Overall, Colombian-US relations during the National Front were “marked by
progress and cooperation greater than those enjoyed between the two countries at any
other time.”521 Then, in the 1970s there emerged an issue that was to place an at times
severe strain on the relationship: drugs. In that decade, Colombia became a centre first for
the trade in marijuana, then, far more significantly, for cocaine. From this point on
Washington pressured Colombian governments to take a tough line against drug
producers and traffickers, pressure that sometimes aroused the resentment of Colombian
officials. One such truculent Colombian was Alfonso López Michelsen, who served as
president from 1974-8 and who dragged his feet on the drugs issue, informing US
officials that it was their problem, not his. 522 Washington had more luck with his
successor, Julio César Turbay Ayala, who was persuaded to begin fumigating marijuana
and who sent 10,000 soldiers to destroy marijuana plants in the remote Caribbean
department of La Guajira. He also signed an extradition treaty with the United States.
Washington was less concerned by the rampant repression carried out under Turbay, who
519 State of siege restrictions were in place 75 percent of the time from 1963 to 1982. Gustavo Gallón,
“Human Rights: A Path to Democracy and Peace in Colombia,” in Christopher Welna and Gustavo Gallón,
eds., Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in Colombia (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
2007), p. 370.
520 Crandall, Driven by Drugs, p. 24; Jenny Pearce, Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth (London: Latin
America Bureau, 1990), p. 63; Kirk, More Terrible than Death, pp. 53-5.
521 Drexler, Colombia and the United States, p. 80.
522 See Ibid, pp. 89-109, for an overview of US relations with López Michelsen.
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gave the armed forces wide police powers, which they proceeded to abuse by detaining
and torturing anyone considered “subversive.” Colombia developed the unwanted
reputation of being yet another South American state where citizens vanished without
trace.523
The election of Belisario Betancur as president in 1982 did not augur well for US
policy in Colombia. Although a Conservative, Betancur’s views were at odds with those
of hard-line US President Ronald Reagan, with Betancur’s efforts to negotiate an end to
the wars Washington was fuelling in Central America a prime example. When the two
met in December 1982 in Bogotá the meeting did not go at all well, as the Colombian
“treated the American president to an after-luncheon speech castigating the United States
for its Latin American policies.” 524 Betancur’s preference for resolving conflicts
peacefully was also in evidence in his approach to the perennial problem of Colombia’s
numerous left-wing guerrilla groups, some of which had been around since the mid-
1960s. He offered an amnesty to the insurgents, and cajoled the most significant guerrilla
organisations into declaring a ceasefire.525 The largest group, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP), established with the Communist Party
and other Colombians of a leftist persuasion a political party called the Patriotic Union
(UP). Within a decade, three thousand UP activists had been assassinated at the hands of
death squads organised by drug lords and the military.526
During the 1980s Colombian cocaine barons began exerting a malign and
pervasive influence over political life. Betancur’s justice minister, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla,
was murdered in 1984 by gunmen working for drug lord Pablo Escobar, whose Medellín
Cartel also tracked down and assassinated Lara Bonilla’s successor in Budapest three
years later. Jaime Pardo Leal, who stood as the UP’s presidential candidate in 1986, was
killed by the Medellín Cartel the following year, while three candidates for the 1990
presidential elections were murdered before the vote either on the command of Escobar
or another drug trafficker, Fidel Castaño. These politicians were targeted either for
advocating the extradition of drug traffickers to the United States, or simply because they
523 Crandall, Driven by Drugs, pp. 27-8; Kirk, More Terrible than Death, pp. 62-3.
524 Drexler, Colombia and the United States, p. 138.
525 An exception was the Army of National Liberation (ELN).
526 Kirk, More Terrible than Death, pp. 116-7; Livingstone, Inside Colombia, p. 55.
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represented the political left. In an act that underlined the absence of press freedom in
Colombia, Guillermo Cano, the editor of one of Colombia’s biggest newspapers, El
Espectador, and a critic of the drug lords, was shot dead by the Cartel in 1986. The
newspaper’s offices were bombed three years later. 527 Escobar corrupted politicians,
judges and law-enforcement officials with bribes, including “million dollar donations to
both major parties.” He even contrived to have himself elected as a substitute member of
Congress in 1982. The Medellín Cartel launched a no-holds-barred war on the state in
1989 when its senior members were threatened with extradition, bombing an airliner,
setting off car bombs and kidnapping significant public figures. As one writer has
commented, by the end of the 1980s the power of the drug lords “had swelled to
unimaginable proportions.”528
It was in this context that George H. W. Bush assumed the presidency of the
United States in 1989. Bush came to office warning of the “clear and present danger” that
drugs presented to US national security, and declared that he would go after cocaine at its
source. This, he argued, was the “cheapest way to eradicate narcotics.”529 To this end, he
radically increased anti-drugs assistance to Colombia and other Andean nations through
his “Andean Initiative,” a five-year aid package totalling US$2.2 billion, with Colombia
receiving an initial donation of US$65 million in emergency aid. Russell Crandall has
asserted that the decision to step up US involvement in Colombia was precipitated by the
August 1989 murder by the Medellín Cartel of Liberal Party presidential candidate Luis
Carlos Galán, whose “violent death horrified many U.S. government officials” and
convinced them that “much more needed to be done to support the Colombian
government in its fight against the drug traffickers.”530 If so, it is unclear why the Bush
administration was so eager to involve Colombia’s military, which was “heavily
infiltrated by the [drug] mafia,” had worked with the traffickers to set up paramilitary
death squads, and was accused by Amnesty International in 1988 of itself employing “a
policy of terror, designed to intimidate and eliminate opponents without recourse to
527 Kirk, More Terrible than Death, pp. 87-8; Pearce, Colombia, pp. 1, 273; Hylton, Evil Hour in Colombia,
p. 77.
528 Livingstone, Inside Colombia, pp. 57-9.
529 The quotes from Bush are in Mario A. Murillo, Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and
Destabilization (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004), p. 124; and Crandall, Driven by Drugs, p. 33.
530 Crandall, Driven by Drugs, p. 34.
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law.”531 Nor did the Bush administration see fit to place human rights conditions on aid to
Colombia. Notwithstanding these contradictions, the bulk of the US$65 million was
indeed military-related.532
Despite the Bush administration’s largesse the “Andean initiative failed to make
any significant changes to the amounts of drugs entering the USA.”533 On the other hand,
Bush’s presidency did coincide with a significant democratization of Colombian politics.
President César Augusto Gaviria in 1990 brought to an end the military’s long-standing
monopoly on the position of secretary of defence. His term also saw the writing of a new
constitution, which rescinded the president’s right to appoint departmental governors –
they would now be popularly elected – along with his ability to declare an indefinite state
of siege. Another provision stipulated that proportional representation would be used for
elections to the Colombian Senate, “so as to lessen the influence of party bosses whose
power base was essentially regional and to make it easier for new political and social
movements to gain at least some representation.” 534 Gaviria also brought down the
Medellín Cartel, with Pablo Escobar shot dead in 1993. Notwithstanding his
achievements, the US government was eager to see the back of Gaviria, who was
considered to have “gone soft on the Cali cartel,” which had replaced Escobar’s group as
the country’s most powerful drug mafia.535
As it turned out, the relationship with Gaviria would in retrospect seem one of
relative harmony when compared to the mutual hostility that characterised Washington’s
dealings with his successor, Ernesto Samper. Tensions were practically inevitable when it
emerged that Samper’s presidential campaign had been funded by the Cali Cartel; while
Samper professed his ignorance of the donations several of his advisers, notably his
campaign manager and defence minister, Fernando Botero, were imprisoned for their
roles in the affair. 536 With Republicans having taken control of Congress in the
November 1994 mid-term elections and accusing President Clinton of weakness in the
fight against drugs, the US government came down hard on the beleaguered Samper,
531 Pearce, Colombia, p. 267; the quote from Amnesty is in Ibid, p. 234.
532 Kirk, More Terrible than Death, p. 242; Crandall, Driven by Drugs, p. 34.
533 Doug Stokes, America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia (London: Zed Books, 2005), p. 87.
534 Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia, p. 251; Livingstone, Inside Colombia, p. 56.
535 Crandall, Driven by Drugs, p. 37.
536 William Avilés, “The Democratic-Peace Thesis and U.S. Relations with Colombia and Venezuela,”
Latin American Perspectives, vol. 32, no. 3 (May 2005), pp. 37-8; Livingstone, Inside Colombia, p. 60.
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revoking his visa and decertifying Colombia in 1996 and 1997 for not cooperating
sufficiently with US anti-drug efforts, rendering Colombia ineligible for certain types of
US aid. The US used Samper’s fragile position to its advantage, hectoring him into
adopting a combative stance on drugs. He obliged by bringing down the Cali Cartel and
commencing the aerial spraying of coca bushes with herbicides.537 However, in a sign
that Washington would not allow its displeasure with Colombia’s elected authorities to
stand in the way of its anti-drugs campaign, US anti-narcotics and military aid in fact
increased markedly while Colombia was decertified, with the US working through
Colombian agencies it considered more trustworthy than Samper.538
The 1990s witnessed the exponential growth of Colombia’s left-wing guerrilla
organisations, the FARC-EP and the ELN, which grew rich on the back of extortion,
kidnapping for ransom and taxing coca. The number of fighters boasted by the FARC-EP,
which had always been the larger group, shot up from about 3-4,000 in the mid-1980s to
a level of 15-20,000 as the century came to a close.539 Moreover, the Colombian army
was increasingly demoralised as a consequence of a number of chastening defeats in
large-scale battles with the FARC-EP in the late 1990s. These setbacks “resonated in
important circles within the Clinton Administration, which was increasingly concerned
about the growing military capacities of the FARC guerrillas.”540 There was also an
explosion in coca growth in Colombia at this time, with the area under cultivation rising
from 79,500 hectares to 122,500 hectares between 1997 and 1999,541 much of which was
grown in regions dominated by the FARC-EP. Additionally, new Colombian President
Andrés Pastrana angered US policymakers by launching a peace process with the FARC-
537 Avilés, “The Democratic-Peace Thesis and U.S. Relations with Colombia and Venezuela,” pp. 38-9;
Kirk, More Terrible than Death, p. 242. It has been suggested that the US was in fact trying to oust Samper.
To quote Crandall, US policy during the Samper years involved “aggressively and publicly attempting to
bring down the scandal-ridden but democratically elected president of Colombia.” Crandall, Driven by
Drugs, p. 3.
538Avilés notes that “This aid directly assisted human rights violators…In 1997, 3,500 Colombians were
killed, the vast majority by public security forces and their paramilitary allies, most of the victims being
peasants perceived as supporters of the insurgency, trade unionists, and human rights and leftist activists.”
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EP, under which the government recognised the insurgents’ control of a huge swath of
territory. Washington, with some reason, saw the zone as little more than a base for rebel
attacks. All in all, “by the summer of 1999 Colombia had become a crisis case for the
United States.”542
The remedy for Colombia’s woes identified by the Clinton administration was
“Plan Colombia,” a $1.3 billion aid package for the Andes which became law in July
2000, of which $860 was reserved for Colombia. The majority of the aid to Colombia -
$642 million - was destined for its military and, to a lesser degree, the police. Washington
was thus making an institution renowned for employing violence against noncombatants
its principal partner in Colombia. Human Rights Watch accused the Colombian armed
forces of being “implicated in serious human rights violations” in 1999 and 2000, noting
that government soldiers had “attacked indiscriminately and killed civilians.” The
military was also admonished for providing support to Colombia’s barbarous paramilitary
organisations, which were “considered responsible for at least 78 percent of the human
rights violations recorded in the six months from October 1999,” including torture,
murders, gang-rapes and dismemberments. 543 Although concerned members of the
United States Congress inserted human rights conditions into the aid package, including a
demand that the Colombian military sever long-standing links to the paramilitary groups,
these could be waived by the president on the grounds of national security, a step taken
by President Clinton in August 2000. 544 Plan Colombia was nevertheless seen as a
political triumph for Clinton, whose Colombian policies had always been constrained by
the Republican-controlled Congress. Indeed, as Crandall has observed, “the Republicans
seemed to be even more enthusiastic about the package than the Democrats.”545 It was
also a boon for the US companies manufacturing the helicopters to be provided to the
Colombian military and police. These helicopters, along with three new counter-narcotics
battalions and herbicide-spraying planes, were to be used for a “push into the south,”
542 Crandall, Driven by Drugs, p. 147.
543 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001, <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/americas/colombia.html>
544 Kirk, More Terrible than Death, p. 261.
545 Ibid, p. 153. See Ibid, p. 155, for a breakdown of Plan Colombia assistance.
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aimed at wiping out coca in areas controlled by the FARC-EP. The stated goal of Plan
Colombia was a reduction in Colombian cultivation of coca of 50 percent by 2005.546
World View of the Bush Administration
While running for the presidency in 1999 and 2000, George W. Bush and his
main foreign policy advisers outlined a realist approach to international affairs in which
the national interest of the United States was placed front and centre. Bush made it plain
that he had little time for US involvement in nation-building exercises, and was notably
critical of Clinton’s policy in Haiti. To quote James Mann, candidate Bush “pressed the
theme that the Democrats of the 1990s had strayed too far from the traditional concerns
of U.S. national security: strengthening America’s alliances in Europe and Asia, building
up a strong military and dealing with the challenges posed by major powers like Russia
and China.” 547 Bush’s chief foreign policy adviser, Condoleezza Rice, likewise
emphasised that great powers such as China and Russia would be the new
administration’s overriding concern.548 The thrust of the new foreign policy was that
America’s massive political, military and economic power would be used to serve its own
interests. In the words of Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, Bush and his advisers “talked
about exercising American power solely in terms of American interests,” an example
being their attitude towards international institutions. These “were fine if they served
immediate, concrete American interests,” but if they did not they would be ignored,
undermined or simply discarded.549
Bush’s choice of top foreign policy personnel also pointed to a more realist
approach to international affairs. Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defence
Donald Rumsfeld were, in the words of Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, “assertive
nationalists – traditional hard-line conservatives willing to use American military power
to defeat threats to U.S. security but reluctant as a general rule to use American primacy
546 United States Department of State, “A Report to Congress on United States Policy Towards Colombia
and Other Related Issues,” February 2003, <http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rpt/17140.htm>
547 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 256.
548 Ibid, pp. 258, 315.
549 Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003), pp. 43-4.
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to remake the world in its image.”550 Condoleezza Rice, who was appointed national
security adviser, also approached international affairs from a realist perspective, while the
man chosen as Bush’s first secretary of state, Colin Powell, often seen as the most
“moderate” member of the foreign policy team, was renowned for his reluctance to
unleash the US military unless vital national interests were on the line. There were also
numerous veterans of the Reagan administration’s war against Nicaragua in important
positions in the new administration. John Negroponte, who Bush appointed US
ambassador to the United Nations, had served from 1981 to 1985 as ambassador to
Honduras, the country to the north of Nicaragua which was the main staging area for
Reagan’s terrorist war against the Sandinistas. Elliott Abrams, an ardent backer of the
contras who was later convicted of lying to Congress about his knowledge of the secret
war against Nicaragua, was appointed NSC director for democracy, human rights and
international operations, while Otto Reich, who had supervised the State Department’s
propaganda offensive against the Sandinistas in the 1980s, became assistant secretary of
state for Western Hemisphere affairs.
The presence of hard-line conservatives in the administration and Bush’s own
statements on international affairs led some analysts to predict that democracy promotion
would barely feature in the new administration’s interactions with the world. For example,
Elizabeth Cohn argued in 2001 that “the George W. Bush administration appears likely
to…jettison altogether the promotion of democracy – even limited versions of it – as a
foreign policy goal.” Cohn noted that during Bush’s first eight months in office US
officials “made no significant statements about promoting democracy abroad,” and she
discerned a notably realist attitude among policymakers. She felt confident enough to
conclude that “the foreign policy framework of this administration will not be the
promotion of democracy,” with realism likely to be “resurgent.”551
Those who predicted that democracy promotion would be downplayed under
Bush were quickly proved wrong. As his presidency unfolded Bush’s remarks on foreign
policy became increasingly ideological and moralistic, and he seized on the idea that
democracy promotion should be a central objective of US foreign policy. He repeatedly
550 Ibid, p. 15.
551 Elizabeth Cohn, “Bush “Realists” say goodbye to democracy promotion,” NACLA Report on the
Americas, vol. 35, no. 3 (Nov-Dec 2001) (electronic version).
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defended the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by appealing to the need to bring democracy to the
Iraqi people. Christopher Meyer, the British ambassador to the US from 1997 to 2003,
has written that he “heard Bush say at Camp David in September 2002 that putting
American troops in harm’s way would be justified if it brought democracy and freedom
to the people of Iraq.”552 By the start of Bush’s second term, the president was touting
democracy promotion as the vital goal of his foreign policy. Bush dedicated his February
2005 State of the Union address to the theme, arguing that repressive states served as
“recruiting grounds for terror,” a reality which he believed could only be changed by
extending freedom to benighted parts of the world. To this end, the president asserted,
“America will stand with the allies of freedom to support democratic movements in the
Middle East and beyond.” Moving beyond mere high-flown rhetoric, he proudly touted
unfolding “landmark events in the history of liberty,” like the “beginnings of reform and
democracy in the Palestinian territories” and the inevitable “victory of freedom in Iraq,”
which would “inspire democratic reformers from Damascus to Tehran.” The United
States, the president averred, had a “generational commitment to the advance of freedom,
especially in the Middle East.”553
Bush’s paeans to democracy led many commentators to assume that
administration neoconservatives like Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, who
were firm believers in the democratic peace thesis and the consequent need for America
to promote democracy,554 had taken a stranglehold over Bush’s foreign policy. Stefan
Halper and Jonathan Clarke, for example, accused the neoconservatives of having
‘hijacked’ American foreign policy after the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001. 555
Francis Fukuyama has suggested, in contrast, that “while there is reason for associating
neoconservatism with Bush’s first-term policies…the connection is often overstated and
glosses over a much more complex reality.”556 Whatever the case may be, there is no
552 Christopher Meyer, DC Confidential (London: Phoenix, 2006), p. 237.
553 George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” 2 February 2005,
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555 Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order
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denying that, particularly after the invasion of Iraq, democracy promotion suffused the
foreign policy discourse of the Bush administration. What follows is an attempt to
determine how the rhetorical commitment to democracy fared in practice.
US Policy towards Colombia under President Bush
Democracy promotion was pinpointed as a primary US goal in Colombia within
the first few months of President Bush’s presidency. In testimony before Congress in
March 2001, General Peter Pace, the head of US Southern Command, stated that “this is
a fight for democracy in Colombia, to support that democracy.” He declared that by
providing huge sums in aid to the Colombian government, the US was “supporting a
fellow democracy while we also assist ourselves.” Pace’s sentiments were echoed by
Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman, who asserted in his confirmation hearings
before the Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2001 that “I think, inescapably,
we…have a stake in Colombia as a long-standing democracy and a friend.”557
Aid
The US has provided its “fellow democracy” Colombia with a great deal of aid
since President Bush took office. The annual outlay of around $700 million has made
Colombia one of the principal beneficiaries of US foreign aid. Most of this assistance,
some eighty percent, has been provided to the Colombian police and military, so that they
might more effectively fight drugs and wage war on leftist guerrillas, particularly the
FARC-EP.558 Until mid-2002, US aid was officially and legally restricted to the anti-
drugs campaign, which largely consisted of training Colombian counter-narcotics
battalions, providing helicopters and spraying coca plantations. Congress then acquiesced
to the Bush administration’s request that US aid also be made available for “counter-
terrorism,” in other words for use against Colombia’s various armed groups. The rest of
the annual Colombia aid package has been directed to various socio-economic and
557 The quotes from Pace and Rodman are in Livingstone, Inside Colombia, pp. 165, 172.
558 For figures detailing US assistance to Colombia, see Center for International Policy, “U.S. Aid to
Colombia Since 1997: Summary Tables,” <http://ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm>
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democracy programs, like assisting those Colombians displaced by violence and crop-
spraying, protecting threatened human rights workers and trade unionists, strengthening
Colombia’s judiciary and attempting to promote alternative development opportunities
for workers in coca-growing regions. The socio-economic side of US aid to Colombia is
nonetheless very much secondary to the military and police component. Bush
administration officials have sought to justify this overwhelming emphasis on security
assistance by arguing that the military side is what the US does best and that Washington
is merely responding to the demands of the Colombian government. As State Department
official Charles Shapiro told the House subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in
April 2007, “Our programs provide greater support in those areas where we have a
unique capability…Government of Colombia officials have clearly told us that continued
U.S. support to counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism programs remains critical and
that our proposed mix of U.S. assistance reflects their needs.” The administration’s
“proposed mix” of aid for the period 2007-13 continues this trend of favouring the
Colombian military.559
The Bush administration has painted the government of Colombian President
Álvaro Uribe, who took office in August 2002, in a glowing light, and has argued that,
under his leadership, Colombia deserves continued and significant US support. Not all in
Congress have been won over to the administration’s point of view, however, and certain
Democrats have repeatedly endeavoured to reduce the amount of money going to
Colombia. In 2003 House Democrats Ike Skelton and Jim McGovern tried to cut military
aid to Colombia by $75 million. When introducing his amendment, McGovern alluded to
Colombia’s human rights shortcomings, especially the cosy relations subsisting between
the army and Colombia’s feared paramilitaries, and claimed that notwithstanding the
enormous amounts of aid provided by the US coca production in Colombia was actually
increasing. He contended that cutting military aid might act as a wake-up call to the
Colombian armed forces, as it would “send a powerful message that Congress believes
559 Charles S. Shapiro, “U.S.-Colombia Relations” (testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere), 24 April 2007,
<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/07/q2/83646.htm>
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respect for human rights is essential.”560 The amendment was defeated by 226 votes to
195. Two years later House Democrats tried again, this time with the objective of
decreasing military assistance to Colombia by US$100 million. Skelton questioned
whether Plan Colombia was producing results, noting that several billion dollars of US
aid to Colombia had failed to affect the flow of drugs entering the US. He also
complained about what he considered Colombia’s unwillingness to share its part of the
burden and asked whether Washington should pour so much money into Colombia “at a
time when our military and our foreign aid dollars, our defense dollars are spread so thin
across the globe.”561 While Skelton spoke for many Democrats, the amendment was still
defeated by 234 votes to 189. Yet another doomed effort to cut aid occurred the year after,
when McGovern argued for a cut in aid of US$30 million. Deriding the anti-drugs effort
as “a miserable failure” that had “accomplished zilch,” and castigating the Colombian
armed forces for committing “heinous acts with impunity,” he called on the House to
“send a powerful message to the Colombian military that our pockets and our patience
are wearing thin.”562 A majority of Representatives had not run out of patience, however,
and McGovern’s amendment was rejected by a vote of 229 to 174.
The likes of McGovern and Skelton had to face the reality that the House of
Representatives, like the Senate, was until November 2006 controlled by Republicans,
who were by and large firmly behind President Bush’s Colombia policy. A flavour of the
sentiments of these Republican “drug war hawks” can be garnered by studying their
speeches lambasting the aforementioned amendments introduced by McGovern and
others. Objecting to the 2006 effort to reduce aid by US$30 million, Mark Souder warned
that it would “hurt kids and families in the United States” as well as making “the futures
of kids and families in Colombia less secure.” Plan Colombia was working, according to
Souder, who asserted, dubiously, that elected officials in Colombia “are not worried
about being murdered anymore.”563 He was joined in opposition by Dan Burton, who
560 Jim McGovern, “Speech by Rep. Jim McGovern ,” 23 July 2003,
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opined that “the number one issue facing this country is the drug problem,” and argued
that Colombia, which was “in the forefront” of the war against drugs, merited American
backing. “Young lives have been saved and many overdoses avoided here because of our
eradication and other Plan Colombia efforts,” he declared.564 A similar speech was made
in 2005 by John Mica, who spoke of the “great progress” achieved under Plan Colombia.
Mica characterised illegal narcotics as America’s “biggest social problem” and viewed
aid to Colombia as a pivotal element of the US anti-drug strategy: “We know where these
drugs are. We can eradicate them. And we can do that continuing Plan Colombia,” he
proclaimed.565
Following the Democrats’ victory in the November 2006 Congressional elections,
there were predictions that aid to Colombia would be reoriented. “Many Democrats want
to reduce military spending and use the money to boost programs to fight poverty,
relocate people displaced by Colombia’s 42-year civil war and encourage farmers to plant
legal crops,” reported the Houston Chronicle.566 A few months later, another media
report noted that Democrats in Congress were “raising doubts about the effectiveness of
nearly US$4 billion…in mostly military aid to Colombia since [Álvaro] Uribe took office
in 2002.” In contrast to the Bush administration, which wanted to continue focusing on
security assistance, “many Democrats express concern about Colombia’s human rights
record and want greater emphasis on social programs,” with Representative McGovern
arguing that “the U.S. aid formula [should be] reversed from its current ratio of 80
percent military versus 20 percent social.”567 In June 2007 Democrats in the House of
Representatives pushed through a 10 percent reduction in aid to Colombia. The
proportion of aid going to Colombia’s military was reduced significantly, by US$150
million, while the House voted to increase socio-economic assistance by US$100 million.
564 Dan Burton, “Speech by Rep. Dan Burton,” 9 June 2006,
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Paramilitarism
The extreme right-wing paramilitaries known as the United Self-Defence Forces
of Colombia (AUC) had grown into a very wealthy, ultra-violent and extremely powerful
organisation by the time George W. Bush became president. The AUC’s wealth derived
largely from its stake in Colombia’s drugs trade, with former leader Carlos Castaño, who
was reportedly murdered on the order of his brother in 2004, famously claiming in 2000
that 70 percent of the organisation’s income came from drugs. The AUC’s raison d’etre
was to eliminate, by any means necessary, Colombia’s left-wing guerrillas and any
civilians considered sympathetic to their cause. Their anti-guerrilla ideology made them
natural allies of the armed forces. Indeed, the AUC’s ties to the Colombian armed forces
were so extensive that Human Rights Watch entitled a 2001 report on military-
paramilitary ties “The Sixth Division,” the other five divisions comprising the army’s
official strength. Human Rights Watch claimed that a number of army brigades worked
hand in glove with the paramilitaries, with soldiers “moonlighting” as paramilitaries,
coordinating attacks with and providing military equipment to the AUC, and receiving
payment for their assistance. A local official in the southern Colombian department of
Putumayo described the relationship as a “marriage.” The marriage between the
paramilitaries and the army’s 24th Brigade was the stuff of nightmares for the inhabitants
of Putumayo, for its offspring were “extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, and
death threats.”568
The AUC, which boasted over 10,000 fighters by 2001, was also a major force in
the political sphere, as shown by its role in the 2002 congressional and presidential
elections. The paramilitaries threatened candidates and resorted to widespread voter
intimidation, including the issuing of “express instructions not to vote for specific
candidates, especially [Liberal Party presidential nominee] Horacio Serpa.” The
paramilitaries also “obliged people to vote for [Álvaro] Uribe” in numerous departments.
Those who defied the AUC ran the risk of death, as evidenced by the fate of a radio
announcer in the department of Cesar, who was murdered “supposedly for having read a
568 Human Rights Watch, “The Sixth Division”: Military-Paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001), pp. 1-3, 16-18.
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communiqué from Liberal candidate Horacio Serpa, after the paramilitaries had
forbidden the broadcasting of any material about that candidate.” According to then
Minister of the Interior Armando Estrada, “The paramilitaries took advantage of the
March [legislative] elections to establish a lobby for them in Congress.” 569 AUC
commander Salvatore Mancuso boasted after the elections that the paramilitaries
controlled 30 percent of Congress, and while he may have been exaggerating, there was
no question that the AUC had many backers in the legislature.
In an article published in 2002, Nazih Richani described the AUC as “a group that
is friendly to U.S. policy and economic interests in Colombia.” He also stated that “it’s
clear that some U.S. agents consider the AUC more of an asset than a liability.”570 Yet in
September 2001 the State Department placed the AUC on its list of Foreign Terrorist
Organisations (FTOs), where it joined the FARC-EP and the ELN. There was some
cynicism regarding the motives of the Bush Administration in taking this step. As
Cynthia Arnson commented, the decision to place the paramilitaries on the list of FTOs
“appeared at least in part to respond to criticism within and outside the U.S. government
that the United States exercised a double standard by condemning terrorism of left-wing
guerrillas while ignoring that of right-wing paramilitaries.”571 While the administration’s
reasons for putting the AUC on the list of terrorist groups are open to dispute, US policy
took a further turn against the paramilitaries in September 2002 when the US Justice
Department issued extradition orders for three AUC leaders, Carlos Castaño and
Salvatore Mancuso included, on charges of trafficking drugs to the United States, where
they would face possible life imprisonment. Just two months later the paramilitaries
announced a unilateral ceasefire, an action that US Secretary of State Colin Powell
deemed “encouraging,” while cautioning that “it remains to be seen whether it is a true
ceasefire and whether it leads to a process that will end the difficulties that have existed
569 Miguel García and Gary Hoskin, Political Participation and War in Colombia: An Analysis of the 2002
Elections, (London: Crisis States Programme, 2003), pp. 7-9.
570 Nazih Richani, “Colombia at the crossroads: The future of the peace accords,” NACLA Report on the
Americas, vol. 35, no. 4 (Jan-Feb 2002) (electronic version). Richani’s view was backed up by Jason Hagen,
who wrote a few months later that “It is no secret to those who follow Colombian issues in Washington that
some U.S. officials privately sympathize with the AUC.” Jason Hagen, “New Colombian president
promises more war,” NACLA Report on the Americas, vol. 36, no. 1 (July-August 2002) (electronic
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with the AUC.”572 The indictment was seen by many as a major factor influencing the
ceasefire declaration, for the likes of Castaño were apparently desperate to avoid jail time
in the US. In the words of Mario Murillo, “there is no question that the indictment…had a
direct impact on the AUC’s decision to announce a ceasefire at the end of 2002.”573
In July 2003 the government of Colombian President Álvaro Uribe and the
leaders of the AUC began formal negotiations aimed at achieving the complete
demobilisation of the paramilitaries by December 2005. This agreement came despite
reports that the ceasefire was being continually flouted, with the Washington Post noting
in January 2004 that “several hundred civilian murders have been attributed to the [AUC]
since [the ceasefire announcement].”574 The Colombian government set about drafting a
law that would provide a basis for the process of demobilisation, but its initial efforts
were greeted with a wave of criticism. Uribe at first proposed that AUC leaders should
confess to their crimes in court, pay compensation to their victims or perhaps perform
some social work, in return for which they could avoid spending a single day in prison.
Members of the United States Congress were among those who were distinctly
underwhelmed by Uribe’s scheme. In September 2003, fifty six members of the United
States House of Representatives sent a letter to the Colombian president warning that
“allowing these criminals to receive suspended sentences and pay reparations in lieu of
jail time…would amount to impunity for serious human rights violations and would
erode the rule of law in Colombia.”575 The Bush administration was inclined to be more
positive, with a “senior Bush administration official” saying that month that “We support
a process that gets one of these armed groups - these terrorist groups – off the
battlefield,” while refusing to comment on Uribe’s aforementioned ideas on “alternative
sentencing.”576 In a display of its support for the demobilisation effort the US handed
over US$3 million to support its early stages.577
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Paramilitary demobilisation was practically stillborn prior to 2005, prompting
criticism from US officials, notably US Ambassador to Colombia William Wood. In
February 2004, Wood noted that the AUC had not lived up to its ceasefire commitments,
while in June he condemned the paramilitaries in an interview with a Colombian
magazine, stating that “They have only one program: narco-terror. And only one agenda:
destruction.” Further evidence of US displeasure came the following month when charges
were issued in the US against another two AUC leaders for drug trafficking.578 However,
by the time of Condoleezza Rice’s trip to Bogotá in April 2005, the process had gathered
sufficient momentum for the new secretary of state to express optimism. Rice was
publicly supportive of Uribe’s negotiations with the paramilitaries, deeming the
demobilisation of around 5,000 AUC members to that point “the impressive result of
tough policies.” She added that she hoped to see passage of “a law that will effectively
dismantle illegal armed groups, bring justice and reparation to victims, and punish those
guilty of major crimes and atrocities.”579 A law governing demobilisation was indeed
passed by the Colombian Congress in June 2005, although its terms proved to be highly
controversial. Law 975, also known as the Justice and Peace Law, provided that
paramilitaries who had committed major human rights violations would receive sentences
of up to eight years in return for confessing their crimes and surrendering assets obtained
by illegal means. Human Rights Watch was scathing in its reaction to the law, arguing
that it “fails to include effective mechanisms to dismantle the country’s mafia-like armed
groups” and “utterly fails to satisfy international standards on truth, justice, and
reparation for victims.”580
Many in the US Congress had followed the Colombian government’s attempts to
draft a law for paramilitary demobilisation with some concern. In February 2005, six
senior members of Congress wrote to President Uribe, affirming that they backed his
efforts to demobilise the paramilitaries, and offering financial support to this end
providing that “such a process is conducted pursuant to an effective legal
framework…that will bring about the dismantlement of the underlying structure, illegal
578 Ibid.
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sources of financing, and economic power of these FTOs [Foreign Terrorist
Organisations].” They emphasised that it was “critical that the provision of benefits…be
conditioned on…compliance with the cease-fire and cessation of criminal activity,” and
underlined that “it is necessary that the perpetrators of atrocities be held accountable for
their crimes.”581 One of the joint signatories of the letter was the Republican chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard Lugar, who wrote once again to the
Colombian president a few months later. This time Lugar expressed the fear that the law
on demobilisation proposed by Uribe “would leave intact the complex mafia-like
structures and wealth of…the AUC.” He added that he was “troubled” that AUC
commanders “can reportedly receive extremely short sentences for their crimes, even if
the groups they command remain active and continue to engage in drug trafficking and
terrorist activities.” 582 Notwithstanding such qualms, the US Congress appropriated
US$20 million for paramilitary demobilisation as part of its foreign aid bill for 2006.
Bush administration officials were seemingly pleased with the law, especially after it was
modified by Colombia’s Constitutional Court in May 2006. As Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns stated in November 2006, “We’ve been very
pleased to support [the Justice and Peace] law and support the process of
demobilization.” While the US would have “a number of questions that we’ll want to
seek answers to about the implementation of this law,” Burns highlighted that “we admire
what President Uribe and his administration have done, what his Cabinet has done, to
seek the demobilization of over 30,000 people.”583
Congressional and administration support came despite the failure of the
Colombian government to address many of the issues raised by the senators and
representatives in their communications with President Uribe. The ceasefire of November
2002 was breached with such regularity that it became totally meaningless, with over
2,000 murders carried out by the paramilitaries to the end of 2005. Moreover, although
over 30,000 AUC fighters and logistical staff had surrendered by April 2006, it was plain
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that the power and organisational structures of the paramilitaries endured. A June 2006
report by the International Crisis Group noted that “the demobilised paramilitaries
maintain important influence in [Colombia’s] Congress,” while “paramilitary control
over local socio-economic structures has been left virtually untouched.” The report also
highlighted that “paramilitaries have penetrated the formal economy, investing in highly
liquid assets and businesses that facilitate money laundering.”584 Then, in October 2006 a
scandal broke in Colombia that called into question the entire demobilisation process. A
laptop computer discovered by Colombia prosecutors revealed that AUC commander
Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, alias “Jorge 40,” had ordered the murders of 558 Colombians in the
Caribbean department of Atlántico while the paramilitary ceasefire was supposedly in
effect. It also emerged that Tovar had organised sham demobilisations, using peasants in
the place of his fighters, had bribed police to turn a blind eye to his continued drug
trafficking, and had “helped senators and congressmen close to him win reelection.”585
A month later, in November 2006, the Colombian Supreme Court ordered the
arrest of three serving members of Congress, along with one former congresswoman,
from the Caribbean department of Sucre, all of whom were accused of having links to the
paramilitaries. One of the accused, Senator Álvaro García, was charged with having
orchestrated a massacre in 2000 and of involvement in the murder of an electoral official
in 1997. The next revelation to seep out came from Senator Miguel de la Espriella, a man
long suspected of having paramilitary connections, who revealed to the Colombian
newspaper El Tiempo that he and numerous other politicians from the Caribbean coast
had signed a secret pact pledging loyalty to the paramilitaries in 2001. “In [the Caribbean
department of] Córdoba you couldn’t practice politics without getting the nod from the
self-defense forces,” he told El Tiempo. 586 AUC commander Salvatore Mancuso
produced a copy of the pact during testimony in January 2007 before the special tribunal
set up to hear paramilitary confessions. During his testimony Mancuso revealed how the
AUC had influenced elections, admitting that “paramilitaries had coerced voters at
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gunpoint to support regional and presidential candidates who favored the paramilitaries’
agenda,”587 one of the preferred candidates being President Uribe. In February, five more
members of the Colombian Congress were arrested on suspicion of having links to the
paramilitaries, including Senator Álvaro Araújo, the brother of foreign minister Maria
Consuelo Araújo, who quickly tendered her resignation. Senator Araújo was accused of
conspiring with paramilitaries to kidnap a political competitor, Victor Ochoa, before the
2002 election, an action undertaken “to intimidate Ochoa’s associates from running and
assure the senator’s election.”588
The “para-politics” scandal continued to snowball, with the most dramatic arrest
that of the former head of the Colombian intelligence service (DAS – Department of
Administrative Security), Jorge Noguera. A former DAS colleague, Rafael García,
alleged that when running the intelligence service Noguera had destroyed files pertaining
to the paramilitaries and provided AUC commander Jorge 40 with a hit-list of trade
unionists. This was in addition to collaborating with them to ensure Uribe’s election
while he served as the future president’s campaign manager in 2002. Noguera was
arrested in February 2007. Although released in March on a technicality Noguera was
rearrested in July “on charges of colluding with paramilitary death squads.”589 In March,
the Los Angeles Times reported that the CIA had intelligence suggesting that the
Colombian army had planned, in concert with the AUC, an assault on a slum in Medellín
in 2002, after which the paramilitaries established control over the area. 590 In May
another five members of Congress and six former lawmakers were arrested for purported
paramilitary ties, and it also emerged that imprisoned underlings of supposedly
demobilised AUC commanders like Mancuso were still “plotting murders and overseeing
drug-trafficking operations and extortion rackets.”591 This information came courtesy of
police wiretaps, but it then became apparent that the police were also tapping the phones
of opposition politicians, journalists and even government officials. The Colombian
government claimed ignorance of the operation, and the head of the National Police and
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other senior police officials were fired. Perhaps most damagingly of all, Salvatore
Mancuso asserted in further testimony in May that members of the Colombian
establishment had been intimately involved in the paramilitary project from the start.
“Paramilitarism was state policy,” stated Mancuso.592
As this scandal was unfolding, former paramilitaries scheduled to testify before
the special tribunal and activists seeking some form of recompense for injustices suffered
at the hands of the AUC were turning up dead. In December 2006 Jaime Andrés Angarita,
a colleague of Salvatore Mancuso, was murdered, prompting Minister of the Interior
Carlos Holguín to speak of a “plot to eliminate specific people within the paramilitary
structure” in order to prevent them from testifying.593 At the end of January Yolanda
Izquierdo, a leader of a group of peasants seeking the restitution of land allegedly stolen
by paramilitaries, was assassinated in Córdoba. She had attended Mancuso’s hearing and
received death threats advising her to drop her demands for compensation. Rodrigo
Ogaza, a member of another group in Córdoba working for the rights of the displaced,
remarked that Izquierdo had been “possibly imprudent,” noting that his organisation
chose not to “make public accusations against specific paramilitary groups or try to
recover specific parcels of land, because to do so would be suicidal.” 594 Amnesty
International cautioned that Izquierdo’s murder “raises serious doubts about a supposed
demobilization process…which has patently failed to effectively dismantle paramilitary
groups.”595 Izquierdo’s death followed swiftly on the heels of the killing of another
advocate for the rights of displaced peasants in Córdoba, Freddy Espitia, which itself
came soon after the office of the League of Displaced Women was set on fire near
Cartagena.596 Then, in April 2007, a human rights activist named Judith Vergara, “who
had denounced right-wing paramilitary violence,” was shot dead in Medellín, in “a sign
that militia terror continues despite a deal meant to disband the illegal groups.”
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According to a colleague of Vergara’s, “The only theory we have is that Judith was killed
by people who did not like the complaints she was making about demobilized
paramilitaries demanding that people continue paying extortion money.” 597 As the
Colombian Commission of Jurists commented, it seemed that “a reengineering of
paramilitarism,” rather than a peace process, was taking place.598
A columnist for the Washington Post remarked in January 2007 that the billowing
scandal of paramilitary influence in Colombian politics “has barely raised an eyebrow in
Washington.”599 The Bush administration has certainly appeared unperturbed, failing to
register any concern about the revelations and even attempting to turn the scandal into a
triumph for the Colombian government. This was evident from the comments of State
Department official Eric Watnik, who told the Christian Science Monitor in February
2007 that “The U.S. applauds the Colombian government for its determination to
investigate, and where appropriate, prosecute all charges of ties to paramilitary
organisations and other illegal armed groups.”600 President Bush was supportive of his
Colombian counterpart during a trip to Bogotá a month later, applauding Uribe for his
commitment to justice in Colombia. Testifying before Congress in April 2007, State
Department official Charles Shapiro was upbeat, arguing that “the allegations that have
surfaced…about government connections to paramilitary groups show both the progress
Colombia has made in rooting out such people and the challenges that lie ahead. It was
the Uribe administration’s policies that led to the discovery of these links and resulted in
the arrest of prominent government figures.”601 Another optimistic official was Deputy
Secretary of State John Negroponte, who, when asked about the scandal while in
Colombia the following month, declared that “I basically see the situation with respect to
the paramilitaries in a positive way.”602
In contradistinction to Bush administration officials, members of the US Congress
have expressed alarm at the nexus between politicians and paramilitaries. In February
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2007, Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy stated that the scandal “confirms the concerns
that many have had for a long time, that the paramilitaries have infiltrated the economic
and political establishment of Colombian society.” He remarked that “It should give us
some pause as to who we are dealing with.” That same month, Democratic
Representative Sander Levin was quoted as saying that “Plan Colombia is in more
jeopardy because of these scandals, the infiltration of the paramilitary into the inner
workings of the Colombian government.”603 Levin announced in April 2007 that the
Democrats were considering holding hearings into the scandal, in order “to figure out
exactly what’s going on in Colombia, exactly what is the role of the paramilitary, how
much a part of the government they are, how the government is trying to address that.”604
That month Senator Leahy blocked US$55 million in aid to the Colombian military over
its alleged connections to the paramilitaries. The Democrats’ misgivings were again on
display when President Uribe travelled to Washington a month later. After meeting Uribe
with several other members of Congress, the speaker of the House of Representatives,
Nancy Pelosi, released a statement in which she noted that “Many of us expressed our
growing concerns about the serious allegations of connections between illegal
paramilitary forces and a number of high-ranking Colombian officials.”605
Free Trade
One of the main preoccupations of the Bush administration as regards Colombia
has been to pry open the country’s markets and secure a free trade accord. This aspect of
policy towards Colombia is reflective of the administration’s more general approach to
relations with Latin America, and indeed its overall foreign policy. As Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Otto Reich remarked in 2002,
“President Bush’s vision for the hemisphere is one of free markets and free people.”606
603 The quotes from Leahy and Levin are in Juan Forero, “Scandal in Colombia Raises Skepticism on
Capitol Hill,” Washington Post, 17 February 2007.
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President Bush has described himself as “a strong supporter of trade with…our Andean
friends,” a point that was reiterated in the Colombian context by Reich’s successor as
assistant secretary, Roger Noriega, who asserted in 2004 that “no one recognizes better
than President Bush that in the long run free trade, and the jobs and economic alternatives
it offers to Colombia’s citizens, will provide the foundation of our long-term partnership
with Colombia.” 607 The administration’s enthusiasm for hemispheric free trade was
evident from its attempt to cajole the 34 states of the Americas, bar Cuba, into agreeing to
a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). This scheme had to be abandoned after
Venezuela and Mercosur, a regional trade grouping comprising Brazil, Uruguay,
Argentina and Paraguay, torpedoed the plan for an FTAA at the Summit of the Americas
in November 2005, on the grounds that the “conditions do not exist to attain a
hemispheric free-trade accord that is balanced and fair.”608
With the FTAA dead and buried the administration refocused its energies on
negotiating free trade pacts with individual states, one of which was Colombia. Talks to
this end had in fact begun in May 2004 in Cartagena, on Colombia’s Caribbean coast.
Explaining the decision to embark on free trade negotiations, US Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick declared that “Colombia’s courageous fight against narco-trafficking
terrorists that threaten democracy and regional stability can be assisted by promoting
economic development and hope.” 609 Other US officials have elaborated on the
advantages that would derive from such an agreement. Assistant Secretary Noriega
argued that “U.S. companies will substantially benefit from the elimination of
Colombia’s relatively high trade barriers,” while “U.S. agricultural producers in
particular expect to gain much through improved access to a large, relatively lucrative
market.”610 In fact, Colombia was already the second largest market in Latin America for
US agricultural products, with exports to Colombia totalling $677 million in 2005
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alone.611 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also joined the fray, stating in 2005 that “a
future [trade] agreement would substantially strengthen U.S.-Colombian economic ties to
our mutual benefit. Free trade and the jobs it creates for Colombians and Americans will
lead to broadened economic opportunities for both nations and even more effective
partnerships against drugs and against terrorism.” 612 The two teams of negotiators
announced that they had reached agreement in February 2006, and in August President
Bush sent a letter to Congress notifying its members of his intention to sign the US-
Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA). In addition to highlighting the benefits the FTA
would offer in terms of US jobs and investment, “Bush said the pact would also
strengthen democracy and spread prosperity in Colombia.”613 The President duly signed
the agreement in November 2006.
Not everyone has been persuaded by the administration’s claims, however. US
trade unions, human rights organisations and Democratic members of Congress have
expressed deep concern about the FTA, which must be ratified by Congress to enter into
law. The main reason for their opposition is Colombia’s status as the world’s most
dangerous country for trade unionists. It is a country where “Union officials who try to
organize factories, farms and other workplaces run the risk of murder at the hands of
hired thugs, often paramilitaries contracted by employers.”614 The number of murdered
Colombian union activists is disputed, although no one doubts the severity of the problem.
In testimony before the US House of Representatives in June 2007 Maria McFarland
Sánchez-Moreno of Human Rights Watch, citing figures from Colombia’s National
Labour School, stated that 72 Colombian unionists were killed in 2006. The Colombian
government put the figure much lower, at 25 unionist murders. However, as McFarland
emphasised, Colombia’s government “reaches this artificially low number by arbitrarily
excluding unionized teachers and peasant unions,” so that when unionised teachers are
611 Office of the United States Trade Representative, “United States and Colombia Conclude Free Trade
Agreement,” 27 February 2006, <http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2006>
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included the government’s tally rises to 58 unionists killed in 2006.615 Moreover, there is
near total impunity for such killings: according to the American Federation of Labour and
Congress of Industrial Organisations (AFL-CIO), of the 236 murders of Colombian
unionists from 2004 to 2006, in only one case has there been a conviction.616 There have
also been extremely disturbing allegations of state involvement in killings of trade union
members, with the Colombian intelligence service, the DAS, accused of colluding with
the AUC to murder union leaders. As noted above, Rafael García, a former DAS agent
now in jail for money laundering, destroying official documents and other crimes, has
alleged that ex-DAS chief Jorge Noguera provided AUC commander Rodrigo Tovar
Pupo with the names of unionists who were then assassinated.
While the physical dangers confronting members of Colombian trade unions
provide the most sensational evidence of the state’s inability or unwillingness to protect
workers’ rights, there are further ways in which Colombian workers are mistreated. In
“parts of the country…many workers toil in semi-feudal conditions,” while “employers
can easily fire or avoid employing unionized workers.” The International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions has denounced what it considers “structural anti-trade unionism” by
the Colombian government and businesses, “which deny the rights to strike and to
collective bargaining, while carrying out major restructurings and downsizing that are
apparently only motivated by one goal: to curb trade union activity.” Further, the
Colombian government has been accused of permitting “serious labor violations to
flourish in sectors such as the apparel and flower industries, where laborers say they are
subjected to forced overtime and exposure to dangerous pesticides.” Some two thirds of
workers in the flower sector “have suffered headaches, rashes, nausea, impaired vision or
asthma, according to the Pesticide Action Network.” Only 5 percent of workers are
unionised, one of the lowest rates in Latin America.617
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The Republican defeat in the November 2006 mid-term elections spelled trouble
for the US-Colombia FTA, for whereas ratification of the accord seemed certain while
the Republicans controlled Congress, this was not the case once the Democrats took over.
The Democrats, who have long-standing ties with US labour groups, expressed grave
concern at the plight of Colombia’s unionists and the Colombian government’s human
rights record more generally. Representative James McGovern, a leading Democratic
critic of US policy in Colombia, remarked in March 2007 that “Countless numbers of
trade unionists in Colombia have been intimidated, have been threatened and have been
murdered. Until those issues are addressed, I think there’s going to be some rough
sledding for the trade agreement.”618 Senior Democrats like Charles Rangel, chairman of
the House Ways and Means Committee, and Sander Levin, who chairs the House
Subcommittee on Trade, quickly made it plain that, in light of Colombia’s dreadful
record on workers’ rights, the FTA, which merely required Colombia to enforce its own
labour laws rather than agree to abide by international labour standards, would have to be
rewritten. As Levin commented, “You cannot put together a free-trade agreement when
there isn’t freedom for workers in terms of their basic international rights.”619 In light of
their well-founded concerns about the treatment of workers in Colombia Democrats
insisted that new language be inserted into the FTA to provide guarantees that
internationally recognised workers’ rights would be respected. It soon became apparent,
however, that new language would not be enough to satisfy them.
Some opponents of the US-Colombia FTA have argued that including tougher
language on labour standards would be insufficient to deal with the problems facing
workers and unionists in Colombia. Carol Pier of Human Rights Watch captured the view
of many critics when she wrote that Colombia’s “human rights problems…cannot be
solved through corrections to the trade agreement.” She believed that “Congress should
reject the pact outright,” as passage of the FTA “would reward Colombia with prized
access to American markets even as its workers’ rights are brutally violated.”620 Many
Democrats came round to this view. This was evident from the trade deal reached by the
618 Quoted in De Leon, “Union organizing can be deadly in Colombia.”
619 Quoted in Juan Forero, “Unionists’ Murders Cloud Prospects for Colombia Trade Pact,” Washington
Post, 10 April 2007.
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Bush administration and senior Democrats in May 2007, when the administration agreed
to amend trade pacts already signed with Peru and Panama to include stronger protections
for workers. Although President Bush suggested that the accord also offered “a clear
path” to progress on the FTA with Colombia, the Democrats made it clear that “the deal
does not apply to Colombia, because of special concerns in that country over attacks on
union leaders by armed groups.”621 The Democrats’ opposition was again on display in
June 2007 when senior House Democrats, including Pelosi, Levin and Rangel, released a
statement in which they emphasised that although they would ratify the FTAs with Peru
and Panama, the “widespread concern in Congress about the level of violence in
Colombia…and the role of the paramilitary” precluded ratification of the US-Colombia
FTA. This trade accord had no hope of passing Congress without “concrete evidence of
sustained results on the ground in Colombia.”622
Other arguments have been put forth against the free trade pact. As part of the
FTA, Colombia must immediately remove tariffs on more than eighty percent of US
imports, with the rest to follow over a ten year period. The impact on the agricultural
sector in Colombia, which comprises 23 percent of Colombian workers, could be severe,
as Colombian farmers would be forced into direct competition with their US counterparts,
who are lavished with billions of dollars in subsidies from the US government. This is
recognised even by the Colombian government: “The Colombian Ministry of Agriculture
and Rural Affairs conducted a study of the effects of liberalization on nine primary
agricultural products and found that full liberalization would lead to a 35 percent
decrease in employment.” 623 The National Federation of Agricultural Unions in
Colombia has predicted that “over 700,000 people currently employed in the rice industry
will lose their jobs as 79,000 tons of subsidized rice from the U.S. floods the Colombian
market.” A similar fate may await Colombia’s corn producers, for the FTA allows for the
annual export to Colombia of 2 million tons of US corn, when Colombians eat just 2.3
million tons of the crop each year. It is possible that due to the lower price “many
Colombians will buy the imported corn, jeopardizing the jobs of the 300,000 Colombians
621 Pablo Bachelet, “Bipartisan deal puts trade back on track,” Miami Herald, 11 May 2007. See Ibid for the
quote from Bush.
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employed in the Corn industry.”624 The potentially devastating consequences of the free
trade agreement on Colombian agriculture were recognised by House Democrat Linda
Sánchez, who denounced it as “a bad deal for American and Colombian working
families” that “will gut Colombia’s farming industry,” while the Washington Office on
Latin America (WOLA) compared the situation facing Colombia’s agricultural workers
to that of their counterparts in Mexico, “where an estimated 1.7 million farmers have lost
their livelihoods since NAFTA went into force.”625
State Department official Charles Shapiro has defended the US-Colombia FTA
on the grounds that it “will help Colombia further reduce poverty and provide legitimate
economic opportunities to all of Colombia’s citizens.”626 Shapiro’s view is shared by the
Economist, which backs the FTA on the grounds that “hampering the free movement of
goods would discourage Colombian farmers from diversifying away from coca and into
legal crops.”627 While we cannot say with certainty what impact the FTA would have on
coca growing, the upbeat predictions of the State Department and the Economist are open
to question. As WOLA has argued, among the “risks” of the FTA is “increased
participation in illicit drug activity.”628 Those Colombian farmers who are unable to earn
a living through growing legal crops may feel they have no choice but to turn to coca. To
quote Oxfam America, “Poor farmers need viable alternatives to growing coca, but US
dumping of rice and corn could undermine their livelihoods and leave them with no other
option.”629 Passage of the FTA could also exacerbate Colombia’s already desperate crisis
of displacement, with farmers being forced to leave the countryside for the urban slums
that have developed on the outskirts of major cities.
There are clearly reasons for doubting US officials when they argue that the FTA
is good for Colombia, and many Colombians have indeed expressed their displeasure
with the agreement. “Indigenous, peasant and Afro-Colombian organizations, along with
624 Witness for Peace, “U.S. Colombia Free Trade Agreement: What are the Consequences of Free Trade?”,
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the trade union movement, have been actively mobilizing against the trade agreement,”
writes Mario Murillo. In March and August 2005, indigenous and peasant groups in the
Colombian department of Cauca held popular referenda on a free trade deal with the US.
“On both occasions, over 95% voted to reject the agreement.” The Colombian
government was unimpressed by the referenda, with a minister deeming “the
outcome…the result of “dark forces” influencing the indigenous and peasant
communities – a not-so-veiled reference to the guerrillas.”630 In October 2004, 300,000
Colombians demonstrated in Bogotá “where they burned a U.S. flag and voiced their
displeasure with ongoing discussions between Colombia and the United States aimed at
establishing a free trade agreement.” 631 Strikes and demonstrations took place in
Colombian cities in September 2006 against the FTA and the government’s planned
privatisations of state companies.632
Oil
Oil is a major factor influencing US policy towards Colombia. In February 2002,
the Bush administration, as part of its aid request for fiscal year 2003, asked Congress to
provide $98 million to establish and train a “Critical Infrastructure Brigade,” whose
“initial role would be to protect a pipeline that transports oil belonging to Los-Angeles
based Occidental Petroleum Corp. from fields in northeastern Colombia to the Caribbean
coast.” 633 The Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline, which extends from the Caño Limón
oilfield in the eastern department of Arauca 500 miles across Colombia, was a favourite
target of guerrillas from the ELN, and was bombed 170 times in 2001. Protecting it was
seen as a way to safeguard the interests of Occidental Petroleum as well as a means of
providing Colombia with much needed revenue to fund its war. As the Washington Post
reported in March 2003, the estimated $500 million lost as a consequence of attacks on
630 Mario A. Murillo, “Colombia’s Indigenous caught in the conflict,” NACLA Report on the Americas, vol.
39, no. 4 (Jan-Feb 2006) (electronic version).
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the pipeline in 2001 “equalled U.S. aid to Colombia that year – money Washington wants
Colombia to spend on the war effort.”634 Anne Patterson, who was US ambassador to
Colombia at the time, justified the plan on the grounds that it was “important for…our
petroleum supplies and for the confidence of our investors.”635 Among these investors
was Occidental Petroleum, whose “lobbyists have long been among Washington’s
leading proponents for increased military assistance to Colombia,” understandable in
light of the fact that the company owned roughly 44 percent of the oil passing through the
Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline.636 Occidental spent some $350,000 lobbying Congress to
pass Plan Colombia while Bill Clinton was President and no doubt had a sympathetic ear
in the White House thanks to its ties to then Vice-President Al Gore, who “owned almost
$500,000 worth of stock” in the company.637
Congress acceded to the administration’s request for funds to guard the pipeline,
approving $93 million for this purpose in its budget for 2003. Another $6 million was
appropriated as part of an anti-terrorism supplemental signed into law in August 2002.638
US Special Forces trainers began arriving in Arauca in early 2003, with the head of the
US Special Forces mission proclaiming that their aim was “to train the Colombians to
find, track down and kill the terrorists before they attack the pipeline.”639 Congress has
continued to provide funding for the pipeline program in the years since its inception,
with the State Department emphasising its continuing utility. Thus, in its 2006 budget
justification, the State Department affirmed that the two Colombian brigades “will
receive additional munitions, equipment and training to sustain this high profile and
important mission,” aimed at securing “a key element of Colombia’s economic
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infrastructure.”640 The mission appears to have been a qualified success. A report by the
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) revealed that attacks on the
pipeline plunged to just 17 in 2004, and 13 in the first seven months of 2005. On the
other hand, the GAO also observed that the guerrillas had modified their strategy,
concentrating instead on sabotaging the electric grid so as to deprive the Caño Limón
oilfield of the power needed to pump oil. Such attacks had risen from zero in 2001 to 23
in 2003, with eleven instances of electrical grid sabotage in the seven months to July
2005.641
Beyond pleasing US oil corporations and boosting Colombian government
revenues, there are major oil-related strategic interests at stake in Colombia. One of the
justifications for US involvement in the country proffered by the State Department in a
2003 report on United States policy in Colombia was that “Colombia has important
reserves of petroleum, natural gas and coal.”642 The point was made again in April 2007
by State Department official Charles Shapiro in testimony before the House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, where he stated that “Colombia is a
strategic energy partner with coal and petroleum production contributing to global energy
supply.”643 Colombia in fact only provides around 1.5 percent of annual US oil imports, a
relatively small amount. The country’s known oil reserves are scanty, leading to fears
that it will become a net importer within a few years. However, there is a widely held
view that there are significant unexplored oil deposits on its territory, with one
commentator suggesting that “Colombia has the potential to be as important an oil
supplier as Venezuela to the US.” Unfortunately for the government, however, much of
the area assumed to contain oil is controlled by the FARC-EP. The depletion of
Colombia’s oil reserves partly explains current President Álvaro Uribe’s eagerness to
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court foreign investors and restructure and partially privatise the state oil company,
Ecopetrol.644
While Colombia’s oil production and potential represent of themselves important
reasons for US involvement in the country, an additional and probably more crucial
motivation is the danger that the conflict in Colombia will spill over into neighbouring
countries, with potentially serious implications for US oil imports. The crucial role
played by South America in US energy security was underlined by Admiral James
Stavridis, the present commander of US Southern Command, who emphasised in
testimony before Congress in 2007 that the US “imports over 50 percent of its oil from
the Western Hemisphere, with 34 percent coming from Latin America and the Caribbean
in 2005 – outweighing the 22 percent imported from the Middle East.”645 Colombia’s
eastern neighbour Venezuela is an especially important source of oil for the United States,
providing around 12 percent of annual American oil imports. Venezuela’s contribution is
exceeded only by Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Canada.646 A report published in 2001 by the
RAND Corporation provides an indication of the significance attached to Venezuela,
which the authors described as “a critical country for U.S. and Colombian security
interests,” due to its regional clout and its status as “one of the world’s largest oil
producers.” 647 Ecuador, located to the south of Colombia, is itself an increasingly
important exporter of oil to the US, supplying 2.7 percent of US crude oil imports in 2005,
double the figure for 2003.648 US officials have drawn attention to the harmful impact on
Ecuador of instability in Colombia. As Stavridis’ predecessor, General Bantz Craddock,
commented, “Ecuador remains plagued by illicit [drugs] trafficking and the presence of
FARC members who penetrate its vulnerable northern border.”649 The potential for the
instability in Colombia to negatively affect other states was also acknowledged by
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Admiral Stavridis, who stated that “In addition to supporting Colombia, countering any
expansion of FARC activity into neighboring countries is also part of our focus.”650
Democracy Promotion in Colombia: Success or Failure?
US officials often refer to Colombia as Latin America’s oldest democracy but, as
the overview of Colombian political history at the start of the chapter showed, its
democratic credentials have always been doubtful. This is a country where drug cartels
have funded presidential campaigns, where politics was until very recently monopolised
by two elite-dominated parties, where the members of another political party, the
Patriotic Union, were systematically murdered, and where trade unionists have for years
been killed with impunity. If we consider the present state of Colombian democracy more
closely, by applying our democracy metric, it is evident that Colombia still fails to meet
many of the criteria of genuine democracy.
If we consider the six criteria of genuinely free and fair elections, Colombia meets
some of the benchmarks but comes up short in significant respects. Citizens over the age
of eighteen, except for members of the police and military, have the right to vote,651 and
there is certainly no lack of political parties, with 24 parties making it into the Congress
that was elected in 2006. Voters also had a wide choice in presidential contests in both
2002 and 2006. Eleven candidates competed for the presidency in 2002, while a left-wing
candidate, Carlos Gaviria, gained 22 percent of the vote in 2006, placing him a distant
second behind the right-wing, law-and-order incumbent, Álvaro Uribe. 652 The
Organisation of American States sent observers to monitor all the congressional and
presidential elections that took place in the period in question. However, Colombia’s
electoral processes have suffered from fraud. In 2002, for example, “the National
650 Stavridis, “Posture Statement of Admiral James G. Stavridis.”
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Electoral Commission invalidated 17,000 votes based on evidence of fraud, annulling the
victories of five Senators-elect.”653
Colombia’s elections have been blighted by interference and intimidation on the
part of armed and criminal groups. In 2002 there was “a concerted campaign by terrorist
organizations such as the FARC to disrupt” the elections. 654 Among the methods
employed by the guerrillas to this end were the intimidation of candidates and voters,
armed blockades of highways, the kidnapping of presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt
and four congressional candidates, as well as assassination attempts against the eventual
victor of the presidential election, Álvaro Uribe, one of which, a car bombing in
Barranquilla, killed four people. As we saw above, the paramilitaries used threats and
violence in an effort to establish a lobby in Congress. “In areas dominated by
paramilitaries, such as the department of Cordoba and urban areas of the Middle
Magdalena region, paramilitaries gathered community leaders – sometimes by force – to
instruct them on acceptable candidates,” reported the US State Department.655 In sum, the
2002 elections were “affected by formidable pressures from armed groups,” whose
actions constituted “an obvious assault on Colombia’s democracy.”656
The 2006 electoral cycle was also marred by “a concerted campaign by the FARC
and AUC to disrupt or manipulate the outcome.”657 The guerrillas set up armed blockades
in their strongholds and attacked people manually eradicating coca in the department of
Meta; dozens of politicians were murdered in the months leading up to the elections.658
Prior to the March 2006 congressional elections there was “good evidence of
[paramilitary] attempts to place candidates on party lists…and to promote favoured
candidates by force, intimidation and bribery, particularly in the Atlantic coast
departments.” Before the day of the election AUC leader Jorge 40 apparently met with a
number of politicians from the Caribbean departments, including serving congressmen, to
653 US State Department, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002: Colombia.”
654 Ibid.
655 Ibid.
656 García and Hoskin, Political Participation and War in Colombia, pp. 9, 14.
657 United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006: Colombia,”
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78885.htm>
658 International Crisis Group, “Uribe’s Re-election: Can the EU Help Colombia Develop a More Balanced
Peace Strategy?”
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discuss electoral strategy. 659 Paramilitaries again employed intimidation to keep
candidates off the ballot paper. One such individual was “independent Colombian
Congressman Pedro Arenas from the eastern department of Guaviare [who] was warned
by paramilitaries that they would kill him if he ran for re-election. Arenas chose not to
run and moved his family out of the region.”660 Notwithstanding the above, election-
related violence was far less severe than in 2002.
The ability of Colombians to make a well-informed judgement when voting has
been compromised to a degree by the aforementioned threats and violence. As we saw
above, those running for president in 2002 had to contend with very real dangers to their
physical safety; it was therefore “understandable that candidates limited their public
appearances.”661 The presidential election in 2006 was notable for President Uribe’s
reluctance to campaign in public. The International Crisis Group commented that there
was a “lack of any meaningful policy debate,” as “Uribe refused to debate his opponents
and avoided speaking of major policy issues.” The incumbent “only hinted at his program
for the next four years.”662 Still, the situation had improved since 2002. As the OAS
reported, “this electoral process demonstrated improved conditions for campaigning,
which in contrast to previous elections, allowed the different candidates to carry out some
public activities.” 663 Moreover, despite problems relating to freedom of speech (see
below), Colombia has numerous privately owned newspapers and magazines, with a
fairly wide circulation, as well as many private TV and radio stations. Also, a 2005
electoral reform which stipulated that competing parties would receive state funding for
their campaigns, as well as TV and radio airtime, helped candidates to disseminate their
message. An official from the left-wing Polo Democrático stated approvingly that “never
659 International Crisis Group, “Colombia: Towards Peace and Justice?” Crisis Group Latin America
Report No. 16, 14 March 2006,
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/16_colombia_towards_peace_and_justice.pd
f>
660 Garry Leech, “U.S. Silent on Colombia’s Election Irregularities,” 13 March 2006,
<http://www.colombiajournal.org/colombia231.htm>
661 Ulloa and Carbo, “The congressional and presidential elections in Colombia, 2002,” p. 790.
662 International Crisis Group, “Uribe’s Re-election: Can the EU Help Colombia Develop a More Balanced
Peace Strategy?”
663 “OAS Receives Reports on Elections in Colombia, Peru and Dominican Republic,” OAS Press Release,
July 12, 2006.
183
before has the Left had access to such a large amount of funds for an electoral
campaign.”664
The overall picture as regards Colombian elections is therefore mixed. Its human
rights performance, however, is quite poor. Although the constitution of 1991 is very
progressive, and incorporates all the pivotal democratic rights, many citizens do not enjoy
these rights in practice.665 The right to life of Colombians is jeopardised by very high
levels of political and criminal violence. Despite the progress made by the Uribe
administration in reducing murders and kidnappings, Colombia remains one of the
world’s most violent states. Furthermore, Colombia’s security forces have themselves
been implicated in many murders of civilians. A March 2007 report by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) “found that Colombia’s
army…had participated in killing civilians in 21 of Colombia’s 32 states” in 2006. The
report also stated that victims had been “falsely presented as leftist rebels killed in
combat.”666
Colombians generally enjoy the right of assembly, as shown by the massive anti-
FARC demonstrations held around the country in February 2008, which attracted
hundreds of thousands of protestors. However, as the death toll of Colombian unionists
demonstrates, the right to freedom of association is extremely restricted. The right to
freedom of speech is also curtailed in Colombia, which is one of the most dangerous
places in the world in which to work in the media. In 2005, according to Colombia’s
Freedom of the Press Foundation (FLIP), 64 journalists were threatened, two were
murdered and six forced to flee the country. However, “these are only the documented
cases.” As Anastasia Moloney has observed, the dangers facing reporters have
implications for the legitimacy of Colombia’s electoral process, for “few journalists dare
to delve into the murky past of some election candidates, investigate illegal sources of
campaign funds and reveal corruption scandals for fear of reprisals from those they
implicate.” According to Moloney, this “climate of fear” is particularly prevalent in the
countryside where “journalists come into daily contact with the armed groups and are
664 International Crisis Group, “Uribe’s Re-election: Can the EU Help Colombia Develop a More Balanced
Peace Strategy?”
665 See “Text of the Constitution of Colombia (1991),”
<http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/colombia_const2.pdf>.
666 Joshua Goodman, “U.N.: Colombia’s army killed civilians,” AP, 15 March 2007.
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more likely to face intimidation.”667 In a report covering events in 2006, Reporters
Without Borders noted that the supposedly demobilised paramilitaries “often threatened
journalists and forced them to flee the region and sometimes the country.” Three
journalists were murdered and ten forced to flee in 2006.668 There is also hostility to the
media from the state itself. When news broke of possible ties between the paramilitaries
and Colombia’s former intelligence chief, Jorge Noguera, in April 2006, President
Uribe’s “response was to rail against the media for reporting the scandal.” 669 In
November 2006, Freddy Muñoz, a reporter for Telesur, a Latin American TV channel,
was arrested by the DAS, accused of being a member of FARC-EP. The charges were
considered baseless by media organisations and Muñoz was released in January 2007,
although he remained under investigation. Moreover, the Colombian police have
admitted to illegally wiretapping journalists.
As regards economic and social rights, Colombia again fares quite poorly. Article
67 of the constitution states that education is mandatory for Colombians aged between 5
and 15. However, according to UNESCO only 88 percent of Colombian children were
enrolled at primary school in 2006, leaving Colombia below the regional average. The
adult literacy rate stood at 92.8 percent in 2005. 670 And while article 51 of the
constitution states that Colombians have the right “to live in dignity,”671 this right is in
practice denied to large parts of the population. Hundreds of thousands of civilians are
displaced each year in Colombia, with non-governmental organisations putting the
overall number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) at well over 3 million.672 The
Colombian government contends that the figure is much lower, although it still estimates
that more than a million have been forced to leave their homes. The government’s figures
667 Anastasia Moloney, “Colombia: elections and threats on the press,” NACLA Report on the Americas, vol.
39, no. 6 (May-June 2006) (electronic version).
668 Reporters Without Borders, “Colombia – Annual report 2007,”
<http://www.rsf.rg/article.php3?id_article=20532>
669 “Unintelligent,” Economist, 22 April 2006.
670 UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “Education in Colombia,” <http://stats.uis.unesco.org>
671 “Text of the Constitution of Colombia (1991),”
<http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/colombia_const2.pdf>
672 The crisis of displacement is attributed mainly to Colombia’s armed groups, which are accused of
forcing people from their land for economic purposes. A report in the Guardian in June 2007 noted that
“Armed groups in Colombia are driving peasants off their land to make way for plantations of palm oil, a
biofuel that is being promoted as an environmentally friendly source of energy.” Oliver Balch and Rory
Carroll, “Massacres and paramilitary land seizures behind the biofuel revolution,” Guardian, 5 June 2007.
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are almost certainly a considerable underestimate, for they do not include Colombians
displaced by the fumigation of coca, who are labelled economic migrants, and they also
exclude the many internally displaced who do not register with the authorities, either out
of fear or ignorance of their right to assistance from the government. Worryingly, the
evidence suggests that this crisis is only worsening. According to the Consultancy for
Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES), a Colombian refugee organisation which
has received threats from paramilitaries, the number of internally displaced people rose
by 48 percent from 2002 to late 2006, while the first 100 days of 2007 witnessed “the
worst displacement in the last decade.”673 The internally displaced are forced to survive
in sub-human conditions, as shown by the example of the slum of Las Delicias, on the
outskirts of the city of Cúcuta. Las Delicias, whose population of 3,000 is drawn largely
from displaced families, is “a sprawl of wooden shacks and corrugated iron huts built
amid the city’s waste,” with no doctor, no school, no sanitation and no running water.
“There are places like Las Delicias in and around every big city in the country,”
according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).674
Moving on to the third element of genuine democracy, Colombia has a Congress
that is no longer legitimate, for it has been corrupted by the paramilitaries. The
infiltration of the AUC into Colombia’s political institutions, notwithstanding their
supposed demobilisation, was evident from the makeup of the Congress that emerged
from the elections of 2006. Several unashamedly pro-AUC candidates who had been
removed from the electoral lists of parties in the official pro-Uribe coalition nonetheless
made it into the new legislature, having run on the ticket of smaller parties like Colombia
Viva and Convergencia Ciudadana. “At least four of the seven candidates who won
senate seats for Convergencia Ciudadana have been questioned about links to
paramilitary groups,” reported the International Crisis Group in June 2006. One of the
four, Luis Eduardo Vives, was arrested in February 2007 on suspicion of working with
the paramilitaries. The report also noted that “an estimated 10 to 20 per cent of the new
673 Anastasia Moloney, “Colombia Faces Worsening Internally Displaced Persons Crisis,” World Politics
Watch, 2 November 2006; Hugh Bronstein, “More than 15,000 Colombians displaced this year,” Reuters,
16 April 2007.
674 Marie-Hélène Verney, “Colombian conflict drives displaced to a life of fear on a garbage dump,”
UNHCR News, 25 October 2006.
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senate is thought to have such ties.”675 That a disturbingly large number of elected
representatives did in fact have links to the AUC was clear from information that
surfaced from the “para-politics” scandal, with politicians from a wide variety of parties
implicated. Some of the arrests have been particularly embarrassing for President Uribe.
As noted above, Senator Alvaro Araújo is the brother of Uribe’s former foreign minister,
while aforementioned senators Álvaro García and Miguel de la Espriella represented
Colombia Democrática, a pro-Uribe party headed by the president’s cousin, Senator
Mario Uribe. Senator Uribe was himself arrested in April 2008, charged with colluding
with the AUC. Mario Uribe was “the latest in a string of more than 30 members of
Congress elected in 2006 who have been arrested for allegedly conspiring with the
paramilitary death squads.” The crisis in Congress is so far-reaching that “Some members
of the leftist Polo Democrático party have suggested scrapping the Congress altogether
and calling new elections immediately.”676
Democracy Promotion in Colombia: An Important US Policy Objective?
While there is strong evidence to suggest that democracy promotion has not met
with a great deal of success in Colombia, this does not mean that it has not informed US
policy. After all, US policymakers regularly invoke democracy promotion as one of their
principal objectives in Colombia. In the words of former Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega, “U.S. policy toward Colombia supports the
Colombian Government’s efforts to defend and strengthen its democratic
institutions…and end the threats to democracy posed by narcotics trafficking and
terrorism.”677 Noriega’s message was reiterated by US “Drug Tsar” John Walters, who
declared that in Colombia “the United States continues to support an agenda of
promoting democracy, advancing free trade, and advancing poverty alleviation and social
675 International Crisis Group, “Uribe’s Re-election: Can the EU Help Colombia Develop a More Balanced
Peace Strategy?”
676 Sybilla Brodzinsky, “Ties may bind Colombian president to death squads,” Miami Herald, 25 April
2008.
677 Noriega, “U.S. Policy and Programs in Colombia.”
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justice.”678 Just a few days after Walters’ made these remarks, General Peter Pace, the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated after meeting Colombian officials that he had
discussed “how to continue the very good partnership, to strengthen the democracy here
in Colombia, which in turn strengthens the democracy in the United States.”679
It should be remembered when considering this question that the US has
historically been quite willing to do business with nasty Colombian rulers, notable
examples being authoritarian presidents Laureano Gómez and Julio César Turbay Ayala,
and military dictator General Rojas Pinilla. Furthermore, presidents who have contributed
to the growth of Colombian democracy, such as César Augusto Gaviria, have not always
been looked upon favourably by the US. Simply put, the state of Colombian democracy
has never really mattered to American officials so long as its leaders co-operated with the
United States. Does this historical trend persist? We can judge whether or not the United
States under President Bush has truly sought to promote democracy by employing our
democracy promotion metric.
There is certainly some evidence that the Bush administration has tried to promote
genuinely free and fair elections in Colombia. The US government has funded OAS
election observation missions in Colombia, with the State Department and USAID
meeting the vast majority of the 2002 OAS mission’s costs ($578,100 of a total budget of
$600,000). 680 The United States has also supported Colombian political parties and
NGOs. For instance, in 2005, the National Endowment for Democracy awarded $86,367
to Bogotá’s Foundation of the Press Freedom (FLIP), to help the group “maintain its alert
network for the protection of journalists, informing national journalists, civil society, and
the international community of incidents of attacks against journalists.” In 2005 and 2006
NED provided a total of $159,801 to the League of Displaced Women, to “promote
participation of displaced women in the department of Bolívar in municipal government.”
NED has also contributed funds to support the programmes of the National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs, which provides training to seven Colombian political
678 John Walters, “Colombia faces challenges to governance, shows progress,” Miami Herald, 19 January
2007.
679 Peter Pace, “Joint Press Statement with CJCF General Peter Pace,” 23 January 2007,
<http://bogota.usembassy.gov/wwwsgeneralpace.shtml>
680 OAS, “Report of the Electoral Observation Mission in the Republic of Colombia - 2002,”
<http://www.oas.org/consejo/docs/cp11823E04.doc>
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parties from across the political spectrum, including the left-wing Polo Democrático.681
The State Department has also highlighted fraudulent practices in Colombian elections,
noting in its 2002 human rights report that “the National Electoral Commission
invalidated 17,000 votes based on evidence of fraud, annulling the victories of five
Senators-elect.” 682 Intimidatory practices have likewise been acknowledged by US
officials. However, the US government has been guilty at times of not treating
Colombia’s elections on their merits. Thus, the State Department in 2006 described
Colombia’s elections as “generally free and fair,” while acknowledging there had been “a
concerted campaign by the FARC and the AUC to disrupt or manipulate the outcome.”683
Given the evidence outlined above, this seems a rather misleading description.
Overall, then, the Bush administration scores rather well when it comes to
promoting free and fair elections in Colombia. However, the administration has failed the
next test, that it should oppose any practices that undermine the legitimacy of a state’s
political institutions. The administration has displayed a stubborn determination to
downplay the “para-politics” scandal, notwithstanding the fact that the revelations about
paramilitary infiltration of the Colombian Congress call into question its very legitimacy.
As noted above, the Bush administration has even tried to turn the scandal into a success
story for the government of Álvaro Uribe. However, as Garry Leech has commented, the
ties subsisting between politicians and paramilitaries did not come to light because of the
president’s policies, but grew out of the mountain of sensational information found on the
computer of AUC leader Rodrigo Tovar Pupo. This computer “was not delivered to
authorities as part of the demobilization process; it was discovered in the possession of
Tovar’s right-hand man when he was arrested in early 2006.”684 Even if the Colombian
government had been the driving force behind these disclosures, the Bush administration
should still have expressed some concern about the level of criminal influence in
681 NED, “Grants: Latin America and the Caribbean Program 2006,”
<http://www.ned.org/grants/06programs/grants-lac06.html>; NED, “Grants: Latin America and the
Caribbean Program 2005,”<http://www.ned.org/grants/05programs/grants-lac05.html>; NDI, “Latin
America and the Caribbean: Colombia,” <http://www.ndi.org/worldwide/lac/colombia/colombia_pf.asp>
682 US State Department, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002: Colombia.”
683 US State Department, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006: Colombia.”
684 Garry Leech, “The Best-Laid Plans of Presidents and War Criminals: The Unintended Outcome of
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Colombia’s political system, if it were genuinely concerned about that country’s
democracy.
Is there evidence that the Bush administration has sought to promote human rights
in Colombia? State Department officials would certainly have us believe that this is so.
“Human rights concerns have been a central element in U.S. policy toward Colombia,”
declared Otto Reich in congressional testimony,685 and there is some persuasive evidence
to buttress this claim. For instance, USAID funds “an individual protection program for
human rights workers, defenders, and community and social leaders” which “has
benefited 4,745 at-risk persons.”686 USAID also contributes to human rights by funding
the Colombian Office of the National Ombudsman’s Early Warning System. By the end
of 2006 the Early Warning System had “issued 54 risk assessments and 20 alerts that
helped prevent or mitigate human rights violations by providing local civilian and
military authorities with recommendations to take preventive actions.”687 The US has also
funded initiatives aimed at helping Colombia’s more than three million internally
displaced persons. USAID has spent $33 million since 2001 “to support the Government
of Colombia’s efforts to provide social and economic development opportunities” to
IDPs, including the provision of basic health services to a million IDPs and educational
opportunities for 180,000 displaced children.688 Furthermore, the US helps Colombians to
put political rights like freedom of speech into practice by aiding groups like FLIP and
the League of Displaced Women.
The Bush administration’s attitude towards human rights in Colombia, despite the
positive contributions just described, is full of ambiguities. Thus, although the US spends
millions of dollars aiding IDPs, it also carries out policies that aggravate the displacement
crisis. The Plan Colombia aid package included $15 million for the estimated 30,000
peasants “who would inevitably be displaced as a direct result of the militarization of
685 Reich, “U.S. Assistance to Colombia and the Andean Region.”
686 USAID Colombia, “Democratic Governance,”
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Colombia’s southern regions.”689 In other words, the US government knew its policies
would lead to more displacement. The US has also been accused of exacerbating the
problem by funding coca spraying. Opponents of fumigation argue that the herbicide
used, known as “Roundup,” kills not just coca plants but other crops as well, and causes
illness among humans and animals. While the US government denies the link, “the
Roundup label for home garden use calls the chemical a hazard to humans and
animals.” 690 The Colombian human rights body CODHES recorded almost 30,000
persons displaced as a consequence of fumigation in 2003 alone.691
The Bush administration has also been condemned by human rights organisations
for failing to enforce the human rights clauses attached to US aid to Colombia. The
release of 30 percent of military aid to Colombia is dependent on a certification from the
US secretary of state that Colombia is meeting certain human rights standards, including
the severance of links between the military and paramilitary groups. 692 Were this
consistently enforced, it would serve as evidence that the US is genuinely attempting to
further democracy in Colombia. However, and despite countless reports of extrajudicial
killings by the Colombian military and continued military-paramilitary links, the State
Department has repeatedly approved Colombia for this aid, including in April 2007, a
ruling that came just weeks after the Los Angeles Times published a story alleging that
the head of the Colombian army, Mario Montoya, had coordinated a military assault on
Medellín in 2002 with the AUC. In response, Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy froze the
$US55 million in aid that had been approved by Secretary of State Rice, insisting that the
State Department explain on what basis it had certified Colombia. The Bush
administration has also placed the goal of free trade above human rights in Colombia.
Despite the perils facing many Colombian unionists, the US government has made
ratification of the US-Colombia FTA one of its main policy objectives.
689 Stokes, America’s Other War, p. 94; Center for International Policy, “The Contents of the Colombia Aid
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The attitude of the Bush administration as regards democracy promotion in
Colombia is therefore somewhat contradictory. As we have seen, there is clearly evidence
that the US does genuinely seek to promote free and free elections there. Its stance on
human rights is unclear, as there is evidence pointing both ways. The US does not pass
the other tests of democracy promotion: its military assistance to Colombia is technically
dependent on democratic performance, but this stipulation has been ignored in practice,
and the administration has failed to take a hard line on the issue of paramilitary-
congressional ties. The last test of democracy promotion – that a state should endeavour
to remove a dictatorial government – is not relevant in this case. In conclusion, we can
say that while furthering democracy takes its place among the goals of US policy in
Colombia it is nonetheless less significant than the “war on drugs” or the objective of
crushing the FARC-EP, which is seen, with justification, as a murderous terrorist
organisation that should be wiped out. Promoting democracy is a second-rung objective.
Democracy Promotion under Bush: The Overall Record
President Bush has repeatedly underscored the commitment of the United States
to promoting democracy abroad, but a brief overview of his record points to a more
ambiguous story. Take, for instance, the example of US policy towards Colombia’s
eastern neighbour, Venezuela, whose left-wing nationalist president, Hugo Chávez, has
become the Bush administration’s most vocal critic, earning Washington’s enmity in the
process. In April 2002 Chávez, who had been twice elected in contests considered
legitimate by observers, was briefly ousted in a coup orchestrated by senior Venezuelan
military figures, business leaders and the country’s largest trade union federation. The
man installed as Chávez’s replacement, Pedro Carmona Estanga, quickly dissolved the
National Assembly and the Supreme Court, abolished the constitution, and sacked elected
mayors and governors. Notwithstanding the undemocratic means used to oust Chávez,
“The Bush administration worked hard to legitimise the Carmona government.”693 Along
with El Salvador, the US was the sole state in the Americas to recognise Carmona, and
693 William M. LeoGrande, “A Poverty of Imagination: George W. Bush’s Policy in Latin America,”
Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 39, no. 2 (May 2007), p. 372.
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Assistant Secretary of State Otto Reich on the day of the coup “invited ambassadors from
Latin America and the Caribbean to his office to inform them that the departure of
Chávez was not a departure from democratic rule, since he had resigned” (italics in
original) and thus only had himself to blame. 694 White House Press Secretary Ari
Fleischer told journalists that Chávez had “provoked the crisis,” while the military had
simply responded to “the message of the Venezuelan people.”695 The administration was
forced to backtrack when Chávez was restored to office the day after the coup.696
The support of the US government for the removal of Chávez in April 2002 was
to be expected, given the assistance the US had provided to Venezuelan organisations
working to oust the Venezuelan president. In the year leading up to the coup the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED) “quadrupled its assistance to various groups that
opposed the Chávez administration,” while “opposition leaders were repeatedly received
at the U.S. embassy, where they sought support for overthrowing the Chávez government
in the months preceding the coup.” US officials were apparently not unreceptive to these
plans.697 The CIA had information on an impending coup attempt the week before it
occurred, but the US government decided against informing the Venezuelan authorities.
The NED and USAID continued to contribute to Venezuelan efforts to replace Chávez
following the events of April 2002, including “financial contributions to various anti-
Chávez organizations in their failed effort to remove Chávez through a recall referendum
in August 2004.”698
The Middle East has been pinpointed by President Bush as the focus of America’s
“generational commitment to the advance of freedom,” but there are certainly grounds for
doubting that democracy promotion has been a goal of the US in this region. The Bush
administration has continued providing Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian regime in Egypt
with billions of dollars in aid. Mubarak’s regime is most assuredly not committed to
freedom: an emergency law has been in place in ever since he became president,
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opposition politicians are regularly arrested, and torture by the security forces is
commonplace. The ultra-reactionary regime in Saudi Arabia remains one of the United
States’ closest allies in the Middle East. This is a state where those “convicted of murder,
drug trafficking, rape and armed robbery can be executed with a sword and in public as a
deterrent.” People who commit less serious crimes are also treated very harshly, as was
the case with 20 foreigners who were sentenced to “receive lashes and spend several
months in prison for attending a party where alcoholic drinks were served and men and
women danced.”699 Less sensationally, civil servants in the kingdom “are banned from
saying anything in public that conflicts with official policy.” As for women, they “are
still deprived of simple rights, such as the right to drive or to travel without a male
guardian’s permission.”700 Moving outside the Middle East, the administration has seen
fit to ignore the undemocratic nature of the Pakistani regime led by General Pervez
Musharraf, who is considered a crucial ally in the “war on terror.” Following the
September 11 terrorist attacks, the US terminated the sanctions President Clinton had
imposed after Musharraf’s coup and nuclear tests, and began providing billions of dollars
in aid, more than US$10 billion since 2001, in return for Musharraf’s help in fighting al-
Qaeda.
Still, some scholars have commended President Bush for his Middle Eastern
democracy promotion agenda, although they remain critical of certain aspects of his
administration’s policies. Writing in 2006, Jennifer Windsor asserted that “The Bush
administration deserves credit for elevating freedom in its rhetoric and especially for its
commitment to reform in the Middle East, an important and courageous departure from
past policy.” However, she described democracy promotion as “now under siege,”
especially after the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas won legislative elections in the
Palestinian territories in 2006. Windsor called on the US “to move beyond bold rhetoric
and more systematically utilize and integrate the full range of tools and tactics at its
disposal: sanctions, incentives, trade linkages, democracy-building programs, exchanges,
and multilateral and bilateral diplomacy.” 701 Amy Hawthorne has discerned three
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194
“strands” of democracy promotion under Bush: “aggressive calls for democracy in
certain “unfriendly” regimes,” US support for civil society groups, and “modest
diplomatic engagement.” US policies towards Iraq and the Palestinians constituted strong
examples of the first “strand,” she argues, although promoting democracy “is not the
primary motivation for either policy.” She emphasised, however, that “United States
policymakers remain deeply ambivalent about whether calling for democratic change is
truly in America’s interest now.”702
While President Bush has certainly embraced Middle Eastern freedom
rhetorically, the close relations Washington continues to enjoy with the likes of Saudi
Arabia call into question the president’s claimed eagerness to advance Middle Eastern
democracy. Furthermore, the Bush administration has displayed a willingness to embrace
Middle Eastern leaders who have overseen and emerged victorious in flawed elections,
presumably because they co-operate with American foreign policy. The US has
commended Algeria, an ally in the “war on terror” which has received US military aid,
on its democratic progress. A White House press release issued following the April 2004
Algerian presidential elections, which the incumbent Abdelaziz Bouteflika won with 85
percent of the vote, stated that “the President congratulates President Bouteflika on his re-
election. These elections represent another step on the road toward democracy in
Algeria.”703 However, the legitimacy of this contest was called into question by the
withdrawal of “the most established Algerian pro-democratic party,” which “called for a
boycott of the election,” and the Constitutional Court’s decision to exclude Taleb
Ibrahimi, the leader of the Islamist Wafa movement, from the ballot, “because the size of
his potential electoral base worried the regime.” In addition, the election was almost
certainly marred by fraud.704 Washington’s upbeat attitude towards Algeria’s elections
stood in sharp contrast to its response to those that unfolded in the occupied Palestinian
Territories in 2006. These legislative elections were won by Hamas, considered a terrorist
group by the US, which promptly cut off aid and refused to deal with the victors, even
though their triumph was seen as legitimate and reflective of the preference of voters.
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(January 2003), pp. 22-4.
703 Quoted in Frédéric Volpi, “Algeria’s Pseudo-democratic Politics: Lessons for Democratization in the
Middle East,” Democratization, vol. 13, no. 3 (June 2006), p. 453 n.3.
704 Volpi, “Algeria’s Pseudo-democratic Politics,” pp. 447-8.
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While this short section on the Bush administration’s broader policy on
democracy promotion clearly cannot be considered comprehensive, it nonetheless
suggests that democracy promotion should not be looked upon as the primary goal of
present US foreign policy. It should also be borne in mind in this context that while
declaring that it seeks the expansion of freedom and democracy abroad, the Bush
administration has itself been guilty of failing to uphold the democratic norms and values
of the United States. As Thomas Carothers has commented, by torturing prisoners
captured in its “war on terror,” holding detainees for years without charge at Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba, and eavesdropping illegally on the telephone calls of American citizens, the
administration has inflicted “blow after self-inflicted blow against America’s democratic
principles and standards.”705 In so doing, the United States has lost a great deal of
credibility as an advocate of global human rights and democracy, for a government that
exhibits such disdain for its own laws and democratic traditions can hardly be taken
seriously when it upbraids other nations for their perceived shortcomings.
705 Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion.”
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6. Conclusion
Answers can now be given to the two questions addressed in this study. The first
of these concerned the results of America’s efforts to promote democracy abroad. Has the
United States had success in this respect, or have its pro-democracy campaigns been
failures? Second, how much of a role does democracy promotion really play in United
States foreign policy? Is it truly a major policy objective, as American presidents and
foreign policy officials would have us believe, or do they actually consider it to be of
little significance, especially relative to other foreign policy goals? Having provided
answers to these questions I will move on to a discussion of the implications of the thesis
for international relations theory. I will finish by offering some policy recommendations
and ideas for future research.
From Reagan to George W. Bush: An Unimpressive Record
The evidence from the three case studies points to the conclusion that America’s
recent record on democracy promotion has not been impressive. Overall, the pro-
democracy campaigns of the United States examined in this study achieved little that was
positive and in some respects served to seriously harm the prospects for democracy in the
target country. The most catastrophic outcome occurred in Nicaragua, where tens of
thousands were killed and injured as a result of the war waged against the government by
the contras, the rebels organised, funded, and directed by the United States. It is simply
illogical to suggest that the Reagan administration promoted democracy in Nicaragua
when it bears responsibility for the deaths of thousands of innocents. There were other,
less sensational, ways in which the US undermined Nicaraguan democracy. The
exigencies of fighting the war forced the Nicaraguan government to spend increasingly
large parts of its budget on defence, money which had previously been used to fund
successful socio-economic programs. The Sandinistas’ problems were compounded by
the economic war waged by the US, which included contra and CIA attacks on
Nicaragua’s infrastructure, causing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of damage,
bringing international lending to the Sandinistas to a shuddering halt, and implementing
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an economic embargo. All of this had a very negative effect on Nicaraguan democracy,
for citizens’ lives became less secure and the struggle for survival took precedence over
participation in political life.
While there is little doubt that the policies of the United States in the 1980s had a
distinctly negative impact on democracy in Nicaragua, the picture is more opaque when it
comes to the Clinton administration’s dealings with Haiti. In some respects, and certainly
in the early part of Clinton’s administration, the US made a decidedly positive
contribution to Haitian democracy. Haitians had Clinton to thank for the demise of the
very brutal military dictatorship of General Raoul Cédras, who was only persuaded to
stand down when it became inescapably clear that American military personnel were
heading to Haiti to force him and his thuggish colleagues from power. Deposed Haitian
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been elected in 1990 only to be ousted by the
military a few months later, resumed his duties on the back of this military intervention,
while the human rights situation took a marked turn for the better in the short-term. We
can say with confidence therefore that during President Clinton’s first term the US had a
fair degree of success furthering democracy in Haiti. However, by the end of the century
democracy in Haiti was looking like a fantasy. Disastrous elections were held in 1997
and 2000 and Haitian political life reached a standstill, leading the president to dissolve
the legislature in 1999 and appoint a government that ruled by decree. The human rights
situation also deteriorated markedly. While political violence was not at a comparable
level to that which prevailed throughout the Cédras years, Haitians nonetheless risked
retribution, even death, if they engaged in political activity. Furthermore, socio-economic
conditions were desperate.
Colombia is often described by United States officials as Latin America’s oldest
democracy, a claim that has little basis in fact. As we saw in the third case study,
Colombian politics has historically suffered from minority domination and more recently
the corrupting influence of cocaine barons, among other flaws. The Bush administration
has therefore had its work cut out promoting democracy in Colombia, and the country
still does not meet a number of the criteria of genuine democracy. Elections in 2002 and
2006 were notable for the pernicious influence exerted by the two left-wing guerrilla
organisations and the extreme right-wing paramilitaries. The legislatures that emerged
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from these contests were generally assumed to have been infiltrated by the paramilitaries.
As revelations of ties between the paramilitaries and Colombian politicians leaked out
from late 2006 it became apparent that Colombian politics had indeed been corrupted by
paramilitarism. Colombia does not have a legitimate Congress and it fails to meet several
of the criteria of free and fair elections. It also suffers from major human rights
shortcomings. International and Colombian non-governmental organisations believe that
there are more than 3 million internally displaced persons in Colombia, out of a
population of around forty five million. These people are divorced from society,
inhabiting slums on the edges of cities, living on rubbish dumps, barely subsisting.
Colombia is plagued by other human rights failings, such as threats and attacks on
journalists in what is one of the most dangerous nations in the world to work in the media,
and extrajudicial killings committed by members of the security forces.
The story that emerges from the three case studies should give proponents of
democracy promotion pause. In each of these high-profile pro-democracy efforts, which
consumed large quantities of taxpayer money, the United States was unable to
successfully promote democracy to any significant degree. Nicaragua was a disaster,
Haiti was heading that way as Clinton left office, while Colombia is still far from real
democracy. Moreover, the more general democracy promotion record of these presidents
is not inspiring. The flagship of the George W. Bush administration’s democracy
promotion agenda has been Iraq, which has been a catastrophe. Although American
officials could point to the removal of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and the holding of
elections as successes, these achievements are far outweighed by the chaos that has
engulfed the country since 2003. Millions of Iraqis have been forced from their homes
and now live as internally displaced persons or as refugees in other states,706 the country
is fragmenting along sectarian lines, and the government cannot provide even a modicum
of security to its citizens. Iraq is not even a functioning state, let alone a democracy. The
Reagan administration’s democracy promotion effort in El Salvador, another very
expensive and much-touted foreign policy undertaking, served to prop up a government
whose security forces killed tens of thousands of Salvadorian civilians. What the record
706 The Norwegian Refugee Council reported in April 2007 that “Some 2 million Iraqi refugees have fled
their homeland, while a further 1.9 million are displaced within the country.” “Number of people made
homeless by conflict soars,” Reuters, 16 April 2007.
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of these presidencies perhaps points to is that the US achieves most for foreign
democracy when it doesn’t become involved to any significant degree. This, however, is
an issue for further research. What this study has shown is that when the United States
becomes embroiled in long-term, military-oriented democracy advancement initiatives
the outcome is often dismal.
While the US record on furthering democracy abroad is not good, it does not
necessarily follow that American policymakers do not genuinely try to pursue this
objective. After all, US presidents repeatedly embrace the cause of democracy promotion.
What the evidence from the three case studies points to is that advancing democracy is
not a top American foreign policy priority, but a secondary goal, and sometimes not even
a goal at all. In Nicaragua, the Reagan administration’s commitment to democracy was
purely rhetorical. A great deal can be deduced from the administration’s principal means
for promoting democracy in Nicaragua, that is funding, arming and directing the contras.
Notwithstanding the pretensions of Ronald Reagan and George Shultz, who deemed the
contras freedom fighters, there is no avoiding the fact that they were terrorists who
regularly targeted farmers, teachers, health workers, hospitals and schools. The contras’
moral deficiencies were unsurprising given their pedigree as protégés of the CIA and
especially the Argentine military junta: even contra civilians admitted that some of their
Argentine handlers were “Nazis.” Although it is true that democracy can be promoted
through violent means, it is nonetheless illogical to argue that a state or a group of
insurgents is endeavouring to bring freedom to a country while at the same time
deliberately murdering civilians.
There is further reason to conclude that the Reagan administration was totally
uninterested in aiding democracy in Nicaragua. Any government honestly desirous of
seeing democratic rule in another country would offer its backing to a fair electoral
process. The elections that unfolded in Nicaragua in 1984 were generally well-received,
including by impartial observers from the United States. However, President Reagan and
other officials poured scorn on the contest, including before it had even occurred. The
administration’s opposition to democracy in Nicaragua was also evident from its
antipathy towards the Esquipulas peace agreement reached by the five Central American
presidents in 1987, the terms of which committed the Sandinistas to democratization. Had
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US policymakers been truly committed to Nicaraguan democracy, they surely would
have welcomed this peace accord, for it gave the US precisely what it claimed to want in
Nicaragua. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that a government that seeks to advance
democracy in another state would be scrupulous about upholding the laws and democratic
norms and practices of its own country. When it came to policy towards Nicaragua,
though, the Reagan administration would do almost anything to get its own way. This
included violating the Boland Amendment of December 1982, which forbade US military
support for groups seeking the overthrow of the Sandinistas, and running a secret war
from late 1984 after Congress cut off funding for the anti-Sandinista covert operation.
These were serious assaults on the democracy of the United States.
The case against the administration of President Reagan is therefore clear-cut. The
aim of US policy towards Nicaragua was straightforward: remove the Sandinistas.
Language about the need for democracy in Nicaragua was purely for public consumption.
Things become more complicated when we analyse the Clinton administration’s policy
towards Haiti, though. The United States under Clinton worked for almost two years to
effect the removal of the Haitian military junta, first through sanctions and diplomacy and
then by threatening to use force, thus passing one of the tests of a state’s commitment to
promoting democracy. Still, while the exit of General Cédras was certainly a boon for
Haiti’s democratic prospects we cannot automatically infer from this that the Clinton
administration was acting out of concern for Haitian democracy. Clinton was subjected to
considerable pressure from important political groups in the United States, especially the
Congressional Black Caucus, and it was this that finally persuaded him to stop trying to
bring about a negotiated accord between President Aristide and the junta. For a long time
US officials endeavoured to persuade Aristide to reach a compromise with General
Cédras, and they leaned on the Haitian president to agree to amnesty provisions for
human rights abusers in the belief that this would facilitate an accord. The point is that
concerns about democracy took a back seat to securing an agreement with the
dictatorship: this was the overriding priority. The US was so eager to strike a deal that it
even contemplated dumping President Aristide in late 1993 and early 1994. The Clinton
administration wanted the junta out, and they were prepared to forget their commitment
to Haitian democracy if necessary.
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After President Aristide returned to Haiti and resumed his duties the Clinton
administration proved its commitment to Haitian democracy in several ways. The United
States kept a large contingent of peacekeepers in Haiti until April 1996 and sought to
train a new police force that would eventually assume responsibility for security. The US
promoted the holding of free and fair elections in Haiti. While the administration could
certainly point to these actions as evidence of it commitment to building democracy it
also pursued other policies that seemed at variance with the goal of democracy promotion.
The Clinton administration’s avowed support for democracy in Haiti was called into
question by its attitude towards the Haitian government’s economic policies. By
demanding that President Aristide push through free market reforms, including trade
liberalization and the privatisation of state companies, in return for aid, the US was
making clear that it was more worried about what happened to its money than it was
about promoting Haitian democracy. Clinton administration officials may have had good
economic reasons for insisting on free market reforms, and it is quite understandable that
they did not wish to hand over large quantities of aid without some say on how it would
be spent. Attaching such conditions to aid ran counter to the goal of promoting
democracy, however, for it deprived the Haitian people and their government of the
power to determine economic policy. That privilege was to be left in the hands of the US
and other lenders and donors.
Notwithstanding these limitations, there is clearly some evidence to suggest that
the administration of Bill Clinton honestly wanted to further democracy in Haiti. This
leaves us with the George W. Bush administration’s policy towards Colombia, which,
like Clinton’s Haiti policy, has been rather contradictory. The US has supported electoral
observation in Haiti, funded programmes aimed at strengthening political parties and
NGOs, funded projects that assist IDPs, and contributed to other initiatives intended to
promote human rights. On the other hand, the State Department has time and again
approved Colombia for military aid, despite well-founded allegations of military-
paramilitary collaboration and extrajudicial killings by the Colombian security forces.
Perhaps the biggest failing of the Bush administration has been its unwillingness to
deplore the revelations of congressional-paramilitary ties. Indeed, the “para-politics”
scandal has been sold as a triumph for Uribe by the administration in Washington.
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Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte has remarked that “I basically see the
situation with respect to the paramilitaries in a positive way,” a remarkable statement for
a representative of an administration that purports to champion Colombian democracy.
The administration’s response to the para-politics scandal demonstrates that promoting
democracy is less important than backing President Uribe. As America’s closest Latin
American ally, Uribe has been offered steadfast support. He is seen as a vital partner in
helping the US to meet its main goals in Colombia: fighting the war on drugs, defeating
the country’s left-wing guerrillas, passing a free trade accord, and ensuring that Colombia
and its neighbours continue to export large quantities of oil to the United States.
The three case studies therefore lead us to the conclusion that the United States
over the past quarter of a century has not made democracy promotion a top policy
objective. It is a secondary concern, and at times plays no role whatever. That democracy
promotion is indeed a second-order policy goal can be seen from the overall foreign
policies of the three administrations in question. President George W. Bush, who
committed his government to “ending tyranny in our world,” nonetheless has seen fit to
retain cosy relations with some of the world’s more unpleasant regimes, notably the ultra-
reactionary Saudi royal family and the authoritarian government of Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak. In fact, this support of repressive and dictatorial Middle Eastern leaders
has been a notable feature of each of the administrations examined in this study. Saudi
Arabia was looked upon very favourably by the Reagan administration, not only due to
its vast oil reserves but because it subsidized the Nicaraguan contras when they were
facing financial meltdown. US policy in the Middle East is inextricably linked to
American energy interests, which are of far greater significance to American
policymakers than the state of democracy in the region. But it is not just the Middle East
where democracy promotion loses out to other policy objectives. President George W.
Bush’s administration backed a coup in Venezuela in 2002, while Reagan’s
administration supported the bloodthirsty regime of Rios Montt in Guatemala,
Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega and Zaire’s Mobutu, among other unsavoury
authoritarians. It is hard to take seriously the democracy promotion rhetoric of American
officials when they enjoy friendly relationships with such regimes.
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The evidence presented in this thesis has two main implications pertaining to
United States foreign policy. First, we should be wary of taking the lofty pro-democracy
rhetoric of American officials at face value. The evidence from the case-studies shows
that democracy promotion is likely to be at best a secondary American policy objective.
On occasion, the appeals to democracy made by American policymakers are meaningless,
as with Reagan’s policy towards Nicaragua. People who take an interest in the foreign
policy of the United States would therefore do well to form their own judgements on
policy issues independent of the public utterances of officials. This is particularly
important for citizens of the United States, in whose name policy is conducted, and who
have the capability, if they are informed, of affecting the course of their country’s foreign
policy. It is difficult to carry out a military operation without public support, which is one
reason democracy promotion if so often invoked as an aim of such actions. Citing
democracy promotion as an objective has the effect of shutting off debate, for there are
few who wish to be seen as anti-democracy. However, there may be very good reasons
for taking a stand against a policy described in these terms. It therefore behoves citizens
to be sceptical of their leaders’ pronouncements and to be knowledgeable about policy,
for they can then perhaps convince their leaders to change course and avoid entanglement
in needless foreign adventures.
This leads to the second implication of the study. Democracy promotion
campaigns with a strong military component tend to end in failure. Even if we conclude
that American leaders are genuine when they profess their intention of advancing
democracy abroad the fact remains that such endeavours rarely achieve their stated aims.
The examples of Clinton’s policy towards Haiti and Bush’s policy in Colombia are
particularly instructive in this regard, for democracy promotion undoubtedly played a part
in each administration’s thinking. Even in these cases, however, progress towards
democracy has been difficult. This lack of results is very significant, and ought to give
pause to the citizens of the United States and their elected representatives. Huge
quantities of money have been spent on the democracy promotion efforts considered in
this thesis, first in Nicaragua, then Haiti, then Colombia, with little to show for the
financial outlay. The American people and members of Congress might do well therefore
to reflect on whether these democracy promotion efforts are worth it. There must be other
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uses to which these billions of dollars could be put, and which have more chance of
succeeding. Another factor to consider is that using the United States military to spread
democracy carries with it the risk that American soldiers will be killed. More than three
thousand American soldiers have lost their lives in what is, purportedly at least, an
attempt to bring democracy to Iraq. Is this really a cause that American servicemen and
women should be asked to die for, especially when the hopes of success are so slim? It
may be time for a wholesale rethink of the mission of promoting democracy.
Implications of the Study for IR Theory
A basic tenet of foreign policy analysis is that “domestic politics and institutions
affect the foreign policy decisions and behavior of states.”707 The evidence from the case
studies strongly suggests that institutions do matter when it comes to making American
foreign policy, and that FPA should therefore be seen as an important analytical tool in
this field of study. This observation has important implications for the study of
international relations. Rationalist theories of IR such as structural realism assume that
the state is a unitary actor whose behaviour is governed largely by structural, or systemic,
factors, above all the international distribution of power. Structural realists contend that
states are forced to seek power to provide for their own security, and that the
accumulation of great power by one state relative to others in the international system is
likely to trigger countermeasures, with the establishment of an alliance to balance against
the strongest state a likely response. “Unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential
danger to others,” argues Kenneth Waltz, and therefore “leads others to try to balance
against it.”708 Waltz acknowledges that “States are free to disregard the imperatives of
power, but they must expect to pay a price for doing so.”709 In other words, if states do
not pay sufficient attention to the international distribution of power they could face
annihilation. It follows that for structural realists non-systemic factors are of minor use
for explaining or predicting state behaviour. However, the evidence gathered in this study
707 C. James DeLaet and James M. Scott, “Treaty-Making and Partisan Politics: Arms Control and the U.S.
Senate, 1960-2001,” Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 2, no. 2 (2006), p. 179.
708 Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” p. 28.
709 Ibid, p. 37.
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demonstrates that domestic institutions play a major role in shaping foreign policy,
calling into question structural realism’s explanatory power. We cannot explain
American foreign relations simply by looking at the international distribution of power; it
is imperative that we also employ FPA, taking into account the domestic foreign policy-
making process, including the part played by Congress and the bureaucracy. This
conclusion is of course applicable to international relations more generally.
The ability of the bureaucracy to shape policy was particularly clear in the case of
President Clinton’s policy towards Haiti, where institutions like the CIA and the
Pentagon for a long time succeeded in obstructing the president’s efforts to return exiled
Haitian leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide. CIA analysts briefed congressional Republicans
against Aristide, and in so doing exacerbated the hostility towards Clinton’s policy in
Congress. The CIA had ties to the leader of the paramilitary group FRAPH, which was
vehemently opposed to Aristide’s restoration, and which managed to prevent the
American ship the Harlan County from docking in Port-au-Prince in October 1993, thus
contributing to the collapse of the Governor’s Island peace accord promoted by the
Clinton administration. The Pentagon was equally leery of seeing Aristide back in office,
partly because such an outcome might require the deployment of US forces, whose lives
would be endangered, and also because they just didn’t like him. It was the opposition of
the Defence Department, along with congressional hostility, that caused Clinton to
procrastinate until September 1994 before finally ordering an invasion to restore Aristide.
The bureaucracy’s ability to shape foreign policy was also a feature of the Reagan
administration’s policy towards Nicaragua, where the CIA, and especially its director,
Bill Casey, provided much of the impetus for the anti-Sandinista covert campaign.
Two scholars have recently observed that, notwithstanding the increased attention
devoted to domestic influences on foreign policy in the FPA literature, “one player
receiving less attention in foreign policy analysis is the U.S. Congress.”710 The evidence
set out in this study suggests that this oversight ought to be remedied, for Congress
clearly plays a most significant part in the making of US foreign policy. This thesis builds
on the work of the likes of James Lindsay, who has shown that the legislature has
throughout American history asserted itself in foreign affairs, and continues to do so
710 Ibid, p. 179.
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today. Lindsay has observed that the historical activism of Congress in the realm of
foreign relations grew out of the constitutional powers granted to the legislature by the
Founding Fathers, notably the right to declare war and ratify treaties (a privilege
restricted to the Senate). 711 Although Cold War imperatives occasioned a period of
congressional retreat in the years after the end of World War 2, this subservience was a
historical anomaly and the “era of congressional deference came to a crashing halt” in the
1970s. 712 Since then, Congress has used its control over government spending –
“Congress’s primary tool for shaping foreign policy” - to once more exert considerable
influence over American foreign relations.713 As I will now show, the three case studies
provide powerful evidence of congressional activism in foreign affairs.
President Reagan’s choice of the contras as an instrument for bringing democracy
to Nicaragua aroused impassioned opposition in Congress, especially among Democrats,
with heated battles breaking out over the issue of contra aid. The Reagan administration
repeatedly acted with contempt for the legislature, which it viewed as a nuisance and an
obstacle to its covert war against the Sandinistas. This was apparent from CIA Director
Casey’s deception before the intelligence committees in 1981, when he claimed the
contras would act as an arms interception force, the administration’s refusal to abide by
the December 1982 Boland Amendment, which was intended to limit the covert
operation to its stated goal, arms interdiction, and Casey’s reticence before the
intelligence committees about CIA involvement in the mining of Nicaragua’s harbours in
1984. The Democrat-controlled House of Representatives repeatedly voted to bring the
covert war to an end and in October 1984 the second Boland Amendment became law,
supposedly terminating United States government support for the contras. It was this law
that led the Reagan administration to embark on its illegal secret war in Nicaragua, which
required donations from third countries, quid pro quos, and an airlift to the contras
orchestrated by the staff of the National Security Council. Following the Iran-contra
scandal Democrats in Congress succeeded in restricting United States aid to the contras
to so-called non-lethal assistance, in other words food, medicine and the like, much to the
711 James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1994), p. 13.
712 Ibid, p. 24.
713 Ibid, p. 30.
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annoyance of President Reagan, who was desperate to continue funnelling military aid to
the rebels. Congress therefore had a very significant impact on American policy in
Nicaragua while Reagan was president.
Clinton administration policy towards Haiti was likewise affected to a very
considerable degree by the United States Congress. The administration was for a long
time extremely reluctant to go through with the military option, largely because of the
open aversion of Republicans in Congress to this course of action. The intensity of
Republican hostility was so severe that Clinton was apparently warned he could be
impeached if the military operation turned out badly.714 It was only because part of
Clinton’s own base in Congress, particularly the members of the Congressional Black
Caucus, was demanding the reinstatement of Aristide that the president, who had
exhausted all other options for a resolution of the crisis by the summer of 1994,
ultimately resorted to force. When the Republicans won control of Congress in
November 1994 the president’s room for manoeuvre on Haiti became even more
restricted. Even before the Democrats’ reversal in the 1994 mid-terms Clinton had
anticipated a short stay for the majority of American troops in Haiti, due to the
tenuousness of congressional backing for Operation Uphold Democracy, but with the
Republicans in power the withdrawal became urgent. US soldiers ceased to participate in
the UN peacekeeping mission in early 1996, well over a year before the operation ended.
The Republicans shut off aid to the Haitian government at various points, curtailing
Clinton’s ability to carry out his plans for Haiti. President Clinton himself later laid some
of the blame for the failure in Haiti at the door of his Republican opponents in Congress.
If the Republicans’ victory in 1994 had major implications for Clinton’s Haiti
policy the same could be said of the Democrats’ triumph in the 2006 mid-term elections.
Up until that point President Bush had been given a fairly free hand when it came to
Colombia, as his policy was firmly backed by congressional Republicans desirous of
looking tough on the drugs issue. Yearly aid handouts in the region of $US700 million
sailed through Congress. While many congressional Democrats wanted to reduce the
714 According to the historian Taylor Branch, who interviewed Clinton, the president’s “closest friends in
the U.S. Senate advised him in person that his contemplated military intervention was…insane” and that
“with major casualties there would be talk of impeachment.” Quoted in Fatton, Haiti’s Predatory Republic,
p. 93.
208
amount of military aid going to Colombia they could do little in light of their lack of
representation. This changed after 2006, however, and in June 2007 the Democrats used
their majority in the House of Representatives to push through a 10 percent aid cut for
Colombia, including a very large $US150 million reduction in military assistance. The
Democrats’ enthusiasm for an aid cut was partly informed by the revelations of political
and paramilitary ties in Colombia that were emerging as part of the “para-politics”
scandal, disclosures that left Bush administration officials seemingly unmoved. Had the
Republicans remained in control of Congress, it is probable that the scandal would not
have affected the amount of assistance going to Colombia, but with the Democrats in
charge it provided a further incentive to diminish aid levels. It also prompted Democratic
Senator Patrick Leahy to hold up $US55 million in previously approved military aid. The
“para-politics” scandal also reinforced the Democrats’ opposition to the US-Colombia
Free Trade Agreement negotiated by the Bush administration, an accord that they also
disliked on the grounds of Colombia’s poor human rights record. The Democrats have
been able to use their congressional majority to block passage of the FTA, which would
surely have been passed had the Republicans not suffered electoral defeat in 2006. In
short, then, Congress has been a major factor in US policy towards Colombia since the
Democrats took over.
Possible Avenues for Future Research and Policy Recommendations
Two possible avenues for research suggest themselves. First, is there a
Democratic-Republican divide on the issue of United States democracy promotion? The
evidence from the three case studies examined here suggests that this may be so, with
Democrats more supportive of this objective than their Republican counterparts. The
conventional scholarly view, however, suggests that democracy promotion is a bipartisan
goal.715 A study addressing this question could be structured in a similar fashion to my
own, with the focus on a number of case studies in which the issue of democracy
promotion was a key aspect of the policy debate. Alternatively, interviews could be
conducted with serving members of the United States Congress or their staffers in order
715 See the comments of Ikenberry and Tony Smith in chapter two.
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to determine their views on democracy promotion. The latter approach could produce
some very misleading data, however, for there is every reason to believe that those
questioned would not give entirely honest answers. After all, the overwhelming majority
of politicians do not want to be seen as anti-democracy. Case studies would therefore be
preferable.
Second, is there more chance of democracy developing in a foreign country if the
United States is relatively uninvolved? As the case studies showed, the US can be very
heavy-handed when it comes to promoting democracy, dispatching soldiers, demanding
economic reforms, insisting on certain policies. This overbearing approach, however, has
often failed to produce the desired outcomes. The example of the Reagan administration,
where democratic openings occurred in the likes of South Korea and Chile, among other
nations, despite only minor American contributions, suggests that a low-key approach
may be more effective. A study that compared democratization in states where the US
role was rather limited with instances where the US was heavily involved could therefore
prove very instructive.
It is not my intention to provide an exhaustive list of policy ideas. However, there
are two suggestions that I would like to make. First, United States policymakers should
be candid about their foreign policy aims. This may sound quixotic, but there is surely no
point preaching the virtues of democracy while at the same time providing billions of
dollars in aid to authoritarian states like Egypt and Pakistan. The blatant contradictions
inherent in such policies engender scepticism about America’s motives even in cases
where democracy promotion is a genuine policy objective. It would therefore behove
American officials either to tone down the high-sounding rhetoric about democracy
promotion or to stop propping up nasty dictators. Perhaps the best course of action would
be to do both. I do not, however, anticipate any change in the discourse that accompanies
US foreign policy. Democracy promotion sounds like a worthy objective, and has proved
very useful for drumming up public support for foreign policy. No doubt it will continue
to be invoked in the future.
Second, if United States policymakers are really serious about promoting
democracy abroad, they should think twice about taking the military route to this end. In
each of the cases dealt with in this thesis the US relied heavily on military means,
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whether this entailed supporting rebels attacking Nicaragua, sending American troops to
occupy Haiti, or funnelling billions of dollars to Colombia’s security forces. In each case
the results were not good. This is to be expected, for two reasons. First, there is only so
much that can be achieved by force. Direct military action by the United States may be
enough to dislodge dictators like Raoul Cédras or Saddam Hussein, but there is no
guarantee that democracy will flower in the aftermath. Second, making foreign military
forces America’s principal partners in democracy promotion is singularly risky, maybe
even illogical, for there is a very strong possibility that by aiding another state’s armed
forces the US will be buttressing an institution that is a byword for human rights abuses,
hardly a sure-fire way of promoting democracy. Furthermore, sending American soldiers
to promote democracy implies that they could lose their lives in a probably vain attempt
to bring democracy to another country, itself a goal of debatable merit.
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